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Summary 
The need for a regional framework for information security in e-Government for the East African 
Community (EAC) has become more urgent with the signing in 2009 of the EAC Common 
Market Protocol. This protocol will entail more electronic interactions amongst government 
agencies in the EAC partner states which are Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda. 
 
Government to Government (G2G) transactions are the backbone of e-Government transactions. 
If a government wants to provide comprehensive services that are easy to use by citizens, 
employees or businesses, it needs to be able to combine information or services that are provided 
by different government agencies or departments. Furthermore, the governments must ensure that 
the services provided are secure so that citizens trust that an electronic transaction is as good as or 
better than a manual one. Thus governments in the EAC must address information security in 
ways that take into consideration that these governments have limited resources and skills to use 
for e-Government initiatives.  
 
The novel contribution of this study is an information security framework dubbed the TOG 
framework, comprising of technical, operational, governance, process and maturity models to 
address information security requirements for G2G transactions in the EAC. The framework 
makes reference to standards that can be adopted by the EAC while taking into consideration 
contextual factors which are resource, legislative and cultural constraints. The process model uses 
what is termed a ‘Plug and Play’ approach which provides the resource poor countries with a 
means of addressing information security that can be implemented as and when resources allow 
but eventually leading to a comprehensive framework. Thus government agencies can start 
implementation based on the operational and technical guidelines while waiting for governance 
structures to be put in place, or can specifically address governance requirements where they 
already exist. Conversely, governments using the same framework can take into consideration 
existing technologies and operations while putting governance structures in place.  
 
As a proof of concept, the proposed framework is applied to a case study of a G2G transaction in 
Tanzania. The framework is evaluated against critical success factors.
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Chapter 1 Introduction and Background 
1.1 Introduction 
This chapter introduces the major concepts that will be referred to throughout this thesis, 
which are e-Government and Information Security. A background of the East African 
Community (EAC) which is the contextual setting to this study is outlined, together with a 
statement of the problem to be resolved. This chapter also lists the general and specific 
objectives of the study and the methodology used.  The layout of the entire thesis is presented 
at the end of the chapter. 
 
For purposes of this thesis, e-Government is defined as the use of information and 
communication technologies to enable efficient and cost effective processes in government 
that lead to the provision of citizen centric services through channels such as the Internet and 
mobile phones. The kind of transactions that take place within e-Government can be 
categorized as follows: 
• Government to Citizen (G2C) services in which a citizen usually initiates a transaction by 
requesting a service such as applying for a driver’s license, or requesting information 
through a web based portal or SMS service. A government may also publish information 
and electronic forms that citizens need on a website. 
• Government to Business (G2B) in which governments interact with businesses, for 
example for tax filing. The interaction is usually through a portal. 
• Government to Employee (G2E): The Government as an employer provides electronic 
services to employees through an intranet. Examples are online leave processing and 
performance appraisals. 
• Government to Government (G2G): These are transactions between one government 
agency and another (within a country or across countries). These transactions may be as a 
result of a G2C or a G2B service request or simply a requirement between two agencies. 
Government agencies may give each other access to their information systems or publish 
web services that can be accessed by authorized users.  
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The concept of e-Government has been greatly enabled by advances in Internet related 
technologies and has been pushed by the need of Governments to provide efficient, effective, 
affordable and quick services to citizens. The need for increased accountability and 
transparency is another factor that has led to attempts by governments to move towards e-
Government (United Nations, 2008). While many developing countries are making steady 
progress in terms of building infrastructure and providing access to digital information and 
services to their citizens (United Nations, 2010), it is important that measures to ensure the 
security of that information are taken as part of any e-Government initiative. Addressing 
Information Security is one of the critical success factors of e-Government implementations 
given that governments handle large amounts of confidential information (President's Office, 
2009; United Nations, 2008; Conklin, 2007). 
 
Information Security is defined in the Computer Science and Communications Dictionary 
(Weik, 2001) as the protection of information against unauthorized disclosure, transfer, 
modification, or destruction, whether accidental or intentional. Information security 
management is an area that has been addressed through guidelines and standards from 
various organizations (NIST, 2006; ISO/IEC, 2005b; OECD, 2002). Technical, operational 
and management perspectives on information security have been presented in standards and 
guidelines. These guidelines have been put into practical use in many countries and are 
largely based on achieving the security goals of Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability 
(CIA). Furthermore, Accountability is now becoming another important principle as 
electronic transactions need to be traceable and parties held accountable for their actions. 
However, information security depends on the context in which it is being applied and the 
addressing of information security starts with a risk assessment and an understanding of the 
particular context in which security is being addressed (Hayat, Reeve, & Boutle, 2007; 
Siponen & Willison, 2009). 
 
This study specifically looks at information security for G2G transactions.  A G2G 
transaction for the purpose of this study is defined as: 
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The sharing of information resources and services between government agencies in a 
restricted network setting with the ultimate aim of providing comprehensive, easy to 
access services to citizens. 
The role of G2G transactions in e-Government is illustrated in Figure 1-1. 
 
Citizen
Business
E-Government
G
2
G
Employee
Citizen
Government Intranet
Public Portal for 
Citizens
Restricted Portal for 
Suppliers
Email
 
Figure 1-1 G2G in e-Government 
 
Figure 1-1 illustrates that a transaction between a citizen, employee or business through a 
portal or intranet is likely to trigger collaboration amongst two or more government agencies. 
Thus for a government to provide efficient G2B, G2C or G2E services, a robust G2G 
backbone must be in place.  
 
Consider, for example, the case of a citizen applying for a driver’s license online. This 
request may result in a cross check of information with the government agency that deals 
with identification of citizens, with the government agency that deals with traffic or road 
safety and with an agency that deals with the establishment of the age of the citizen.  While 
the citizen may be required to register their request at one point, the details need to be sent 
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electronically to all the agencies involved, the information retrieved from the agencies 
collated and used to trigger a response to the request. The inter-agency collaboration that will 
result from the citizen request, which is the G2G transaction, needs to meet the security goals 
of Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability and Accountability. In other words, the individual 
information security requirements of each agency should be preserved in the joint 
collaboration. This is a challenge considering that each agency may have different security 
policies and different technological platforms on which data is stored. Furthermore, other 
security risks to G2G collaboration may arise as a result of the context in which the 
transaction is taking place. 
A typical G2G transaction can be viewed as in figure 1-2 below.  
 
Figure 1-2 G2G Transaction 
 
Figure 1-2 illustrates that a G2G transaction may be between two agencies in the same 
country or across borders. The challenges that need to be addressed in proposing an 
information security framework for such transactions include: 
• Differences in the organizational policies in each agency. 
• Differences in Hardware, Database and Software platforms in the agencies. 
• For transactions going across countries, legal environments may differ, and regional laws 
do not necessarily exist. 
• Laws and policies may change or new laws may arise. This should not affect the 
applicability of the proposed framework. 
Agency 1 
Policies 
Services 
Hardware 
Software & 
Databases 
Agency 2 
Policies 
Services 
Hardware 
Software & 
Databases 
Agency 3 
Policies 
Services 
Hardware 
Software & 
Databases 
Country A Legal Environment Country B Legal Environment 
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• The approaches to handling information security may vary due to resource limitations in 
the individual agencies, and organizational priorities within that agency. 
• Each government agency is a potential provider and a consumer of services; in both cases 
they must be ready for secure collaborations. 
The framework proposed must also take into consideration the contextual issues. The risks 
identified for a G2G transaction between government agencies in Switzerland for example, 
will be different from those in Tanzania because of different cultural (Chaula, Yngstrom, & 
Kowalski, 2006), infrastructural, resource and policy environments (Ezz & Themistocleous, 
2005). 
 
This study uses three countries in East Africa to determine what issues need to be addressed 
so as to come up with a robust information security framework that can be applied 
successfully in the East African Community. 
1.2  Background 
The East African Community (EAC), as at the beginning of 2010, comprised of a block of 
five countries namely, Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda. The positioning of 
these countries within Africa is shown in the map in Figure 1-3. 
 
The EAC has undertaken various e-Government initiatives in recent years, introducing e-
Government strategy documents both at country and regional level and various legislations to 
enable e-transactions. Furthermore, projects towards delivery of services and citizen 
participation have been undertaken or are in progress in Rwanda (Ndahiro, 2009) and 
Uganda (De Jager & Van Reijswoud, 2007). Details of these e-Government initiatives are 
presented in chapter five of this thesis. 
 
The use of e-Government promises a wealth of benefits for the countries in the EAC if 
implemented successfully. The countries of the EAC, namely, Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, 
Tanzania and Uganda, are all ranked in the bottom 50 countries in the world in terms of e-
readiness out of 175 countries surveyed (United Nations, 2010). While there are few citizens 
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with access to personal computers (PCs) in the EAC, there is a proliferation of mobile phones 
which allow citizens’ access to electronic services (Hellström, 2010). 
Uganda
Tanzania
Kenya
Burundi
Rwanda
 
Figure 1-3 Map of the East African Community 
 
In 2009, the governments of the EAC countries signed a common market protocol that is 
aimed at promoting free movement of labor, capital, goods and services; and harmonization 
of taxation (EAC, 2009). A successful implementation of the protocol will involve 
collaboration of government agencies in each country of the EAC and amongst the five 
partner countries.  
 
The focus on e-Government implementations in the EAC needs to be not only on improved 
service delivery, but also on the underlying structures that will enable governments to offer 
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value added services to citizens. According to the UN e-Government Survey of 2008 (United 
Nations, 2008), where earlier emphasis of e-Government was mostly on developing e-
services, the focus has shifted towards building and managing integrated and coordinated 
government services. The report also states that ICT-based connected governance efforts are 
aimed at improving cooperation between government agencies, allowing for enhanced active 
and effective consultation and engagement with citizens. The cooperation would involve 
multiple stakeholders regionally and internationally. In the UN e-Government Survey of 
2010 (United Nations, 2010) e-readiness rankings for Tanzania and Rwanda improved since 
2008, while the rankings for Uganda and Kenya declined. Burundi maintained the same 
ranking. The UN survey report does acknowledge that security is a major factor that hinders 
countries from providing more online services as the threat of fraud and identity theft is 
great. 
 
Several studies have looked at the challenges of implementing e-Government and have 
identified the need to address technical, social and organizational factors which include the 
values, perceptions and key stakeholders in e-Government implementations. The studies by 
Heeks (2002); Chango (2007); and Schuppan (2009) which were carried out in the African 
context all recommend that the specific contextual issues be studied rather than adopting, 
without modification, solutions that have been applied in other regions of the world. In the 
specific EAC context, studies have been done mostly from an organizational management 
perspective and from the point of view of G2C transactions (Bakari, Tarimo, Yngstrom, & 
Magnusson, 2005; Karokola & Yngstrom, 2009).  The need for a study that specifically looks 
at G2G transactions in the EAC is presented in the next section. 
1.3  Motivation of the Study 
This thesis focuses on Information Security for G2G transactions in the EAC context. The 
need to study the EAC is motivated by the EAC Mission Statement which is to “widen and 
deepen Economic, Political, Social and Culture integration in order to improve the quality of 
life of the people of East Africa through increased competitiveness, value added production, 
trade and investments” to be achieved through the implementation of e-Government as one 
of the strategies (East African Community, 2006). 
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The focus on G2G in particular is motivated by the potential role that G2G can play in the 
successful utilization of e-Government services, and more importantly the role that e-
Government can have in the development of economy. The need for a developmental focus 
in ICT research in Africa is presented in a study by Thompson & Walsham (2010), who 
argue that without appropriate and sufficient research in the African context, it is difficult to 
apply ICT solutions to African contextual issues. 
The specific focus on information security for G2G transactions is motivated by the influence 
of information security on the success of G2G and e-government implementations. A study 
by Ezz & Themistocleous (2005) presents ten barriers to the adoption of G2G as shown in 
figure 1-4. 
Legislative & 
Regulatory Resource BarriersSecurity CoordinationCultural
Information & 
Knowledge 
interchange
Organizational 
structuresLegacy SystemsTechnical Obstacles
Resistance to 
change
Barriers to G2G Adoption
 
Figure 1-4 Barriers of G2G Adoption - (Ezz & Themistocleous, 2005) 
These ten barriers would apply generally regardless of the context. However, in order to 
overcome barriers, it is necessary to study the context in which G2G is being applied. While 
security is presented as one of the barriers, all the other barriers have a bearing on robust 
information security management. The need for a specific perspective or context in 
information security is guided by studies cited in section 1.2 above, and other studies 
including Kayworth & Whitten (2010), and Loser et.al (2011) which have concluded that a 
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socio-technical approach is necessary for holistic addressing of information security. Thus 
while generic technical solutions may be applicable to information security problems, the 
social issues have to be addressed in the context in which the problem exists and therefore 
the solution is to be applied. 
One of the areas to be explored is the contextual governance situation as represented by the 
legal & regulatory barrier. Governance is one of the major drivers of a successful e-
Government implementation (Rose & Grant, 2010; OASIS, 2010a)and there is a need to 
propose a structured governance approach to information security that is applicable at a 
regional level.  
Another area is to recognize and take into consideration the resource constraints, represented 
by the resource barrier in Figure 1-4. The resources include both financial and human 
resource skills related to ICT and e-government. The resource constraints in the EAC will be 
different from those in developed countries. Impediments to the use of ICTs and the growth 
of e-Government in African countries are discussed by Rezaian (2007)and Chen et al (2006) 
as including unreliable power sources, lack of government co-ordination, dependence on 
donor funding, and lack of adequate human resource skills. In a G2G setting, such 
impediments would be faced by government agencies and addressing these specific 
contextual issues would address barriers including cultural, organizational structures, and 
coordination. 
The technical barriers identified in Figure 1-4 including technical obstacles, legacy systems, 
information and knowledge interchange can be overcome by applying generic technical 
mechanisms that will lead to technical interoperability that is needed to overcome these 
barriers in a G2G transactions. However there is still a need to explore the appropriate 
technical mechanisms for information security in the EAC given the resource constraints in 
this context. 
Galpin (2008) suggests that in answer to African contextual issues with regards to application 
of ICTs, research from elsewhere in the world may be a starting point to understand how to 
effect change, but it must be noted that local, cultural and societal explanatory factors differ 
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from country to country. Solutions must, therefore, be assessed as to whether they are 
appropriate before they are applied. There is a need to ensure that sustainable solutions are 
found such as the use of open technical standards and to link these solutions to specific 
information security requirements.  
The solution developed in this study can be extended or generalized for use in countries or 
regions that face similar contextual issues as in the EAC. Part III of this thesis presents the 
contextual issues in the EAC and points out the differences with other regions of the world. 
The framework developed in this study, and presented in part IV of this thesis, then 
specifically considers those contextual issues found in the EAC environment. 
1.4 Problem Statement 
As the EAC moves towards greater co-operation in various spheres such as common markets, 
common currencies and free labor movement, electronic transactions will become more 
pervasive and cross-border in their nature.  Information security is a critical success factor in 
e-Government implementations, and particularly in G2G transactions. It needs to be 
addressed in the context of the transactions being secured, but there are no national or 
regional information security frameworks that have been adopted in the EAC. An 
Information Security Framework for G2G transactions is therefore necessary to ensure the 
take up of electronic transactions and successful implementations in resource-poor 
environments such as the EAC. 
1.5 Objectives of the Study 
1.5.1 General Objective 
The general objective of this study is to add to the body of information security and e-
Government knowledge by proposing an Information Security framework for G2G 
transactions in the context of the EAC. The information security framework shall be such 
that is can be generalized to apply in a setting with similar context to the EAC. 
1.5.2 Specific Objectives 
i. To define information security requirements in the EAC context for G2G 
transactions. 
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ii. To propose a framework that addresses the requirements identified. 
iii. To evaluate the proposed framework. 
1.5.3 Research Questions 
i. What are the information security requirements for G2G transactions in the EAC 
context? 
ii. What are the factors in the EAC that need to be addressed in an information security 
framework for G2G transactions? 
iii. How can a sustainable information security framework for G2G transactions be 
achieved in the EAC context? 
1.6 Research Methodology 
1.6.1  Research Approach and Design 
The overall approach followed in this study was largely an interpretive approach, with 
induction being used to draw conclusions. The reason for using this approach was the need to 
understand the context of the study and the researcher being part of the study process in order 
to fully answer the research questions. This approach is opposed to the deductive approach 
whereby given the dearth of readily available data in the EAC on e-government and 
information security – sufficient sample data for a quantitative analysis would not have been 
possible. The use of the interpretive approach in computer science and information systems 
research has been discussed by Bernsten, Sampson & Osterlie (2005) and de Villiers (2005). 
 
Multiple methods were used to address the different facets of the research problem. The first 
method used is Appreciative Inquiry. Wirtenberg, Russell & Lipsky (2008) investigate the 
Appreciative Inquiry method as a tool towards developing sustainable processes. This 
method lends itself well to addressing this study’s third research question, which is how 
sustainable framework for G2G transactions can be developed for the EAC context. 
However, in order to reduce bias that may result from using purely qualitative data, some 
quantitative data was employed for triangulation. This quantitative data was obtained through 
using a questionnaire survey as the method for eliciting the required information from 
Government Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs). Furthermore, since this study 
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specifically addresses the EAC context, a case study from the EAC context was used as a 
‘proof of concept’ of the information security framework that was developed. 
 
Appreciative Inquiry is described by Olivier (2004), as starting with a discovery phase which 
is an appreciation of what already exists. Thus an exploration of research and practical 
implementations of information security in e-Government and particularly G2G was done as 
is presented in the next part of the thesis. The current EAC situation was also explored with 
regards to what e-Government initiatives and / or enabling structures are currently in place. 
The discovery phase is followed by the dream phase, which is what could it be. Then comes 
the design phase when models for improvement are developed and lastly the implementation 
phase. 
 
In the discovery phase, investigation was undertaken to discover what research has been 
carried out on information security of G2G, what other countries have put in place in terms 
of information security for e-government, and what international standards exist. The 
discovery phase was also extended to investigate what the existing situation in the EAC is, 
with emphasis on the positive factors that can enable secure G2G transactions. For discovery 
in the EAC, a survey was carried out to obtain data on the information security practices in 
transactions among MDAs in three countries of the EAC, which are, Rwanda, Tanzania and 
Uganda, through the use of questionnaires. 
 
The outputs of what was discovered were used in the Dream Phase to come up with a list of 
requirements of secure G2G transactions in the EAC. These requirements were the input for 
the Design phase, in which an information security framework for G2G in the EAC was 
developed. The framework developed comprises of five models which are a technical model; 
an operational model; a governance model; a process model; and a maturity model. In the 
Implementation Phase, the framework was applied to a case study of G2G transactions in the 
EAC. In keeping with appreciative inquiry approach – the focus was on a positive core, such 
that the framework can be implemented regardless of the factors that may not be enabling in 
the current EAC situation. The research approach and design is as illustrated in Fig 1-5 
below. 
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Figure 1-5 Research Approach & Design 
 
The research approach and resultant methods were chosen on the basis of four factors 
which are: 
i. Feasibility: The author of the thesis being a government employee in one of the 
countries studied and involved in e-Government projects has ample access to the 
necessary resources to carry out the discovery process and case study. 
ii. Appropriateness: This study’s main objective is to develop a framework that is 
applicable in the EAC context. While the framework may include a technical aspect, 
non-technical aspects shall be researched using the interpretive approach with 
appreciative inquiry. In addition, the lack of readily available data in the EAC region 
was another factor that influenced the choice of an interpretive approach. 
iii. Validity, reliability and trustworthiness: To reduce subjectivity that may be 
introduced by using an interpretive approach, empirical data obtained from a survey 
is used to triangulate findings. 
iv. Robust: The approach is likely to produce novel and significant results which are an 
information security framework for G2G transactions in the EAC context, which can 
be generalized for use in countries/ regions with similar contextual issues. 
15 
 
 
1.6.2 Evaluation of Research findings 
The framework, which represents the novel findings of this thesis, was evaluated at the end 
of the study using Critical Success Factors (Bergeron & Bégin, 1989). The framework, 
presented in chapter eight of this thesis, is a unified framework consisting of five models. 
These models are a technical model, an operational model, a governance model, a process 
model and a maturity model. The critical success factors used to evaluate the framework are 
taken from one of the EAC country e-government strategy documents, and from the ISO – 
ISMS standard for information security management. It was found that the TOG framework 
addresses each of the Critical Success Factors. The extent to which the framework addresses 
the critical success factors is presented in detail in chapter ten of this thesis. 
1.6.3 Research Scope and Limitations 
The study was carried out in three countries of the EAC and investigated e-Government with 
a focus on G2G interactions. When the study started, the EAC comprised of 5 countries, 
namely Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda. By the time this thesis was being 
completed, one additional country had been admitted into the EAC, which is South Sudan. 
Due to time limitations, and logistical difficulties in obtaining information, only three 
countries of the EAC were studied in detail, namely Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda. At the 
time that information was being sought for this study from the various government agencies, 
Kenya was suffering from the after effects of post-election violence in early 2008, and 
Burundi was also experiencing upheavals that made it difficult to obtain information from 
government offices. At the same time, South Sudan had not yet come into existence as a 
country. 
 
The information security framework proposed in this study includes both technical and non-
technical (socio) mechanisms to address information security. The framework was evaluated 
using Critical Success Factors – which are well suited to a socio-technical framework. These 
are, however, not in themselves sufficient to evaluate the novel technical mechanism, which 
is Governance and Attribute Based Access Control (GABAC) for G2G transactions, 
proposed as part of the technical model of the framework. This is a limitation of the study 
and could be a basis for future work in the area of securing G2G transactions. 
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1.7 Significance of the Study 
In section 1.3, a motivation of this study has been discussed. The findings of this study that 
are presented in part IV of the thesis open up new areas in the fields of information security 
and e-Government by:  
i. Providing a new framework applicable to the EAC, that is a framework for 
information security in G2G transactions in the EAC context. The EAC context is 
investigated in detail in Part III of the thesis. 
ii. Providing a process where none exists specifically that is a sustainable 
implementation process for the framework in the EAC context. 
These contributions add to the field of information security by adding knowledge on 
contextual issues that face the EAC and how these can be addressed. The contributions also 
have a practical value of providing governments that face similar contextual issues to the 
EAC with a starting point for implementation of an information security framework for 
electronic G2G transactions which are becoming an inevitable part of government service 
delivery. 
1.8 Layout of Thesis 
This thesis is comprised of five parts. Part I contains the introduction and background to the 
thesis and consists of one chapter. This chapter describes the major concepts that are used in 
this study and introduces the background, problem statement and objectives of the study and 
the methodology used to conduct the study. It also includes a layout of the chapters in the 
thesis. 
 
Part II is presents a literature study and background research, and starts off the discovery 
phase of our appreciative inquiry. Part II comprises of chapters two, three and four. Chapter 
two discusses relevant research in the fields of information security in e-Government. 
Chapter three examines examples of existing policy level information security and e-
Government infrastructure in countries outside of EAC, while chapter four presents 
internationally accepted standards for information security that are applicable to G2G 
transactions. The motivation for Part II is to discover what proven solutions exist and identify 
how they can be reused to answer the research questions. Such reuse would result in reduced 
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costs in terms of cultivating the necessary skills and in terms of financial resources where 
open, non-proprietary solutions exist. This approach also contributes to answering the 
research question on how to achieve a sustainable framework. By looking at research from 
East Africa in chapter two, pointers towards the contextual differences between the EAC and 
other parts of the world are identified. 
 
Part III, consisting of chapters five and six, is a situational analysis of e-Government 
initiatives and practices in East Africa from an Information Security perspective. Chapter 
five presents current e-Government practices and initiatives, while chapter six presents the 
findings of a survey on actual practices in government and in MDAs. Three countries were 
surveyed, which are Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda. Part III concludes the Discovery phase 
of the study. 
 
Part IV presents the major contributions of this study. It comprises of four chapters, namely 
chapter seven which represents the Dream Phase and details the information security 
requirements, and the components of a sustainable framework. At the end of chapter seven, 
the first research question has been answered. Chapter Eight presents the detailed framework 
while in chapter nine, a case study in which the framework is applied to a real-life G2G 
transaction is presented. Chapter nine thus presents the implementation phase of the study. In 
chapter ten, an evaluation of the framework using critical success factors is presented. At the 
end of part IV, all three research questions have been answered. In chapter ten, the 
framework is evaluated using Critical Success Factors. Thus all the three research questions 
are answered by the end of Part IV. 
 
Part V, which consists of chapter ten, concludes the thesis and looks at further work. The 
thesis is structured as shown in Figure 1-6. 
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Figure 1-6 Layout of Thesis 
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1.9 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented the background to the study, the problem statement, research 
objectives and methodology used in order to come up with the original research findings 
which are an extensible framework for information security in G2G transactions and a cost-
effective and sustainable implementation process for the framework in the context of the 
EAC. 
 
The assurance that an information system is secure is a challenge to any information system 
regardless of the nature of the transactions in that system. However, in meeting the challenge 
of addressing information security, solutions must take into consideration the context in 
which the proposed solution is to apply. The methodology proposed for this study is designed 
to address each of the research questions and ultimately meet the general objective of this 
thesis, which is to add to the body of knowledge in information security by proposing an 
information security framework for G2G transactions that takes the EAC context into 
consideration. 
 
The framework proposed in this thesis is applied to a case study of a G2G transaction in one 
of the countries of the EAC. The framework is then evaluated using critical success factors 
drawn from international and national standards and policy documents.  
 
In the next part of the thesis, a study of literature that is related to this study is presented. The 
purpose of the literature review is to establish what information security standards, 
frameworks or academic research is available and how this literature relates to the research 
questions. The findings of this part will be combined with the EAC contextual issues 
addressed in part III of the thesis and will contribute to the design of the information security 
framework for G2G transactions in the EAC. 
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PART II: LITERATURE STUDY AND BACKGROUND RESEARCH  
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Chapter 2 Research Related to Information Security in e-Government 
2.1 Introduction 
In this section of the thesis, which is the first part of the discovery stage of the appreciative 
inquiry, an exploration of research related to the research questions is done. The research 
questions are: What are the information security requirements for G2G transactions in the 
EAC? What are the factors to be addressed in an information security framework for G2G 
transactions in the EAC? and How can a sustainable information security framework for 
G2G transactions be achieved in the EAC context? 
The three research questions focus on three areas which are information security 
requirements for G2G; the EAC context; and sustainable information security frameworks. 
The related research presented in this chapter is therefore presented along the focus areas of 
the research questions in three categories. These are information security requirements for e-
Government in general and G2G in particular. The next category is research in the EAC 
context. For the EAC context, additional research was carried out during this study to obtain 
sufficient background information to answer the research questions. The findings are 
presented in chapter five of this thesis. The last category presented in this chapter addresses 
research related to sustainable frameworks. 
2.2 Information Security Requirements for e-Government. 
This section discusses research that has been published on information security requirements 
for e-Government and for technical mechanisms that may be used to meet these. The focus 
areas of the studies presented in this section are general security requirements, access control 
and security management. 
2.2.1 Security Requirements 
The security requirements for e-Government implementations are discussed by Zissis and 
Lekkas (2011) in five broad categories which are Availability, Confidentiality, Integrity, 
Authenticity, and Accountability. Durbeck, Schillinger and Kolter (2007) study a particular 
e-government project, which is the Access e-Gov project, and list four security requirements. 
They further discuss how the requirements can be addressed as follows: 
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• Communication Security comprising of message integrity, user authentication and 
confidentiality: Encryption and Digital Signatures using international standards are 
proposed to meet this requirement.  
• Privacy: The authors identify a need to protect users’ data so the citizens can trust the 
architecture and propose the use of a special purpose language to define privacy 
requirements.  
• Trust: that can be met by authentication of network components amongst themselves.  
• Access Control: Attribute Based Access Control is suggested to provide a flexible 
dynamic infrastructure that suits loosely coupled SOA. 
Trust is also identified as a security requirement for e-Government transactions in 
Kaliontzoglou, Karantjias, & Polemi (2008). Their findings indicate that in order for an e-
Government service to succeed in its business goals, it should be secure in all aspects so that 
all the entities involved trust it. Thus an e-Government service should make use of security 
services and mechanisms supported by the environment or the architecture where it is 
deployed. The conclusion can be related to the second research question of this study which 
seeks to find out the contextual characteristics in the EAC which would affect the 
implementation of an information security framework. 
 
In a G2G transaction, the government agency providing a service has to address the security 
issues related to the service provision. The security services in electronic transactions are 
tackled by He & Antón (2009) through the specification of access control policies. Two 
major challenges of access control systems are identified, namely: defining correct and 
complete policies to control users’ access to the system and its resources; and ensuring the 
resulting policies comply with the system requirements and high-level security/privacy 
policies.  However these challenges were, to an extent, resolved in a study by Hu, Quirolgico, 
& Scarfone (2008) who present a method of Access Control policy composition using 
Semantic Web technology that leverages the pervasive capability of semantic content and the 
fluency of machine understandable knowledge for the management of federated resources. 
Beimel and Peleg (2011) introduce an improved method of Access Control policy 
composition which underpins access control with ontologies through the application of the 
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Web Ontology Language (OWL) and the Semantic Web Rule Language (SWRL). In these 
three studies, the electronic transactions are achieved through web services. 
 
Many e-Government implementations are achieved through Service Oriented Architectures 
(SOA) with Web Services (Chunnian, Yiyun, & Qin, 2011), (Scholl & Pardo, 2010), (Simon, 
Laszlo, Goldschmidt, Kondorosi, & Risztics, 2010). This is because e-Government 
implementations involve transactions across heterogeneous systems. Web Service System 
security is investigated by Gutiérrez, Rosado, & Fernández-Medina (2009) who look at the 
use of security patterns and a standards-based approach to design a secure web service 
system. They use the case of a Bank Transfer system and conclude that security is a crucial 
aspect, if WS-based systems are to be the ‘de facto’ solution for inter- and intra-integrating 
heterogeneous systems. For this to become a reality, a software engineering-based, security 
engineering-centred global approach must be defined. This approach should provide 
developers with all the activities, tasks, tools, security artefacts and organizational structures 
necessary to design a secure WS-based solution. The idea of combining organizational 
structures with technical mechanisms to help design secure systems is an interesting point 
that can be applied to the EAC.  
 
Still in the sphere of web services and service oriented architectures, O’Brien, Merson & 
Bass (2007) recognised that security is a major concern for Service Oriented Architectures 
(SOA) and Web services and suggested characteristics of SOA that need special attention as 
they directly impact on security. These issues include the presence of metadata in messages, 
services provided by third-party organizations, enforcement of access restrictions based on 
the identity of a user, and the use of public directories to find services. The authors cite the 
use of web service security standards to resolve some of these issues. The benefits of SOA/ 
Web services which are also applicable in security are Technical neutrality, Reusability and 
Formal contracts between end points (Sprott & Wilkes, 2004). 
 
ISO 27002 requires legal and regulatory aspects to be taken into consideration when 
incorporating security requirements in the design of systems. To this end, Gerber and von 
Solms (2008) state that the escalating magnitude of national and international laws and 
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regulations has caused organisations to become increasingly aware of the importance of legal 
compliance and the obligations that arise from it. A process and a model are presented by the 
authors, which, when implemented, will lead to the specification of legal aspects that satisfy 
the ISO 27002 controls. Similarly, Guarda & Zannone (2009) state the legal requirements 
should be incorporated into software engineering for e-Government transactions by following 
existing laws and more especially those related to privacy and data protection. A practical 
implementation of how legal requirements can be incorporated in software system 
engineering is demonstrated in a study by Islam, Mouratidis & Jurjens (2011) in a framework 
that allows developers to elicit requirements from legislation, and track that these 
requirements are addressed through the system development. 
 
The studies presented above present both information security requirements and mechanisms 
to meet those requirements. The mechanisms proposed include technical and non-technical 
requirements including legislation, and appropriate organizational structures. These 
requirements and mechanisms are summarised in Table 2-1, in the order of their discussion 
in this section. 
 
From a technical perspective, G2G transactions are implemented through machine to 
machine interactions, thus the studies cited in the table above focus on access control as a 
requirement and web services as a mechanism for technical solutions for information security 
in e-government. A further exploration of studies on access control is presented in the next 
sub-section. The other discovery is legal compliance as a security requirement in e-
government and the use of standards as a mechanism for implementing security. Access 
Control is investigated further in section 2.2.2., while legislation is discussed further in the 
investigation of the EAC context that is presented in chapter five. 
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Table 2-1 Focus of Studies on Information Security 
Study Requirements Mechanisms for meeting 
requirements 
Zissis & Lekkas (2011) Availability, Confidentiality, 
Integrity, Authenticity, and 
Accountability 
Cloud Computing Architecture and 
Cryptography 
Durbeck, Schillinger and 
Kolter (2007) 
Authentication, integrity, 
confidentiality Privacy; Trust; 
Access Control 
Encryption and Digital Signatures 
using international standards; 
Special purpose language; 
Attribute Based Access Control  
Kaliontzoglou, 
Karantjias, & Polemi 
(2008) 
Authentication; Integrity; 
Privacy and Confidentiality; Non 
repudiation; Availability; Trust; 
Need to consider implementation 
context 
Encryption;  Standards; Addressing 
of contextual issues such as lack of 
skilled staff 
He & Antón (2009) Access Control Access Control Policies 
Hu, Quirolgico, & 
Scarfone (2008) 
Access control rules that manage 
dynamic trust relations amongst 
federated parties 
Semantic Web 
Beimel & Peleg (2011) Access Control Policies OWL and SWRL 
Gutiérrez, Rosado, & 
Fernández-Medina 
(2009) 
Mutual Authentication; Integrity;  
Confidentiality 
Secure Web Services; Organizational 
structures; standards 
O’Brien, Merson & Bass 
(2007) 
Confidentiality; Authenticity; 
Availability; Integrity 
Web Service Security Standards 
Sprott and Wilkes (2004) Technical neutrality; Reusability; 
Formal Contracts 
Service Oriented Architectures; Web 
Services. These are discussed further 
in Chunnian et.al (2011); Scholl & 
Pardo (2010) and Simon et.al (2010) 
Gerber and von Solms 
(2008) 
Legal Compliance Intellectual Property rights; 
Legislation; Contractual Obligations; 
International Treaties; Standards 
Guarda & Zannone 
(2009) 
Privacy; Legal Compliance Privacy aware access control 
mechanisms; policies and legislation. 
Incorporation of legislation into 
system engineering process is 
discussed by Islam et.al (2011) 
 
2.2.2 Access Control 
In implementing G2G transactions through SOA and web services, a crucial security service 
is access control. A description of web services and their relation to access control is given 
by Shen & Hong (2006) as follows: 
 “A web service is a web-based loosely coupled application that can be published, located 
and invoked across the internet. Web services technology enables organizations to exploit 
software as a service. Services are accessed by method invocations. Method interfaces are 
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described and published and may be freely available. In web service environments, 
access control is required to cross the borders of security domains, to be implemented 
between heterogeneous systems. Interaction is between remotely located parties who may 
know little about each other.” 
Three access control models that can be applied in G2G transactions are: 
• Role Based Access Control (RBAC) 
RBAC uses roles as a basis for access control decisions and was designed specifically with 
enterprise organization structures in mind. RBAC allows the specification of security roles 
that map naturally to an organization’s authorization structures (Bertino, 2003). However, 
RBAC does not entirely suit web service transactions and its weakness in open environments 
was identified by De Capitani di Vimercati and Samarati (2005). Several studies have 
subsequently been done to extend the RBAC model in order to address some of the 
weaknesses (Demchenko, Gommans, & de Laat, 2007). 
• Attribute Based Access Control (ABAC)  
In recent years, there has been a shift to looking at attributes as a basis for access control in a 
web services environment (Coetzee & Eloff, 2007). Attributes describe the characteristics of 
the requester, and may be a combination of identity and role. Attributes may be subject 
attributes, resource attributes or environment attributes. The ABAC model comprises of an 
Attribute Authority, Policy Enforcement Point, Policy Decision Point and Policy Authority.It 
has been recognized that there is still a need for the usage of semantics and/ or ontologies to 
ensure correct access control decisions with the ABAC model, and some research to that 
effect has been done (Warner, Atluri, Mukkamala, & Vaidya, 2007). 
• Governance Based Access Control (GBAC) 
The idea as presented by the Centre for Governance Institute – CGI (Centre for Governance 
Institute, 2005) is that transactions in which information is shared must be governed by the 
relevant legislation to which the organizations sharing the information are accountable. Thus 
any request for information is checked against the existing laws or regulations before it is 
granted. The argument presented by CGI is that traditional access control models such as 
RBAC, or any identity or rule based access control assumes that subjects are compliant with 
a single authority. This makes such models insufficient for the needs of e-Government 
transactions as information in such transactions is shared across not only organisational but 
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also jurisdictional borders. CGI defines GBAC as a method of classifying and accessing 
information asset holdings by directly linking them back to the specific legal measures that 
mandate their collection, dissemination, protection and disposition. 
 
An analysis of the access control mechanisms leads to another discovery that regardless of 
the access control method used, where transactions are taking place across different security 
domains, it is necessary to ensure semantic interoperability so that credentials that are used in 
authorisation and access control decisions are interpreted in the same way by all parties 
involved in the transaction (Jeong & Han, 2006). In order to make correct access control 
decisions in transactions where attributes are passed from one security domain to another, the 
interpretation of the meaning of the security attributes needs to be consistent across the 
domains. One way to ensure this is through the use of domain specific ontologies. The use of 
ontologies in web services has been promoted by the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), 
which has recommended the Web Ontology Language (OWL) as a general ontology for the 
semantic web (W3C, 2009). OWL is based on the Resource Description Framework (RDF) 
schema, which was an earlier specification from W3C. The ontology serves the purpose of 
clearly defining terms that are used in a transaction and enables a semantic evaluation of 
terms to determine similar meaning. For Web Service transactions, domain specific 
ontologies based on OWL or RDF have been proposed including ontologies for e-
Government transactions (Domingue, Gutierrez, Cabral, Rowlatt, Davies, & Galizia, 2004). 
Ontologies can also be used to model other contextual information such as identified risks, 
legal requirements and operational controls.  
 
Analysis of ABAC, RBAC, and GBAC in G2G transactions 
The three access control mechanisms described above, each has its limitations when applied 
to G2G transactions. For Role Based Access Control, the organizational structures of two 
government organizations may be very different. What is an appropriate role in one 
organization, and therefore defines the access levels for a process or user may be defined 
differently in another organisation. If these two organisations collaborate in a G2G 
transaction, then there needs to be a definition of roles that hold across G2G transaction. For 
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Attribute Based Access Control, the challenge is being cognizant of issues such as legal 
compliance which is a requirement that was presented in some of the studies that were 
analysed in section 2.2.1. If it were possible to combine Governance Based Access Control 
and Attribute Based Access Control, it is likely that a more suitable Access Control model 
for G2G interactions would be formed. This possibility is investigated in the Design phase of 
this thesis where an access control model called the Governance and Attribute Based Access 
Control Model is proposed. This is presented in chapter eight of this thesis. 
2.2.3 Security Management 
In section 2.2.1 some of the requirements and mechanisms were non-technical ones, tending 
towards governance or management issues including legislation and organizational 
structures. In this sub section, an investigation of studies on security management studies 
relevant to G2G transactions is presented. 
 
The effect of national culture on online transactions is investigated by Seidenspinner & 
Theuner (2007) who look at three countries which are Germany, Egypt and China, and 
conclude that national culture affects the way that transactions are carried out. A proposition 
that national culture may have an impact on e-Government security effectiveness in developing 
countries is made by Alfawaz, May, & Mohanak (2007). They look at the effect of legislation 
on security and privacy and states that many developing countries have yet to consider adopting 
adequate legislation related to information security management, laws that criminalize cyber-
attacks and enable police to adequately investigate and prosecute such activities. In addition, 
many do not have privacy or network security laws or regulations which could be used to take 
action against the misuse of ICT resources.  Zarei & Ghapanchi (2008), however, argue that e-
Government development should not wait until reaching full security levels. They state that 
providing fully functional security for all the e-Government programs is impractical. Other 
security heuristic principles stated include the need for a security development and management 
plan, and application of security standards by a team with sufficient experience. The 
recommendations of the study by Zarei & Ghapanchi are to an extent validated by a study 
conducted in South Africa by Dagada, Eloff and Venter (2009) who conclude that while 
legislation that deals with information security exists, it is not used in organizational policies. It 
will therefore be necessary in the framework being proposed to address how organizations in the 
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EAC can consistently map their policies on existing and new legislation while taking into 
consideration international standards that are applicable. At the same time, the framework should 
remain implementable regardless of whether legislation is currently in place and should not 
require all security measurements to be in place at once. 
2.3 Research in the EAC context 
As previously presented in chapter one of this thesis, the ICT and e-Government service 
deployment in the EAC is the low according to the UN Survey on e-readiness conducted in 
2010 (United Nations, 2010). The countries of the EAC, namely, Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, 
Tanzania and Uganda, are all ranked in the bottom 50 countries in the world in terms of e-
readiness out of 175 countries surveyed. This may explain why so few studies related to e-
Government and/or information security have been carried out in the EAC context. In one of 
these, (Hellsten, 2010), an argument is presented that the technical infrastructure in the EAC 
is sufficient to provide e-Government services, however implementation approach towards e-
Government has to be reviewed. Details of current initiatives in the EAC and in each of the 
three countries surveyed are presented in chapter five of this thesis. The rest of this section 
presents studies on e-Government and on Information security that address the EAC context. 
2.3.1 Studies on e-Government in the EAC 
Kaaya (2003) who bases her research on Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda in the EAC states that 
a four stage development model is used in e-Government strategies which are: 
• Stage 1: Web sites are established to provide information about government functions 
and services 
• Stage 2: Downloadable forms that can be completed and submitted offline are made 
available on the web site; email interaction between government officials and users may 
also be supported  
• Stage 3: Web sites begin to support some formal online transactions such as payments or 
creating and submitting information online such as renewing driving license and filing 
tax returns 
• Stage 4: Comprehensive and sophisticated government portals are developed to provide a 
wide range of information to users coupled with reliable security/privacy/confidentiality 
provisions. 
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The study makes two conclusions that are relevant, namely, the countries of the EAC are at 
stage 2 in terms of e-government services offered, and the common cultural and economic 
similarities of countries in the EAC are a basis for common approaches to e-Government. 
According to the UN e-Government survey of 2010 (United Nations, 2010), stages 1 and 2 
have been achieved in all East African countries, and in some cases stage 3 has been 
accomplished. The challenge remains the provision of a wide range of secure services as 
required by stage 4. 
 
Rwangoga and Baryayetunga (2007) propose the following measurable objectives for e-
Government projects in a study based in Uganda:  
i. Improved service delivery and the quality and speed of government’s interaction with 
citizens and businesses as well as among government entities. 
ii. Improved responsiveness to customer needs by using new modes of contact to 
provide public sector information and services. 
iii. Increased government transparency by increasing the availability of information and 
accessibility to services. 
iv. Saved time and money by improving efficiency in government processing, in part 
through use of common technology standards, policies and a federated architecture, 
as well as contributing to financial reform within the public sector. 
v. Creation of positive, spin-off effects in society through the promotion of ICT skills 
development within government, businesses and households. 
Of the above objectives, objective (iv) is of particular interest in terms of use of common 
technology standards, policies and a federated architecture that would enhance security in e-
Government transactions. 
 
The role of political will and human resources skills as factors that lead to successful e-
Government initiatives is examined by Mwangi (2006) in the case of Rwanda. Additionally, 
Saidam (2007) states that lessons learnt from international experience should be applied. The 
roles of political will, resources and organizational culture in the EAC community efforts 
towards e-government are discussed by Hellsten (2010) who argues that the basic technical 
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infrastructure for e-Government in the EAC is in place, but what are needed are changes to 
implementation approaches that consider the leadership culture. 
 
This study looks in detail at the EAC in part III of this thesis, but prior to that presents what 
has been done in some countries outside of the EAC with regards to information security 
management at national level. This is presented in chapter three of this thesis. 
2.3.2 Studies on Information Security in the EAC 
In Tanzania, a study of information security in higher institutions of learning (Bakari, 
Tarimo, Yngstrom, & Magnusson, 2005) led to two key conclusions, namely, the necessity of 
adequate planning at national and organizational level for a successful information strategy; 
and the need for developing countries to transform traditional information security policies 
into relevant policies to cater for digital information security. These conclusions give some 
insight on a possible way to approach the design of a sustainable information security 
framework and further motivate this study since a framework for e-Government security 
would not only ease planning at a national and organizational level, but also guide the 
drafting of relevant security policies.  
 
The need for regulations to underpin Information Security is discussed by Tarimo, Yngstrom, 
& Kowalski (2005) who recognize the contexts in developing countries as significantly 
different from those in developed countries, including the slow pace of government 
initiatives. Tarimo et.al conclude that instead of waiting for government intervention, 
organizations deploying ICT can put forward their own initiatives to make sure that their 
systems follow standards that make provision for security, interconnectivity and 
interoperability with other ICTs in the country and beyond. This conclusion is supported by 
Zarei & Ghapanchi (2008) who state that a top-down approach to information security might 
not work for a developing country, since governments are slow in implementing the 
necessary governance structure, while a bottom- up approach may be constrained by lack of 
guidelines. 
 
Karokola & Yngstrom (2009) investigated Tanzanian government institutions’ requirements 
with regards to information security and suggested a score of the priority areas. Technical 
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security issues together with awareness are ranked most important. Their findings also 
highlight the need for strong access control mechanisms. Non-technical aspects including 
managerial, operational and economic factors are also considered priority areas. The findings 
show that legal and regulatory requirements are not high on the list of priorities. This could 
be explained by the fact that there are currently not many laws in Tanzania that address 
information security. 
 
These studies leave some gaps that need to be filled in to address specific G2G requirements. 
There is a need to establish what kind of transactions take place and what are the mechanisms 
in place for security. This is done as part of this study and presented in chapter five. 
 
2.4  Studies on Information Security Frameworks 
The third research question of this thesis seeks to propose a sustainable framework for 
information security. A comprehensive information security framework in an organizational 
setting is proposed by Da Viega (2008) as comprising of six components which are: 
Leadership and Governance; Security Management and Organization, Security Programme 
Management; Security Policies; User Security Management; and Technology Protection and 
Operations. This framework leaves out some important aspects such as interoperability 
between the government agencies that are participating in a G2G transaction. A study by Lee, 
Yee & Cheung (2009), that is limited to data interoperability, does provide some insights into 
building an information security framework. These insights include the use of open standards 
such as XML, and the use of maturity levels to track progress in implementation of the 
framework. 
 
In the next chapter, a discussion of examples of national level implementations of 
information security frameworks is presented before moving on to investigate the EAC 
situation in detail. 
2.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, studies related to information security in e-government have been presented. 
The studies reviewed show that there are technical solutions that address environments in 
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which G2G transactions can be implemented such as use of web services and Service 
Oriented Architectures. For e-Government transactions, security requirements have been 
identified including authentication, integrity, trust, privacy, and access control. Several 
mechanisms for addressing access control have been found in the studies that were reviewed 
and a summary of the possible access control mechanisms that can be used in e-Government 
have been presented. 
 
However, information security cannot be addressed solely by using technical mechanisms. 
Thus studies that address the management of information security have also been presented. 
The studies discussed in this chapter were chosen because they all stem from a developing 
country context albeit outside of the EAC. These studies help to point out some contextual 
issues that would be common across countries that may have limited resources and are just 
starting to put in place enabling legislation for information security practices in government.  
 
Studies from the EAC are presented both from an e-Government and an information security 
perspective. These studies mostly focus on the management of information security rather 
than introducing new technical mechanisms for the addressing of information security 
requirements.  These studies also give light on the EAC context and the possible need for 
governments not to attempt to follow a strictly top down or bottom up approach to addressing 
information security but to be able to do what they can with limited resources. The 
information from the research studies in the EAC is combined with the findings of this study 
presented in chapter five and used to establish the specific contextual factors that need to be 
addressed in an information security framework for G2G transactions in the EAC. 
 
Finally, studies on information security frameworks are presented, and the main discovery 
from these is that there is a need to address interoperability as well as to use maturity levels 
to track progress in implementation of frameworks.  All the discoveries in this chapter are 
summarized in chapter seven, in the build up to answering the research questions 
 
This thesis attempts to combine both the technical and management perspective in one 
framework to enable implementing organizations or governments to have one reference 
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framework from which information security for G2G transactions can be addressed 
holistically. The next chapter looks at country implementations of frameworks that relate to 
the research questions of this study. 
 
.  
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Chapter 3 Examples of Policy Level Information Security Frameworks 
3.1 Introduction 
A G2G transaction has been defined in chapter one as “the sharing of information resources 
and services between government agencies in a restricted network setting with the ultimate 
aim of providing comprehensive, easy to access services to citizens”. G2G transactions may 
take place within a country or across country borders. In section 2.4 published research on 
information security frameworks was presented. However, this study aims at an information 
security framework that can be applied practically in the EAC. Thus in this chapter, examples 
of national policy infrastructure for achieving information security in e-Government are 
examined. These frameworks promote collaboration amongst government agencies within 
the country. Three categories of policy infrastructure are presented, which are, Information 
Security Frameworks, Interoperability Frameworks and Enterprise Architectures.  
 
Interoperability Frameworks and Enterprise Architectures are addressed together with 
National Information Security Frameworks because they aim at achieving seamless flow of 
information across diverse entities, which may have different technology platforms and 
different policies. They thus have a bearing on information security in G2G transactions. For 
G2G transactions where ultimately information may need to be composed and provided to a 
citizen, regardless of the source of the information, it is important that the security objective 
of availability is achieved. Interoperability Frameworks and Enterprise Architectures are a 
way to ensure that information stored on different platforms is available in a convenient 
manner when needed. Two examples of national implementations are given in each of the 
categories.  
 
The countries chosen for the examples in this chapter are the United States, Australia 
(Tasmania), United Kingdom, Spain and South Africa. The first four countries are ranked in 
the top ten in the 2010 UN e-Government development index (United Nations, 2010) and are 
taken to be representative of countries with good practices that the EAC can learn from. 
South Africa is included in the examples presented because it is ranked among the top ten in 
Africa in the same survey. 
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3.2 Information Security Frameworks 
National Information Security Frameworks provide a holistic approach to information 
security covering both physical and logical security of government information assets. 
National frameworks usually consist of policies and practices. Policies provide general, 
overarching guidance on matters affecting security while practices document methods and 
minimum compliance activities as appropriate to ensure that policy objectives are met. The 
two frameworks presented are discussed from the point of view of their relevance to G2G 
transactions. These two frameworks were chosen because they were the most comprehensive 
documents found through an online search on national information security frameworks. 
3.2.1 Her Majesty’s Government (HMG) Security Policy Framework 
The HMG Security Policy Framework (Cabinet Office UK, 2008) that is used by the United 
Kingdom government was developed with the recognition that protective security is an 
essential element towards making government work more efficiently. Protective Security is 
defined to include physical, personnel and information security. Security risks must be 
managed effectively, collectively and proportionately, to achieve a secure and confident 
working environment.  Seven policy statements in the framework cover the following areas: 
• Governance, Risk Management and Compliance (GRC): Sets out the roles and 
responsibilities of central government, departments and agencies, and states that where 
statutory requirements and international obligations exist, they must be complied with. 
Risk assessment is required at departmental level. 
• Protective Marking and Asset Control: In relation to marking of information assets, 
departments and agencies are required to apply the government protective marking 
system which is aligned with the ISO 27001 standard. 
• Personnel Security:  This principle is designed to provide a level of assurance as to the 
trustworthiness, integrity and reliability of all HMG employees, contractors and 
temporary staff. 
• Information Security and Assurance: This principle states that departments and agencies 
must have an information security policy that addresses both operational and technical 
issues. 
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• Physical Security: Physical security involves the appropriate layout and design of 
facilities, combined with suitable security measures, to prevent unauthorized access and 
protection of HMG assets – people, information, materials and infrastructure. This means 
putting in place, or building into design, measures that prevent, deter, delay and detect, 
attempted or actual unauthorized access, acts of damage and/or violence, and triggers an 
appropriate response.  
• Counter – Terrorism: Departments and Agencies are responsible for reducing risk from 
terrorist attacks to as low a level as is reasonably practical.  
• Business Continuity: Departments should aim to continue their critical business activities 
following a disruption and effective recovery afterwards (return to ‘normal’). It is an 
essential aspect of securing their business. 
 
The above framework is a very comprehensive framework that deals with various aspects of 
information security in government. The discoveries within this framework that directly 
relate to the research questions of the study include Governance, Risk and Compliance 
(GRC), protective marking, information security and business continuity. The framework 
relates to the UK context, based on the government structures and legislation where 
applicable. There is a need to do the same for EAC, but using a format that is context-
specific. Clear identification of actors and their roles, and how the mapping of the outputs of 
one role to another can be achieved, would contribute to a sustainable information security 
framework.  
 
3.2.2 Tasmania Government Information Security Framework 
The Government of Tasmania has adopted an Information Security Framework (Department 
of Premier and Government, Tasmania, 2009) which provides guidance to government 
agencies on what Information Security Policy Principles they need to adhere to, as well as 
important legislative requirements and the primary roles and responsibilities for information 
security. The areas covered by the framework are Information Security Governance; Record 
Security; Physical Security; Personnel Security; General ICT; Incident Management; and 
Risk Management. The ISO 27000 series of standards are to be used to help the 
implementation of the framework. 
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This framework consists of a number of documents (Department of Premier and 
Government, Tasmania, 2009), the contents of which are summarized in Table 3-1. 
Table 3-1 Tasmanian Government Information Security Framework 
Document Name Contents Outline 
Tasmanian Government Information Security 
Charter  
• Legislative requirements  
• Information security policy principles  
• Information security policies  
• Primary roles and responsibilities  
Tasmanian Government Information Security 
Guidelines  
• Overview of the Tasmanian Government 
Information security framework  
• Information security governance  
• Records, Physical and Personnel security  
• General ICT  
• Incident management  
• Information security risk management  
Tasmanian Government WAN and Internet 
Services: Information Security Policies and 
Standards  
A whole-of-government implementation of the 
framework with polices and standards specific to 
this topic  
Agency implementations of the Framework  Determined by each agency  
 
The Tasmanian framework addresses security at two levels, which are, across the whole 
Government and at individual agencies. This approach is an interesting one that can be 
adopted to provide a flexible framework that is consistent and applicable in different 
scenarios. This study looks at G2G transactions, which pre-supposes that more than one 
agency is involved. However, a framework that can also fit the individual agency needs can 
be achieved. This is done in the framework that is developed in this study and presented in 
chapter eight. 
3.3 Interoperability Frameworks 
Interoperability frameworks are a tool used by governments to ensure that e-Government 
implementations work, given that government agencies often have different technical 
platforms and different organizational processes. Two examples are presented in this section, 
one from South Africa and the other from Spain. While other national interoperability 
frameworks may exist, the two frameworks presented here are sufficient to illustrate the basic 
structure and purpose on interoperability frameworks in relation to this study. In addition, 
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one example is from the African continent – that is South Africa, while the other is taken 
from outside of Africa, that is, Spain. 
3.3.1 South African Minimum Interoperability Standards (MIOS) for Information 
Systems in Government 
The South African MIOS (SITA, 2007) are standards based on international and/or open 
standards that enhance interoperability. The Government of South Africa adopted MIOS in 
order to ensure that public sector organizations that provide e-services have the underlying 
infrastructure for web enabled government. 
The MIOS standards have been driven by: 
• Interoperability: only standards that are relevant to systems interconnectivity, data 
interoperability and information access are specified 
• Market Support: the standards selected are widely supported in the market and are likely 
to reduce the cost and risk of government information systems 
• Scalability: standards selected have the capacity to be scaled to satisfy changed demands 
made on the system 
• Open Standards: the specifications for the standards documented are freely 
implementable and available to the public at large 
• Security: all standards selected need to support a secure computing environment 
The principles stated in MIOS cover interconnectivity, data interoperability, web services, 
information access, content management metadata, identifiers, mobile phones and biometric 
data interchange. For each of these a list of applicable standards is given. 
 
The use of open and freely available standards is advocated for, one of the reasons being cost 
reduction. This is applicable in the EAC setting and a list of applicable standards could be 
compiled and updated centrally so that government agencies keep up to date on standards. 
The use of open standards could contribute to the sustainability of the framework, which is 
part of the 3rd research question of this study. 
3.3.2 Spanish National Interoperability Framework 
The Spanish Government has adopted a National Interoperability Framework (Ministry of the 
Presidency, Spain, 2010) in order to create the necessary conditions to guarantee the suitable 
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level of technical, semantic and organizational interoperability of the systems and applications 
used by Public Administrations. This framework allows the exercise of rights and the fulfillment 
of obligations through electronic access to public services, benefiting the efficacy and the 
efficiency at the same time.  The framework refers to national legislation. The guidelines for 
achieving these levels of interoperability are summarized in Table 3-2. 
Table 3-2 Spanish national interoperability framework components 
Component Guidelines 
Organizational 
interoperability 
• Establish and publish access and use conditions of services 
and data in accordance to relevant legislation. 
• Maintain an inventory of administrative procedures with 
indication of level of computerization. 
• Maintain inventory relations among public bodies. 
Semantic Interoperability • Establish and maintain data models considered of common 
interest that will be used during information exchanges in 
Public Administrations. 
• Establish and publish the corresponding interchange data 
models that will be of mandatory application for information 
interchanges in Public Administrations. 
Technical Interoperability • Use open standards, together with standards that are widely 
used by citizens, with the aim to guarantee independence in 
the choice of alternative technologies by the citizens and 
Public Administrations and adaptability to progress of 
technology. 
 
The Spanish national interoperability framework recognizes that some activities may not be 
computerized thus a framework would possibly include addressing operational issues that 
may not be tied to the use of technology. The idea of open standards for technical 
interoperability is also featured in this framework. Furthermore, the holistic addressing of 
interoperability namely, technical operational and semantic is applicable to G2G transactions 
as by their nature those transactions will occur across technically and organizationally 
disparate domains. 
3.4 Enterprise Architectures 
As mentioned in chapter two, SOA are largely used to implement e-Government. There is 
some overlap between SOA and enterprise architectures (Ibrahim & Long, 2007). SOA can 
be built on existing enterprise architectures. Implementation of enterprise architectures can 
result in the achievement of interoperability (Janssen & Scholl, 2007). In this section, two 
examples of government wide enterprise architectures are presented. 
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3.4.1 Federal Enterprise Architecture Framework 
The Federal Enterprise Architecture (FEA) is a model developed by the United States 
Government for use by its Government Agencies (CIO Council, 1999). Information security 
is a component of FEA which has been successfully implemented in different government 
environments (http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/E-Gov/EA-Success). 
 
The underlying principles encompassed of FEA, as envisaged by the Chief Information 
Officers (CIO) Council of the USA (CIO Council, 1999), include the following: 
• Establishment of Federal Interoperability Standards 
• Coordination of technology investments with the Federal business and architecture 
• Minimization of the Data Collection Burden 
• Securing of Federal information against unauthorized access  
• Functionality: Taking advantage of standardization based on common functions and 
customs 
• Providing access to information 
• Selecting and implementing proven market technologies 
• Complying with Privacy Act of 1974 
The FEA framework (CIO Council, 1999, p. 23) is presented in Table 3-3. 
Table 3-3 FEA Framework 
Perspectives Data Architecture 
(Entities = What) 
Applications 
Architecture 
(Activities = how) 
Technology 
Architecture 
(Location = what) 
Planner’s View 
Objectives/Scope 
List of Business Objects List of Business 
Process 
List of Business 
Locations 
Owner’s View 
Enterprise Model 
Semantic Model Business Process 
Model 
Business Logistics 
System 
Designer’s View 
Information 
Systems Model 
Logical Data Model Application 
Architecture 
System Geographic 
Deployment 
Architecture 
Builder’s View 
Technology 
Model 
Physical Data Model System Design Technology 
Architecture 
Subcontractor’s 
view 
Detailed 
specification 
Data Definition 
Library or Encyclopaedia 
Programs “Supporting 
Software  Components 
(i.e. operating 
systems)” 
Network 
Architectures 
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The FEA Enterprise Architecture Framework ties organizational and technical goals together, 
which can be applied to get a holistic security framework by linking operational and 
technical activities necessary to achieve security. The FEA framework also defines views 
that correspond to different roles. Such views help implementers of the framework to 
understand how their roles affect the entire organization. A similar approach to an 
information security framework for G2G transactions could work as a tool for raising 
awareness and thus inculcating information security practices across government.  
3.4.2 Government Wide Enterprise Architecture 
The Government Wide Enterprise Architecture (GWEA) is a framework adopted by the 
South African Government to address the following challenges in Government: 
• Inconsistent and non-standard planning frameworks 
• Use of different notations and varying levels of details in plans submitted by departments 
• Problems for South African Information Technology Authority (SITA) to certify plans 
using a consistent and government wide accepted framework 
• Government unable to integrate services as a result 
• Costly systems development and rampant duplication 
• Low organizational maturity and stagnant service improvement 
The GWEA framework is designed to meet these challenges by achieving interoperability at 
three levels (GITOC, 2009). The three levels are:  
• Organizational level: organisational components are able to perform seamlessly together; 
• Semantic level: ensuring the precise meaning of exchanged information between different 
kind of Information Systems; and 
• Technical level: technical issues of linking computer systems and services. 
This approach is similar to that proposed by the Spanish Interoperability framework that is 
discussed in section 3.3.2. The GWEA brings the additional value of illustrating how the 
enterprise architecture framework adds value to the operations of government through what 
is acting as a foundation to meet government objectives (Segole & Needham, 2009). These 
government objectives are security, interoperability, reduced duplication, economies of scale 
and digital inclusion. The objectives, when met, can lead to lower costs, increased 
productivity and citizen convenience.  
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As with the Spanish interoperability framework, GWEA outlines the need for interoperability 
which is applicable to information security in G2G transactions. In addition, the framework 
is presented in a way that ties it with its contribution to the overall goals of government. 
Since the third question of this study addresses how a sustainable framework can be 
achieved, it is necessary that the information security framework that is proposed also has a 
mechanism to address awareness amongst top leadership, and acceptability so that the value 
of the framework at all levels of government is achieved. These discoveries are used in 
chapter ten, whereby e-government critical success factors are used to evaluate the 
framework. 
3.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter national interoperability, information security and enterprise architectural 
frameworks have been presented.  For each of these, relevance to the research objectives has 
been identified. The focus of this chapter was to see what has been done by governments 
round the world. All the initiatives except for the FEA framework are fairly new and thus no 
data on their success are available yet. The frameworks presented, however, do have 
relevance to this study as summarized below: 
•  A national information security framework addresses specific national issues such as 
legislation and priority areas 
• Interoperability is a key issue of concern and is addressed at technical, semantic and 
operational levels. Open standards may be used to address interoperability 
• The framework may include mechanisms to be implemented internally within an 
agency and also applied in a G2G transaction 
• The framework may include operational mechanisms that are not necessarily directly 
tied to technical mechanisms 
• As a means of achieving acceptability, which will contribute to sustainability, the 
framework may be evaluated against set government policy objectives. 
 
For G2G transactions, national level policies and guidelines will guide the individual 
government agencies that participate in the transaction. However, there are two areas where 
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the national information frameworks described above do not address the challenges in G2G 
information security that were described in chapter one. Firstly, there is a need for a means 
for an agency to map national policies onto organizational policies and plans and technical 
mechanisms for information security, which should be flexible enough to incorporate 
changing legislation. Secondly, there is need for a means to preserve information security 
across a G2G transaction. The framework that is presented in chapter eight of this thesis does 
address these two areas through a process model that is part of the framework. 
 
Another pertinent discovery from the frameworks presented in this chapter is that all the 
examples given were achieved through a concerted effort at central government level, with a 
particular government department spearheading the initiative. An investigation into the EAC 
context that is presented in chapter five will reveal that most e-Government initiatives are not 
centralized in the EAC. This gives a justification for the EAC not to simply adopt a 
framework in use in another part of the world, but to critically examine contextual factors 
and come up with a framework that will fit the needs of the EAC. 
 
The framework examples presented in this chapter frequently refer to the application of 
standards to achieve information security. In the next chapter, an investigation of standards 
related to information security for G2G transactions is presented.   
  
45 
 
Chapter 4 Standards Related to Information Security in e-Government 
4.1 Introduction 
A reference to the use of standards in addressing information security has been discovered 
both in the research presented in chapter two, and in the national information security 
frameworks presented in chapter three. This chapter describes standards that are relevant to 
G2G transactions in e-government. Open and freely available standards are referred to where 
possible. The exception is standards issued by the International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO) because this is the de-facto standards body recognized worldwide.  
 
The detailed investigation into use of standards is motivated by the need to develop a 
sustainable framework in which the EAC governments need not “re-invent the wheel”, but 
rather concentrate on those specific mechanisms that will address context sensitive needs, as 
will be presented in chapter eight of this thesis. Standards also address some of the barriers to 
G2G that are discussed in chapter 1 including information exchange, technical platforms and 
resource constraints. 
 
The standards bodies whose standards are cited are: 
• European Committee for Standardization or Comité Européen de Normalisation 
(CEN) is a regional body with membership of 33 nations in Europe: CEN 
provides a platform for European standards and other technical specifications 
which can be accessed at http://www.cen.eu. 
• International Organization for Standardization (ISO) is an international body with 
a membership of 163 countries with a Central Secretariat in Geneva, Switzerland  
• International Electro technical Commission (IEC) is an international organization 
that publishes standards for electrical, electronic and related technologies 
• National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST), an agency of the 
government of the United States of America, develops standards and guidelines 
for use by federal agencies and external bodies that deal with federal entities 
(http://csrc.nist.gov). The agency is also in charge of Federal Information 
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Processing Standard (FIPS) publications. NIST guidelines are based on the 
Federal Information Security Act of 2002 (United States Congress, 2002) 
• Organization for Advancement of Structured Information Standards (OASIS) is a 
not-for-profit consortium that drives the development, convergence and adoption 
of open standards for the global information society. OASIS promotes industry 
consensus and produces worldwide standards for security, Cloud computing, 
SOA, web services, the Smart Grid, electronic publishing, emergency 
management, and other areas. SOA and web services are mechanisms to 
implement G2G transactions.  OASIS open standards offer the potential to lower 
cost, stimulate innovation, grow global markets, and protect the right of free 
choice of technology  
• Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is an 
international organization with 34 member countries which provides a forum for 
governments of these countries to compare policy experiences, seek answers to 
common problems, identify good practice and coordinate domestic and 
international policies  
• World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) is an international community which 
develops web standards. 
 
In the next section, a description of standards and their relationship to information security 
for G2G transactions is presented. 
4.2  Non – Technical Standards related to information security for G2G transactions 
4.2.1 ISO/IEC 27001:2005 
The ISO/ IEC 27001:2005 is named Information security management systems — 
Requirements (ISO/IEC, 2005a) and can be downloaded for a fee from www.iso.org. This 
international standard presents a process approach for information security management, 
which emphasizes the importance of understanding an organization’s information security 
requirements and the need to establish policy; objectives for information security; risk 
management and implementation of controls; performance management and continual 
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improvement. The "Plan-Do-Check-Act" (PDCA) model is adopted and is applied to 
structure all ISMS processes.  
The relevance of this standard to G2G transactions is that individual MDAs involved in a 
G2G transaction should have internal processes or mechanisms to address information 
security. The PDCA process principle be applied both for a framework that is applicable 
within an MDA and across MDAs participating in a G2G transaction. However the PDCA 
process is a generic process that does not consider contextual issues. In chapter eight of this 
thesis, a more appropriate process model is presented that addresses the EAC context as 
discovered and presented in chapter five. 
4.2.2  ISO/IEC 27002:2005 
The ISO/IEC 27002:2005 is named Code of Practice on Information Security Management 
(ISO/IEC, 2005b) and can be downloaded for a fee from www.iso.org. This international 
standard addresses information security from a traditional point of view of Confidentiality, 
Integrity and Availability (CIA). Confidentiality deals with ensuring that information is 
accessed by authorized users only. Integrity means that the information should not be altered 
without authorization and lastly information should be available as and when required. 
ISO/IEC 27002:2005 is intended as a common basis and practical guideline for developing 
organizational security standards and effective security management practices, and to help 
build confidence in inter-organizational activities. The standard addresses 10 security 
domains which are security policy, organization of information security, asset management, 
human resources security, physical and environmental security, communications and 
operations management, access control, information systems acquisition, development and 
maintenance, risk, incident and business continuity management, and compliance. The 
standard also states as well as critical success factors for information security management 
systems. 
The security requirements of confidentiality, integrity and availability have been discovered 
in the literature presented in chapter two. The additional discovery from this standard is the 
description of critical success factors as part of the standard. These critical success factors 
48 
 
will be used to evaluate the framework that is developed in this study. The evaluation is 
presented in chapter ten. 
4.2.3  FIPS PUB 200 
FIPS PUB 200 is the Minimum Security Requirements for Federal Information and 
Information Systems (NIST, 2006). This standard can be downloaded for free from 
www.csrc.nist.gov. The standard specifies 17 security areas for which federal organizations 
are required to develop and adopt policies. Four of these that relate to this study are:  
• Access Control (AC): Organizations must limit information system access to 
authorized users, processes acting on behalf of authorized users, or devices 
(including other information systems) and to the types of transactions and 
functions that authorized users are permitted to exercise. 
• Identification and Authentication (IA): Organizations must identify information 
system users, processes acting on behalf of users, or devices and authenticate (or 
verify) the identities of those users, processes, or devices, as a prerequisite to 
allowing access to organizational information systems.  
• System and Communications Protection (SC): Organizations must secure 
organizational communications at the external boundaries and key internal 
boundaries of the information systems; and techniques that promote effective 
information security within organizational information systems.  
• System and Information Integrity (SI): Organizations must manage information 
system flaws in a timely manner; provide protection from malicious code; and 
monitor information system security alerts and advisories and take appropriate 
actions in response.  
This standard addresses information security requirements discussed in previous sections of 
the thesis, but with the additional discovery of the promotion of effective information 
security within organizational boundaries. 
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4.2.4 Network and Information Security Standards Report, Issue 6.2 
 The Network and Information Security Standards Report (CEN, 2007) can be downloaded 
for free from http://www.cen.eu. This report identifies the increasing importance of the 
availability, reliability and security of networks and information systems to the economies in 
Europe and proposes standards to address current security threats. The standards are 
addressed under five categories which are referred to as Security Services. Security Services 
are defined as follows: 
• Registration, Authentication and Authorization Services. These services provide 
the means to ensure that users are uniquely and unambiguously identified and 
granted access only to those assets for which they have been authorized.  
• Confidentiality and Privacy Services. These services provide the means whereby 
e-business information is stored and transferred securely. They also ensure that 
private information is protected in accordance to legislation. 
• Trust Services. These services are required to ensure that e-business transactions 
are properly traceable and accountable to authenticated individuals and cannot 
subsequently be disavowed.  
• Network and Information Security Management Services: These services are 
required to ensure that appropriate management controls, processes and 
procedures are in place in addition to the technical security measures to protect 
the system and network infrastructure. 
• Assurance Services. These services provide e-business users with confidence that 
all technical and non-technical security measures have been designed, configured 
and are being operated in a secure manner in accordance to the relevant standards. 
There are two discoveries in this standard, which are the connection of accountability to trust 
as a requirement, and the provision of assurance that both technical and non-technical 
measures have been designed to meet information security requirements. These are issues 
that are addressed in the framework proposed for the EAC in this thesis. 
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4.2.5 OECD 81829 2002 
The OECD standard number 81829 2002 is named Guidelines for the Security of Information 
Systems and Networks: Towards a Culture of Security (OECD, 2002). This standard can be 
downloaded for free from www.oecd.org 
The Guidelines outline nine principles aimed at instilling a culture of security in 
organizations. The guidelines identify the need for the incorporation of security as an 
essential element of information systems and networks. The nine principles are awareness of 
the need for information security; responsibility for the security of information systems; 
response to security incidences; ethics, that is, respect for the legitimate interest of others; 
democracy, that is, security of information systems and networks should be compatible with 
the essential values of a democratic society; risk assessment; security design and 
implementation; security management and lastly, reassessment of information security 
management systems. 
In chapter five of this thesis, an investigation is done as to what national culture may exist in 
the EAC that could influence information security practices. The discoveries of chapter five 
are used in the design of the information security framework and its related models to ensure 
that the cultural context of the EAC is taken into consideration in the solution proposed. 
4.2.6  OECD Guidelines for Electronic Authentication  
The Guidelines for Electronic Authentication (OECD, 2007) can be downloaded for free 
from www.oecd.org. The guideline defines authentication as a function for establishing the 
validity and assurance of a claimed identity of a user, device or another entity in an 
information or communication system. One of the recommendations in this guideline is that 
both public and private sectors should encourage the use of authentication schemas that are 
legally compatible, technically interoperable and meet business needs. Such schemas will in 
turn facilitate cross-sectoral and cross-jurisdictional online interactions and transactions. 
Furthermore, they will ensure that authentication products and services can be deployed at 
both national and international levels. The guideline further sets out foundation and 
operational principles for electronic authentication. 
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The discovery with this standard is the need for national level mechanisms when addressing 
the authentication information security requirement. This discovery leads to the investigation 
in chapter five, of legislation that may be in place in the EAC to address authentication, and 
the inclusion of national level mechanisms, which are Certificate authorities, in the 
information security framework for the EAC that is presented in chapter eight of the thesis.  
4.2.7  OECD Guidelines on Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data 
The OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data 
(OECD, 1980) can be downloaded for free from www.oecd.org. These guidelines set 
minimum standards for protection of personal data including restrictions of collection of 
personal data, use of personal data, need to be complete, accurate and up to date data and 
protection of personal data from loss, unauthorized access, destruction, modification and 
disclosure. The guidelines are currently being reviewed. 
This standard highlights the need for legislation on cross border transactions. G2G 
transactions are likely to be cross-border across the EAC partner states. The presence of 
legislation on privacy is investigated further in chapter five of this thesis. 
4.2.8  NIST Special Publication 800-53 Revision 3 
These guidelines are named Recommended Security Controls for Federal Information 
Systems and Organizations (NIST, 2009) and can be downloaded for free from 
www.csrc.nist.gov. The purpose of these guidelines is to help federal agencies to select and 
specify security controls to meet the requirements of the Minimum Security Requirements 
for Federal Information and Information Systems (FIPS 200). For each of the security 
requirement areas outlined in FIPS 200, baseline security controls are presented. Some of the 
controls mentioned in this document include access control policies, security attributes for 
authentication, access control for mobile devices, security awareness and training policy and 
procedures, audit and accountability policy and procedures, contingency planning, 
configuration management, risk assessment policy and procedures, incidence response 
management procedures, environment management policy and procedures, cryptography, 
enterprise architecture and system and information integrity policy and procedures.  
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The discovery in these guidelines is the use of both technical and non-technical controls in 
addressing information security requirements. The framework presented in this study 
includes both technical and non-technical requirements in addressing information security in 
G2G transactions. 
4.3 Technical Standards 
The standards and guidelines presented in section 4.2 mostly address the information security 
management process. In order to address the technical aspects of information security, a 
survey of current technical information security standards is presented in this section. The 
standards presented in this section are those related to the technical mechanisms that can be 
used to implement e-Government transactions. Complex e-Government transactions are 
largely achieved through the implementation of Service Oriented Architectures (SOA). Web 
services are the reference technology used to implement SOA -based information systems 
(Gutiérrez, Rosado, & Fernández-Medina, 2009). Web Services are software that provide a 
standard based approach for machine to machine interaction (W3C, 2004). The Organisation 
for Advancement of Structured Information Standards (OASIS) conducted a survey on e-
Government (OASIS, 2010a) of which one of the findings was that there is a need to use 
Open Standards to underpin the delivery of e-Government online services. The reason behind 
the use of these standards is to help to ensure interoperability and to produce the best value 
for money. OASIS has proposed technical standards for web services that are applicable for 
e-Government implementations. These are discussed 4.3.1 to 4.3.3. 
4.3.1 XACML 
The eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) is a policy language which uses 
XML statements to present access control policies. XACML version 2.0 was ratified as a 
standard by OASIS in February 2005 (OASIS, 2010b). XACML components are as shown in 
Table 4-1. 
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Table 4-1 XACML Components 
XACML Component Description 
Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) Forms a request (using the XACML request language) based 
on the attributes of the subject, action, resource, and other 
relevant information. The PEP then sends this request to a 
Policy Decision Point (PDP) 
Policy Decision Point (PDP) Receives and examines a request, retrieves applicable policies, 
evaluates the applicable policy and returns the authorization 
decision to PEP 
Context Handler Context Handler can be defined to convert the requests in its 
native format to the XACML canonical form and to convert 
the Authorization decisions in the XACML canonical form to 
the native format 
Policy Information Policy Serves as the source of attribute values, or the data required for 
policy evaluation 
Policy Administration Point (PAP) Creates security policies and stores these policies in the 
repository 
 
The need for organizational information security policies is included in many of the 
standards presented in section 4.2.  For electronic transactions the organizational policy 
should be translated into an electronic format that can be read by other systems. XACML is 
an open standard for expressing policies and thus would be applicable in G2G transactions. A 
government agency (Service Requestor) that is requesting a service electronically from 
another agency (Service Responder) would submit their request in XACML request 
language. This request would be checked by the Policy Enforcement point in the service 
responders access control policy, and combine it with the attributes presented by the 
requestor. This request would then be passed on to the Policy Decision Point of the Service 
Responder. 
In this study, an access control model, based on XACML and using SAML attributes is 
developed and presented as part of the information security framework for G2G transactions. 
This model is presented in chapter eight of this thesis. 
4.3.2 SAML 
The Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) is an XML-based security specification 
schema for exchanging authentication and authorization information. SAML handles the user 
authentication and also carries attribute information for authorization and access control 
(OASIS, 2010b). 
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SAML assertions are of three kinds, namely, Authentication assertions, Attribute assertions 
and Authorization Decision assertions. An assertion is defined as a piece of data regarding 
either an act of authentication performed on a subject, attribute information about the subject, 
or authorization data applying to the subject with respect to a specified resource. Assertions 
are produced by a SAML authority, which is an abstract system entity in the SAML domain 
model. The user or web service requesting assertions from the SAML authority is called the 
Requester. These assertions are then used in communicating with an entity called a 
Responder, who utilizes those SAML assertions to respond appropriately to the Requester. In 
a web services environment, SAML assertions may be carried within a SOAP message. 
Other than assertions, SAML is also composed of protocols, bindings and profiles. Protocols 
allow service providers to request for assertions, authentication and name identifier 
registration and mapping.  Bindings are the mappings from SAML request-response message 
exchanges into standard messaging or communication protocols such as SOAP and HTTP. A 
profile of SAML defines constraints and/or extensions in support of the usage of SAML for a 
particular application. SAML has been implemented in e-Government settings for identity 
management (McKenzie, Crompton, & Wallis, 2008) and studied for authentication and 
authorization in federated networks by Marin-Lopez, Pereniguez, Lopez, & Perez-Mendez 
(2011). 
 
As part of this study, a way to implement SAML as a mechanism for meeting information 
security requirements in an e-Government setting was investigated (Wangwe, Eloff, & 
Venter, 2008a). The six information security requirements addressed were authentication, 
privacy, authorization and access control, data integrity and trust. The applicability of SAML 
to the security requirements was presented as follows: 
• Authentication: A SAML authentication assertion simply asserts that the service 
requestor provided authentication, the method of authentication used, and who did the 
authentication. An authentication services such as Lightweight Directory Access 
Protocol (LDAP) can provide the actual authentication. For example, the following 
portion of an assertion: 
<saml:AuthnStatement   AuthnInstant=2006-04-12T16:57:30.000Z”> 
indicates the time and date of an assertion; while 
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<saml:AuthnContext><saml:AuthnContextClassRef> 
urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:ac:classes:Kerberos 
indicates that the authentication was done through a local server in order to acquire a 
Kerberos ticket for subsequent use. 
• Privacy: SAML V2.0 defines how pseudonyms can be used between providers to 
represent the entity that has been authenticated. This is achieved through the Name ID 
element. In addition, SAML includes mechanisms to allow providers to communicate 
privacy policy and settings. 
• Authorization and Access Control: SAML authorization decision assertions indicate 
what resources the subject is allowed to access. Furthermore, SAML attribute 
assertions may be used to describe the role that the subject holds in the context of the 
particular transaction. For example: 
<saml:AuthzDecisionStatement 
Resource=”http://civilregistry.go.tz/birthdateregister.html” 
Decision=”Permit”> 
<saml:Action>GET</saml:Action></saml:AuthzDecisionStatement> 
indicates that permission has been granted to access web page birthdateregister.html. 
An example of an attribute assertion would be: 
<saml:AttributeStatement><saml:Attribute> 
NameFormat=http://pensions123.co.tz Name=”MemberType” 
<saml:AttributeValue> pensioner </saml:Attribute> 
</saml:Attribute></saml:AttributeStatement> 
• Data Integrity:  In SAML implementations, it is possible to confirm that data 
integrity has not been compromised, that is, a given message has not been altered 
during transmission. This is done through the use of XML signatures, and additional 
security related technologies such as PKI. Furthermore network protocols such as 
IPSec and RFC2246 can be used to secure SAML traffic. 
• Trust: Trust is achieved by using a separate authority (trusted third party) to issue 
security tokens which are acceptable to all parties. In the case of a SAML 
implementation, the trusted authority would issue SAML assertions to confirm the 
authenticity and access rights for the service requester.  
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4.3.3 Web Services (WS) Security Framework 
The objective of the WS Security Framework is to have a standard way of handling web 
services security in transactions originating from entities that may have different security 
environments/policies. The WS – Security framework has been adopted by OASIS as a 
standard (OASIS, 2010b). The standards contained in the WS – Security framework are 
illustrated in Table 4-2. 
Table 4-2 WS Security Framework Components 
WS Security 
Framework component 
Description 
SOAP Message Security Describes enhancements to SOAP messaging to provide message 
integrity and confidentiality. The specified mechanisms can be used to 
accommodate a wide variety of security models and encryption 
technologies. This specification also provides a general-purpose 
mechanism for associating security tokens with message content. No 
specific type of security token is required, the specification is designed 
to be extensible (i.e. support multiple security token formats). 
User Name Token Profile Describes how a web service consumer can supply a Username Token as 
a means of identifying the requestor by “username”, and optionally using 
a password (or shared secret, or password equivalent) to authenticate that 
identity to the web service producer. 
SAML Token Profile Describes how to use SAML assertions with the WS Security SOAP 
message specification 
X.509 Token Profile Describes how to use X.509 with the WS Security SOAP message 
specification. An X.509 certificate specifies a binding between a public 
key and a set of attributes that includes (at least) a subject name, issuer 
name, serial number and validity interval. An X.509 certificate may be 
used to validate a public key that may be used to authenticate a SOAP 
message or to identify the public key with SOAP message that has been 
encrypted. X.509 is an ITU-T (ITU Telecommunication Standardization 
Sector) standard for PKI (Public Key Infrastructure) in cryptography, 
which, amongst many other things, defines specific formats for PKC 
(Public Key Certificates) and that the algorithm that verifies a given 
certificate path is valid under a given PKI (called the certification path 
validation algorithm) (http://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.509/en). 
Kerberos Token Profile Describes how to use Kerberos tokens with the WS Security SOAP 
message specification. Kerberos is a network authentication protocol 
developed by Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
(http://web.mit.edu/Kerberos/). It is designed to provide strong 
authentication for client/server applications by using secret-key 
cryptography 
Rights Expression 
Language Token Profile 
Describes  the use of ISO/IEC 21000-5 Rights Expressions with respect 
to the WS-Security SOAP message specification 
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4.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, information security standards from international, regional, technical and 
national organizations have been presented. 
International organizations are those whose membership is open to nations worldwide. The 
standards from international organizations which have been presented in this chapter are 
standards from ISO, IEC, and OECD. Standards from one regional body, the CEN, have been 
presented. CEN’s membership comprises of nations in the European region. For national 
standards, NIST that is the standardization body of the United States of America have been 
presented. Technical standards are those from international organizations, but whose 
membership is on an individual or corporate basis. The standards presented are from OASIS 
and W3C. 
 
The discoveries from these standards were discussed and can be summarized as: 
• The PDCA process principle as a generic process model for implementation of an 
information security framework, and the need to a process model that is context 
sensitive to the EAC situation 
• Security objectives of Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability 
• The presence of critical success factors for information security frameworks within 
ISO standard 27002:2005 
• The need for promotion of effective information security within organizational 
boundaries 
• Accountability as a security objective related to the trust requirement 
• The need to include cultural considerations in an information security framework 
• Legislation as a mechanism for addressing the authentication and privacy information 
security requirements 
• Implementation of technical and non-technical mechanisms to address information 
security 
• Use of open technical standards as a mechanism to meet information security 
requirements. 
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The standards and guidelines presented address security requirements that are applicable in 
many settings. However recognizing that a successful implementation must take context into 
consideration, standards organizations have started moving towards investigating context 
specific standards and guidelines, for example the ISO 27799:2008 standard for health 
information systems (ISO, 2008), and work done by OASIS on legal XML (OASIS, 2008).  
In the next part of the thesis, an EAC situational analysis is undertaken to discover what 
initiatives have been done with regards to e-government, what legislation is in place with 
regards to e-government and information security, what cultural practices may affect 
information security implementations and what are the related practices in individual MDAs 
in the EAC. 
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PART III: EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS  
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Chapter 5 Current e-Government Initiatives and Practices in the EAC 
5.1 Introduction 
In the second part of the thesis, a literature survey was presented that discussed international 
standards, existing frameworks and research related to this study. This part of the thesis 
consists of chapters five and six which together present a situational analysis of e-
Government practices from an information security perspective in the three countries 
surveyed. Chapter five discusses regional and national e-Government initiatives while 
chapter 6 presents the detailed findings of a survey on G2G related information security 
practices in individual MDAs in the EAC. 
 
This chapter starts with a discussion on regional EAC initiatives followed by the initiatives 
and practices in three countries surveyed, namely, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda. For each 
country, resources, policies, strategies, legislation and projects related to e-Government are 
presented, together with a discussion on how information security is addressed in these 
initiatives. The national cultural considerations that may affect information security are also 
discussed. 
5.2 Regional EAC Initiatives 
The EAC regional framework for e-Government (East African Community Secretariat, 2005) 
highlights the following areas where EAC partner states need to provide an enabling 
framework for e-Government: 
• Legislation: Necessary legislation on data security, network security, cyber-crime, 
information systems and electronic transactions needs to be put in place. 
• Risk Assessment: A study to identify the challenges, threats and vulnerabilities of 
networks and information infrastructures needs to be undertaken. 
• Security standards: An investigation of data security standards and issues necessary for 
the exchange of classified government information of the partner countries of the EAC 
needs to be undertaken.  
The East African common market protocol (EAC, 2009) requires partner states to establish a 
common standard system for issuing national identification documents to their nationals that 
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may be machine-readable and electronic. The protocol in article 42 also calls for the 
promotion and ensuring of the sustainability of an information and communications 
technology culture. 
5.3 Initiatives in Rwanda 
5.3.1 Resources 
Rwanda has a population of about 10 million and a GDP per capita of USD 520 in 2009 
(National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda, 2010). The central ministry responsible for ICT 
had a budget of RwFr. 162,992,037,193 equivalent to about USD 282,140,000 in the 
2010/2011 budget(Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning - Rwanda, 2010).Internet 
users are estimated to be 3% of the population while mobile phone penetration stands at 13% 
(Hellström, 2010). Rwanda is hailed as having one of the most comprehensive integrated 
ICT4D plans throughout Africa, and e-Government is one of the pillars of that plan (UN 
Economic Commission for Africa, 2007).  
5.3.2 Government Policies, Strategies and Standards 
In 2010 the government of Rwanda unveiled the National Information and Communication 
Infrastructure (NICI) 2010 plan (Government of Rwanda, 2010). With regards to e-
Government, the plan aims to ensure that that implementation cuts across ministries and 
agencies horizontally so that complete business processes are automated and not just 
departmental planned actions. Furthermore it is planned that core design criteria for e-
Government applications in terms of portal design, look and feel, and minimal content will 
be identified and standardized. Another point of interest is the identification of re-usable  
applications and ensuring that duplication does not take place, together with implementation 
of  standardized data dictionaries and controlled data exchange to ensure proper ownership of 
information. 
 
Technical standards for e-Government were adopted in 2006 (RITA, 2006). The objective of 
these standards is to establish common models, frameworks and standards. The benefits 
expected are:  
• Cost reduction by reducing duplicity and sharing administration and training expenses; 
economies of scale in purchasing and simpler upgrades paths 
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• Improved interoperability and integration 
• Improved availability of accurate information whenever and wherever needed 
• Improved security 
• Reduced technical risk since guidelines are based on International best practices and 
industry. 
The report covers policies and standards for Data, Communications Infrastructure,  
Hardware, System Administration, Security, Applications, Collaboration and Application 
Integration. For security, the standards are based on the OECD Guidelines for the Security of 
Information Systems (OECD, 2002), which has been discussed in chapter four of this thesis. 
Several technical security technologies are described for maintaining confidentiality and 
integrity of information. 
5.3.3 Legal Environment 
The following legislation in Rwanda is related to information security in e-Government: 
a) The Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda (Republic of Rwanda, 2003) in Article 
22 states that : 
“The private life, family, home or correspondence of a person shall not be subjected 
to arbitrary interference; his or her honour and good reputation shall be respected. A 
person’s home is inviolable. No search of or entry into a home may be carried out 
without the consent of the owner, except in circumstances and in accordance with 
procedures determined by law. Confidentiality of correspondence and communication 
shall not be subject to waiver except in circumstances and in accordance with 
procedures determined by law.” 
The clause of the confidentiality of correspondence and communication is relevant to this 
study since G2G transactions would be subject to adherence to this article of the consitution.  
b) Other laws: The following bills and laws have been proposed and/or adopted: 
Information and Communication Technology Bill of 2009; E-Contracting Law  of 
2010; and Cyber crime bill of 2009 (UNCTAD, 2010). It was not possible to get a 
detailed description of the contents of these bills and law up to the time of submission 
of this thesis. 
63 
 
5.3.4 E-Government Implementations 
A summary of e-Government implementations in Rwanda (Ndahiro, 2009) follows: 
a) National Identity (ID) project: 
This is an ongoing project that aims at establishing a smart card identification system 
that offers authentication that will allow access by citizens to different services such 
as insurance, banking and immigration. A description of the project is available at 
www.minict.gov.rw.The national ID forms an essential core for any future G2C 
services that will be offered by the Government of Rwanda. 
b) Document Management: 
This G2G project seeks to deploy an ICT system across MDAs that should be able to 
register all incoming and outgoing mail and to provide scanning facilities in case 
documents being tracked or registered need to be archived. The system would also 
enable secure and consistent storage of documents and a search facility. This will 
reduce paper based process and inefficiency in service delivery in all MDAs.  
c) Gov-NET: 
The key objectives of this G2G project are: 
• To inter-network all the government ministries and PSOs via their organizational 
network into a secure GovNet, the Wide Area Network (Intranet) of Government. 
• To provide a common Internet gateway for all government ministries via GovNet. 
• To facilitate civil and public service-wide information access, interchange and 
exchange via GovNet, an important component of the overall e-Government 
initiative. 
5.3.5 National Cultural Considerations 
Rwanda has adopted a top down approach with strong commitment from the head of 
government towards the use of ICT as a tool for development of the country (Cunningham, 
2007; Kanyesigye, 2011). ICT initiatives and e-Government projects fall under the mandate 
of the Rwanda Development Board. This strong and visible political commitment to ICT is a 
very good factor in ensuring that any initiatives can be adopted across the country.   
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5.4 Initiatives in Tanzania 
5.4.1 Resources 
Tanzania is a country in East Africa with a population of about 43 million people and per 
capita GDP in 2009 of Tanzania Shillings 693,185 or USD 522 (Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Affairs - Tanzania, 2010a). The government of Tanzania consists of central 
government ministries, departments and government agencies or parastatal organizations. 
The central government budget for the financial year 2010/2011 by the Ministry of 
Communication, Science & Technology, which is responsible for ICT, was Tanzania 
Shillings 3.1billion - equivalent to about USD 2million (Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Affairs - Tanzania, 2010b). Internet penetration stands at 11% of the population (Tanzania 
Communications Regulatory Authority, 2010). A shortage of ICT skills in central and local 
government in Tanzania has been documented in research carried out by Msuya (2010). 
 
Despite its low GDP, low ICT spending and low numbers of internet users, mobile phone 
penetration in Tanzania is fairly high, standing at 31% of the population, and the private 
sector has introduced many services to take advantage of the high use of mobile phones. 
(Hellström, 2010, p. 14). Citizens expect government to keep up with these innovations and 
in response the government of Tanzania has come up with policies and strategies to harness 
the use of ICT. These are outlined in the next sub section. 
5.4.2 Government Policies, Strategies and Standards 
Tanzania’s national ICT policy was adopted in 2003 (Ministry of Communications and 
Transport, 2003), after the Government recognized the need to harmonize independent ICT-
related initiatives. The broad objectives of the policy are to provide a national framework that 
will enable ICT to contribute towards achieving national development goals; and transform 
Tanzania into a knowledge-based society through the application of ICT. Ten policy areas 
are articulated, including Strategic ICT leadership, ICT Infrastructure, ICT Industry, Human 
Capital, Legal and Regulatory Framework, Productive Sectors, Public Service, Local Content 
and Universal Access. Two of these are particularly relevant to this study. These are: 
• Legal and Regulatory Framework: This section of the policy addresses the desire of the 
Government to ensure that appropriate legal regulatory frameworks are setup and to 
ensure that electronic transactions take place in a secure environment. 
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• Public Service: This section states the government’s intention to be the model user of ICT 
to improve efficiency, reduce wastage of resources, enhance planning, raise the quality of 
services and access global resources. 
 
The Tanzanian e-Government strategy (President's Office, 2009) is aimed at improving 
efficiency in government and providing better services to citizens. The strategy outlines 
seven guiding principles including:  Service Innovation; Equal Access; Ease of Use; Benefit 
Realization and Involvement of All Stakeholders; Security and Privacy; Partnership and 
Outsourcing; and Interoperability. The two principles that relate directly to information 
security are Security and Privacy and Interoperability. The strategy states that E-Government 
in Tanzania’s context is about “Delivering quality services to the public through technology”.  
In particular the strategy is aimed at the use of ICT to support processes within the 
government (G2G) as well as for the delivery of services to beneficiaries, such as citizens, 
businesses and organizations. However, the strategy does not provide guidance to 
Government MDAs, who are the major implementers of e-Government, on how to go about 
addressing information security issues. 
 
The salient features addressed by the  strategy can be summarised as follows: 
• Service Innovation: This involves creating new operational processes and changing 
current process to lead to innovative services that are sustainable 
• Equal Access: Ensure that all citizens will have equal access to e-Government services 
through different service delivery channels 
• Ease of use: Provision of user-friendly Citizen-Care and Business-Centric services for all 
• Benefit Realization: Ensuring that the benefits obtained by citizens from using e-
Government services will be greater than those from visiting government offices in 
person  
• Security and Privacy: Use of security and privacy mechanisms to ensure the proper use 
and handling of personal information and transactions  
• Partnership and Involvement of all Stakeholders: Building of strategic partnerships with 
private sector stakeholders and encouraging private-sector led innovations in delivering 
public services 
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• Interoperability:  Ensuring that newly implemented systems leverage existing systems 
and are aligned to the principle of Open Access. 
 
The strategy lists six critical success factors, and the requirements for each factor as shown in 
Table 5-1. 
Table 5-1 Critical Success Factors in Tanzania's E-Government Strategy 
Critical Success Factors Requirements 
Political will, support and commitment 
 
• Continuous engagement of political leaders in 
support to e- Government in order to maintain the 
momentum 
Availability of HR capacity 
 
• Continuous capacity development 
• Continuous public involvement 
Institutional and Legal framework 
 
• Clearly defined institutional framework and 
supportive legislation and enforcement mechanisms 
Financial Resources 
 
• Recognition of e-Government as a priority area in 
the Government agenda 
Commitment by all actors 
 
• Continuous coordination and buy-in by all actors or 
stakeholders 
• Active coordination among all stakeholders to 
develop and enforce coherent e-Government service 
delivery 
Sustainable Infrastructure 
 
• Network and information security Infrastructure to 
sustain e-Government services 
 
With regard to standards, the Government of Tanzania has not set any government wide 
standards related to e-Government. 
5.4.3 Legal Environment 
The legal and regulatory environment in Tanzania has some legislation that is relevant to e-
Government transactions. Such legislation includes: 
a) The Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania (United Republic of Tanzania, 
2000) which addresses privacy in section 16 as follows: 
“16(1) every person is entitled to respect and protection of his person, the 
privacy of his own person, his family and of his matrimonial life, and respect 
and protection of his residence and private communications. 
(2) For the purpose of preserving the person’s right in accordance with this 
Article, the state authority shall lay down legal procedures regarding the 
circumstances, manner and extent to which the right to privacy, security of his 
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person, his property and residence may be encroached upon without prejudice 
to the provisions of this Article.” 
This article of the constitution can be related to e-Government and to G2G transactions in 
particular in that any information provided by a citizen to a government agency should be 
used only for the purpose it was intended for and should be protected from unauthorized 
access. 
b) The Written Laws – Miscellaneous Amendments of 2007 (Parliament of Tanzania, 2007). 
This law added section 40A to the Evidence Act which reads as follows:  
“In any criminal proceedings, information  retrieved from computer systems, 
networks or servers; or the records obtained through surveillance of means of 
preservation of information including facsimile machines, electronic 
transmission and communication facilities; or the audio or video recording of 
acts or behaviours or conversations of persons charged shall be admissible in 
evidence.” 
This law is important since one of the major concerns of government departments and 
agencies is the possibility of fraud occuring in electronic transactions as a result of 
insufficient information security controls, as confirmed in the survey findings that are 
presented in chapter six. If fraud does occur, then the responsible MDA can be held 
accountable in a court of law through the provision of electronic evidence. 
5.4.4 e-Government Implementations 
Examples of e-Government implementations that have been carried out were obtained from 
interviews with staff of MDAs as well as requests for information from an online discussion 
group of Tanzanian IT professionals. This forum is called ethinktank Tanzania and is 
accessible at the URL http://groups.yahoo.com/group/eThinkTankTz/. The list below gives a 
description of four e-Government implementations.  
 
a) Parliamentary Online Information System (POLIS) 
POLIS is an open access system implemented in 2003. The system provides an index to 
the proceedings and publications of the Parliament of Tanzania and it includes the full 
text of parliamentary motions. The system also provides flexible and user-friendly forms 
to facilitate the searching of contents. Updates are collected from relevant government 
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departments offline and then updated by the parliament office. The services provided by 
POLIS can be categorised as Government to Citizen (G2C). POLIS project output can be 
viewed at www.parliament.go.tz. 
b) Government Pensioners Payroll System (GPPS) 
GPPS is a system that facilitates the processing of Government pensioners payroll for  
civil servants who retired from central government before 2004 through an outsourcing 
arrangement between central government and a government agency. GPPS was 
implemented in 2009. The service can be categorised as a government to government 
(G2G) transaction. The central government department responsible for pensions is linked 
through a secure communications link with the government agency that provides the 
service. An access control list has been established to guide authorization decisions to 
different information and functionality. Authentication is through the use of passwords. A 
contract under the Tanzanian law has been signed between the two parties to govern the 
provision of the service. This implementation is used as a case study in this thesis and is 
described in more detail in part IV of the thesis. 
c) Central Admission System (CAS) 
CAS allows students who have completed high school to apply online, through mobile 
phone or the internet, to public and private universities. The system was implemented in 
2010. Access is granted when a valid examination number is entered. Currently the 
service offered is a G2C service although it is planned that the system shall be expanded 
to involve G2G transactions with other agencies such as the agency responsible for 
issuing student loans. An interface of this system can be viewed at www.tcu.go.tz. 
d) Tanzania Interbank Settlement System (TISS) 
TISS is a system to allow transfers of payments that involve accounts with the Bank of 
Tanzania (BoT). The system was first implemented in 2004 for commercial banks but use 
by Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs started in 2010 (Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Affairs, 2010c).  The services can be categorised as G2B and G2G. Access is 
through special terminals connected through secure communications links. For payment 
transfers a link provided by the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial 
Telecommunication (SWIFT)  is used, while for enquiries a virtual private network has 
been set up. Contractual agreements are signed between participating parties which are 
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binding under the laws of Tanzania. The participants are financial institutions that are 
regulated by the Bank of Tanzania and institutions that deal in high volume large 
transaction payments. An example is the Tanzania Revenue Authority who the MDA 
with the responsbility for collection oftaxes. More information on TISS is available at 
http://www.bot-tz.org/PaymentSystem/NPSoverview.asp. 
 
5.4.5 National Cultural Considerations 
Chaula et.al (2006) investigate the role that culture plays in information security in an 
organization in Tanzania and suggests that the unstructured approach to information security 
management is a reflection of the unstructured approach to life in general in Tanzania. 
5.5 Initiatives in Uganda 
5.5.1 Resources 
Uganda has a population of about 30 million and a per capita GDP of USD 506 (Office of the 
Prime Minister, 2010). The 2010/2011 budget estimates for spending on ICT is Uganda 
Shillings 12.15 billion (Republic of Uganda, 2010) which is about USD 5million. Internet 
usage stands at 8% of the population while mobile phone penetration is at 27% of the 
population (Hellström, 2010).  
5.5.2 Government Policies, Strategies and Standards 
As was the case with Tanzania, Uganda adopted its National Information and 
Communication Policy in 2003. The policy (Ministry of Works, Housing and 
Communications, 2003) sets out 14 policy objectives. For purposes of this study, three of the 
objectives that are highlighted are: 
• To promote the use of ICT in the stimulation of production, storage, and dissemination of 
in-country information and knowledge in both the public and private sectors 
• To facilitate the broadest possible access to public domain information  
• To provide for establishment of an enabling and desirable legal and regulatory framework 
that, among other things, takes into account the convergence of technologies. 
The Uganda National e-Government Strategy was drafted in 2004. The strategy (Ministry of 
Works, Housing and Communication - Uganda, 2004) identifies establishment of standards 
as one of the areas where action has to be taken. It is stated that an architecture that enables 
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collaboration and seamless integration of various systems is required. The key components of 
such architecture would be a common e-Government Portal, metadata for presenting 
information and services to this portal and a secure e-Government environment to ensure that 
the documents and information sent reaches only the intended recipients and in time. 
5.5.3 Legal Environment 
Of the three countries surveyed, Uganda has made the most strides in putting in place an 
enabling legal environment for e-Government. The following is legislation in Uganda that 
relates to e-Government and information security: 
a) The constitution of the Republic of Uganda (Republic of Uganda, 1995) states in Section 
27 subsection 2 that: 
“No person shall be subjected to interference with the privacy of that person’s home, 
correspondence, communication or other property”. 
This is similar to the Tanzanian constitution and relates to the need for G2G transactions 
to preserve the privacy of the information that is exchanged. 
b) National Information Technology Authority Act (Parliament of Uganda, 2009) which 
defines e-Government as the use of information and communication technologies to 
deliver services in a convenient efficient customer-oriented and cost-effective way. The 
functions of the National Information Technology Authority, as stated in the Act, that 
have direct bearing on this study include regulation and enforcement of standards 
including security standards; regulation of electronic signature infrastructure and other 
matters related to electronic information and provision of guidance on the establishment 
of e-Government. 
This law could be used to address the authentication security requirement by having the 
National Information Technology Authority (NITA) act as the agency in charge of 
issuing digital certificates or electronic credentials to MDAs. 
c) Electronic Transactions Bill (Ministry of Information and Communication Technology - 
Uganda, 2008a). Salient definitions in this bill include: 
“e-Government services” includes a public service provided by electronic means by a 
public body in Uganda; 
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“electronic agent” means a computer program or an electronic or other automated means 
used independently to initiate an action or respond to data messages or performances in 
whole or in part, in an automated transaction; 
The bill strives to create a legal framework for the facilitation of electronic transactions 
through recognition of electronic evidence as part of a legal process, electronic signatures 
and defining the authenticity of the electronic record. 
d) Electronic Signatures Bill (Ministry of Information and Communication Technology - 
Uganda, 2008b): This bill aims to govern the use of electronic signatures and certification 
authorities. 
e) Computer Misuse Act (Parliament of Uganda, 2010): is aimed at making provision for 
the safety and security of electronic transactions and information systems; preventing 
unlawful access, abuse or misuse of information systems including computers and 
making provision for securing the conduct of electronic transactions in a trustworthy 
electronic environment and to provide for other related matters. 
5.5.4 e-Government Implementations 
Examples of e-Government implementations in Uganda were difficult to come by.  
Information was sought by contacting staff of the ICT ministry as well as sending requests to 
an online discussion forum for Ugandan IT professionals, namely the iNetwork forum 
(www.i-network.or.ug). A few examples of e-Government implementations in Uganda are 
described below. 
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a) DistrictNet 
DistrictNet is a G2G infrastructure project that is aimed at interconnecting of government 
districts and was started in 2002. The objective is to improve performance and 
productivity in local government (De Jager & Van Reijswoud, 2007). The project will 
allow exchange of information used in routine operations of government such as payroll 
information and inputs required for centralized planning and budgeting. 
b) SchoolNet 
This project started in 1997 as a program supported by the World Bank and the Ministry 
of Education and Sports of Uganda. A portal of educational resources for schools has 
been developed and is available at the URL www.schoolnetuganda.sc.ug. Schools are 
given user names and passwords to be able to access the content on the portal. The 
project embodies both G2C and C2C functionality, allowing Government to disseminate 
information electronically to schools, and for teachers and students to interact in areas of 
common interest. 
c) e-Tax filing 
In 2010, the Uganda Revenue Authority launched a portal that enables citizens and 
businesses to file their tax returns online and to register payments made to the authority.  
A user needs to register and login in using a Tax Identification Number (TIN) and a pass 
code. The portal is accessible at www.ura.go.ug. The e-Portal will allow both G2C and 
G2B transactions, and it will be expanded in the future to incorporate G2G transactions 
between the revenue authority and other government agencies who require some of the 
information filled in by tax payers for the own transactions. An example is the Ministry 
of Lands who require evidence of tax payments in the process of granting land titles. 
5.5.5 National Cultural Considerations 
A national ICT master plan and e-Government network feasibility study carried out in 
Uganda in 2006 (MEGA-TECH, Inc, 2006) states the following: 
“There is a broad range of individual, and largely uncoordinated, ICT initiatives and 
programs ongoing across the Government. This lack of coordination precludes a 
planned, managed, and adequately funded integrated approach to ICT development. 
Therefore, an ICT Master Plan to guide the coherent development of ICT within the 
government must focus on structures and processes that foster integration, 
73 
 
cooperation, and common objectives and processes. Even successful ICT initiatives 
such as the World Bank project with the Ministry of Finance to implement the 
Financial Management System and the Information Sharing System have not resulted 
in a dialogue of lessons learned with other Government entities to provide a model of 
ICT implementation.”  
The report further notes that many of the initiatives are donor funded, which are difficult to 
sustain. This statement points towards a national culture that does not involve cohesive 
planning. Since one of the research questions’ being addressed in this thesis is aimed at 
developing a sustainable framework, the approach proposed is one that recognizes the 
frequent lack of co-ordination in government initiatives. 
5.6 Discussion 
The previous sections in this chapter have presented the practices at a national level in 
Tanzania, Uganda and Rwanda. A Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Challenges 
(SWOC) analysis in the context of our research question can be obtained from the 
information above for each country as shown in Table 5-2. 
Table 5-2 SWOC analysis of e-Government practices in Tanzania, Uganda and Rwanda 
 Rwanda Tanzania Uganda 
Strength Strong policies that 
encompass international 
standards. Centrally co-
ordinated initiatives 
Some successful 
implementations 
Enabling legislation is 
in place 
Weakness Few internet users/ mobile 
phones; lack of a 
comprehensive national 
framework for information 
security in e-Government 
Lack of enabling 
Legislation; lack of a 
comprehensive national 
framework for information 
security in e-Government 
Few implementations 
and lack of a 
comprehensive national 
framework for 
information security in 
e-Government;  
Opportunities Ongoing implementations; 
and ongoing drafting of 
legislation 
Ongoing implementations Ongoing 
implementations 
Challenges Resource constraints; Resource constraints, 
culture of unstructured 
approach to information 
security 
Resource constraints, 
culture of 
uncoordinated 
initiatives 
 
The challenges for the three countries surveyed are common, that is resource constraints. The 
culture is different from Rwanda where government initiatives are centrally coordinated, with 
ICT initiatives falling under the mandate of the Rwanda Information Technology Authority 
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(RITA) which is now part of the Rwanda Development Board. In the other two countries, 
Tanzania and Uganda, there are un-coordinated and unstructured initiatives. In terms of 
initiatives at a regional (EAC) level, the un-coordinated culture in the two countries shall 
have an effect on the implementation of regional initiatives, and is thus taken into 
consideration in the design of the framework for information security in G2G transactions 
that is presented in chapter eight of this thesis. A framework for the EAC would have to take 
into consideration that combination of factors that are firstly, resource constraints – both 
financially and in terms of adequate human resource skills; secondly, legal and regulatory 
constraints – both insufficient legislation and lack of specific national information security 
frameworks; and thirdly, national culture constraints – un-coordinated or unstructured 
approaches to ICT initiatives. These EAC contextual factors are compared against other 
countries in Table 5-3. The United Kingdom is chosen as representative of the four countries 
whose national information security frameworks are discussed in chapter three, and who are 
ranked in the top ten in the 2010 UN e-Government development index (United Nations, 
2010). South Africa is chosen, because it is the only African country whose information 
security framework was discussed in chapter four. 
Table 5-3 Comparison between EAC and United Kingdom and South Africa 
Factor EAC United Kingdom South Africa 
Resources Average national (public 
sector) ICT related budgets 
of about USD 96 million for 
year 2010 
National (public 
sector) ICT budget of 
about USD 12billion 
for year 20101 
National (public 
sector) ICT budget of 
USD 2.7 billion for 
year 20102 
Legalisation/ 
Regulatory 
Environment 
Some legislation & policies 
are in place; no national 
frameworks 
Legislation in place, 
national frameworks in 
place 3 
Legislation in place, 
national frameworks in 
place4 
Culture Uncoordinated and 
unstructured approaches in 
government 
Coordinated 
approaches  towards e-
Government5 
Coordinated 
approaches towards e-
government6 
5.7  Conclusion 
The context of the EAC has, so far in this chapter, been discussed at a national or 
governmental level.   
                                                 
1 www.directgov.uk 
2 www.treasury.gov.za 
3 Discussed in section 3.2.1 of this thesis 
4 Discussed in sections 3.3.1 and 3.4.2 of this thesis 
5 www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk 
6 www.sita.co.za 
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The contextual issues identified are: 
• All the governments in the EAC countries surveyed are under financial resource 
constraints. National / Public sector ICT budgets are small. The comparison of financial 
resources was the EAC average against one country in Africa and one country in the 
developed world. A lack of adequate skills in ICT has also been identified. The 
framework developed must be such that it can be applied in a resource-poor environment. 
• Legislation related to information security does exist and is continuing to be put in place 
in the EAC. In addition, although no national information security related frameworks are 
in place, there are some related policies such as e-government strategies and national ICT 
policies that include some provisions for information security in e-Government. The 
framework developed must recognize existing legislation and seek to raise awareness 
across MDAs on that legislation. 
• Many e-Government initiatives are not centrally conceived and/ or coordinated. Thus any 
framework developed cannot presuppose coherency across governments even though 
national e-government strategy documents do exist. 
The above contextual issues are the factors that need to be addressed in an information 
security framework for G2G transactions in the EAC. These factors can be summarized as 
resource constraints; legal and regulatory constraints and national culture constraints.  
Identification of these factors answers the second research question of this study.  
The combination of these three factors are what distinguishes the context of the EAC from 
other countries, specifically the countries whose national information security frameworks 
were discussed in chapter three as is presented in Table 5-3. It is possible that some countries 
outside of the EAC have similar issues. In that case the framework developed and presented 
in chapter eight of this thesis could be generalized and applied to countries with a similar 
combination of issues. 
This chapter presented national and regional EAC issues. For G2G transactions that take 
place in individual agencies, there is a need to discover more information on practices in 
individual MDAs with the EAC. This was done, as part of this study, through a survey whose 
findings are presented in chapter six.  
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Chapter 6 Survey of Practices in Individual MDAs 
6.1  Introduction 
In chapter four, data has been obtained from secondary sources, in an attempt to analyze the 
context in which G2G transactions are being carried out in the EAC. This information 
however needs to be supplemented with empirical data on actual G2G transactions taking 
place if any. Furthermore data needs to be obtained on the information security practices in 
place that surround the G2G transactions that are taking place.  
 
The use of empirical data in interpretive approaches is discussed in de Villiers (de Villiers, 
2005) where surveys and questionnaires are one of the research strategies that overlap 
between the positivist and interpretivist approaches. The objective of the survey presented in 
this chapter was to supplement the findings from literature that are presented in chapter four 
by obtaining actual practices in  central government (ministries and departments) and 
government agencies (including parastatal organisations). The survey was also aimed at 
triangulating some of the information obtained in chapter five, from reviewing Government 
initiatives in e-Government, including application of standards or specific mechanisms to 
ensure security. 
 
The questionnaire included both closed and open type responses. Open responses were 
designed to encourage descriptive answers on what is actually being done and what the views 
of the MDAs are. The questionnaire used is included in this thesis as Appendix A. 
 
6.2 Areas Covered by the Survey 
The questionnaire covered nine areas designed to address security mechanisms/ solutions that 
are in place in the MDA for G2G transactions thus contributing to answering the research 
question on the EAC contextual issues. The areas surveyed also attempted to obtain 
additional information on the security mechanisms mentioned in the literature that was 
reviewed in chapter four. The areas that were surveyed are: 
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6.2.1  Presence of an information security policy 
The East African Regional e-Government Strategy, (East African Community Secretariat, 
2005) states that the EAC shall develop a secure information infrastructure in all the partner 
states. By implication, all participating MDAs shall have to have secure information 
infrastructures in place both for internal and for G2G transactions. An organizational 
information security policy is a tool that is useful in documenting the information security 
guidelines that need to be adhered to be an organization. Such a document would typically 
incorporate the particular contextual issues that are relevant to the organization and is usually 
aligned with the organizations operational activities and strategic goals. An organizational 
information security policy should guide both internal organizational transaction and external 
collaborations. For the purpose of this survey, a question was asked as to whether or not an 
information security policy was in place. 
6.2.2  Mode of transaction with other MDAs 
The definition used for a G2G transaction for this research was the transactions between one 
government agency and another (within a country or across countries). The question in the 
survey was aimed at establishing whether the MDA transacts manually, by email or through 
access to computer systems of other MDAs. It was also necessary to establish an indication 
of the volume of electronic transactions that are actually taking place. However, even for 
manual transactions, security mechanisms and practices need to be in place, so as to ease 
transformation to electronic transactions when it occurs. The mode of transaction would 
enable the design of an information security framework that takes into consideration current 
modes of transaction (whether manual or electronic) and provides for future changes or 
modifications to the mode of the transactions. Such flexibility in the framework shall 
enhance the sustainability of the framework, which is part of the third research question of 
this study. 
6.2.3  The kind of information involved in transactions 
The need for data protection for information in e-Government transactions is highlighted in 
the EAC Regional e-Government Framework (East African Community Secretariat, 2005), 
and is reflected in e-Government strategy of some of the partner countries (United Republic 
of Tanzania, 2009), (RITA, 2006). Additionally, as presented in chapter four, partner 
countries of the EAC have recently put in place legislation that is related to protection of 
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electronic transactions. The survey question on the kind of information involved in 
transactions was to establish if sensitive information such as confidential information or 
payment related information was being exchanged between MDAs. The aim was to establish 
the security requirements based on the information involved in the G2G transactions, which 
is the first research question of this study.  
6.2.4  Concerns in electronic transactions 
In chapter three, policy level information security frameworks (Cabinet Office UK, 2008) 
pointed out some concerns that are addressed by governments, including Business Continuity 
and Access Control. The survey question on concerns in electronic transactions was aimed at 
identifying areas perceived as high risk in electronic transactions. The options given in this 
case were fraud – that would possibly result from weak access control; network breakdowns 
resulting in interruption of electronic G2G transactions and any other concerns that the 
respondent could be aware of. In EAC, issues such as frequent power failures and poor 
communications infrastructure may be a major concern in implementing e-services, leading 
to network breakdowns and thus the need for addressing of business continuity as part of an 
information security framework. The responses to this question shall therefore contribute to 
developing the information security framework, which is the third research question of this 
study. 
6.2.5  Security mechanisms in use for data exchange 
The country specific e-government documents mention mechanisms that may be used to 
address information security (RITA, 2006). The survey question on security mechanisms in 
place was to establish whether these mechanisms are practically in use in MDAs. 
Mechanisms that are already in use would be included in the proposed framework as part of 
the interpretive research approach, focusing on and using the positives that are already in 
place to come up with a solution to security of G2G transactions in the EAC. The security 
mechanisms could include a wide range of technological tools such as PKI or any other 
encryption mechanisms, antivirus software, etc.  The question was also aimed at seeking to 
find a correlation, if any, between the kinds of information exchanged and the mechanisms in 
place. This survey thus included an open ended question to allow respondents to fully 
describe the mechanisms in place. 
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6.2.6  Presence of binding agreements between collaborating MDAs 
 In a G2G, one MDA exchanges information with another MDA based on a request by one of 
the MDAs or perhaps as a requirement of existing legislation. The survey question of the 
presence of binding agreements related to the security information between the MDAs was to 
establish if such agreements exist. The presence of such an agreement would mean that, even 
in the absence of national level legislation in respect to security of information exchange in 
G2G transactions, the MDAs can still transact in an accountable manner. Such an agreement 
could be in the form of a contract or a memorandum of understanding. 
6.2.7  Presence of common format for exchange 
 Interoperability is one of the challenges in electronic G2G transactions and some of the 
policy level information security frameworks studied have provided for standards or 
mechanisms to address interoperability (SITA, 2007), (Ministry of the Presidency, Spain, 
2010). Since the parties in a G2G transaction may be running different applications in 
different computing environments with different data formats, there has to be a mechanism to 
ensure interoperability, to ensure successful electronic exchange of information without 
comprising the integrity of the information. This survey question was aimed at collecting 
information on formats in place that enhance interoperability. 
6.2.8  Presence of common language or terminology or laws 
Ultimately electronic G2G transactions involve machine to machine interactions enabled for 
example by web services as seen in some of the studies cited in chapter two of this thesis 
(Hu, Quirolgico, & Scarfone, 2008), (Gutiérrez, Rosado, & Fernández-Medina, 2009). In 
transactions that involve machine to machine communications, for example, through web 
services, lack of semantic interoperability can lead to incorrect authorization or access 
control decisions. This survey question was aimed at investigating if MDAS define standard 
terminology to be used in multiparty transactions. Such terminology would save as a basis 
for addressing semantic interoperability in G2G transactions.  
6.2.9  Views of the MDAs on the need for standards 
MDAs were requested to provide their views on the need for development and adoption of 
national standards related to information security. This question was to establish whether 
MDAs saw the need of national frameworks such as those examined in chapter three of this 
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thesis, and or adoption of other international / regional standards related to information 
security. 
6.3 The Survey Respondents 
Questionnaires were sent by email and or physical delivery to fifty MDAs in the three 
countries surveyed which are Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda. Of these, 18 MDAs responded. 
A follow up of those who did not respond was done by telephone, email or physical visits.  
Eighteen of the MDAs that did not respond gave the reason that they did not have IT 
departments in place and as such felt they were not in a position to respond. Four of these 18 
MDAs, all based in Rwanda, referred us back to the Rwanda Information Technology 
Authority (RITA – now part of the Rwanda Development Board) as the authority that 
addresses all IT related issues. RITA did respond to the questionnaire. The remaining 14 
MDAs did not give a reason as to why they did not respond. The pattern of responses of the 
questionnaire is shown in Table 6-1. 
Table 6-1 Pattern of Responses to Questionnaire 
Country 
No. of 
questionnaires 
sent out 
No. of MDAs 
that responded 
No. of MDAs that 
gave a reason for 
lack of response 
No. of MDAs that did 
not give a reason for 
not responding 
Tanzania 20 8 10 2 
Uganda 20 6 4 10 
Rwanda 10 4 4 2 
 
50 18 18 14 
 
Given the difficulties in collecting data on ICT related issues as discovered in other studies 
(Msuya, 2010), the data collected from 18 MDAs was taken to be significant enough to 
represent the practices in the EAC. 
 
Of the responses, eight were from Tanzania, six from Uganda and four from Rwanda. 
Respondents were asked to state whether they were from central government (ministry or 
department); an agency, parastatal or any other government institution (government agency). 
From the 18 respondents, 5 were from ministries or departments, and 13 were from 
government agencies. 
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The respondents were also asked to state their role in the MDA as being Managerial (IT), 
Managerial (Other), IT Support or Operations. Of the 18 responses received, 10 were from 
Managerial (IT), 2 were from Managerial (other), 6 were from IT Support and none from 
operations. The profile of the respondents is shown in Figure 6-1 below: 
 
 
Figure 6-1 Profile of Respondents 
 
The figure shows that over 50% of the respondents occupied a managerial role in IT. This is 
to be expected as the survey questions touched on both policy and technical issues. 
6.4  Key Findings 
The survey was carried out to supplement findings on contextual issues that were presented 
in chapter four, and to obtain some insights into how a framework can be developed for 
information security. The key findings from the survey are summarized in the sub sections 
below, while the detailed findings are presented in the next section. The three subsections are 
summarized based on three research questions. 
6.4.1  Information Security requirements for G2G transactions in the EAC 
G2G transactions are indeed taking place, and 44% of the respondents indicated that these 
interactions involved direct access to systems in the other agencies. The security 
requirements for such access would involve authorization and access control mechanisms 
and will be discussed further in chapter six. However, only 33% of the respondents indicated 
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that binding agreements are in place and common formats for data interchange exist. Even 
less, 22% indicated common terminology for data exchange between MDAs which points to 
a need to enhance the security mechanisms with mechanisms for semantic interoperability. 
Additionally over 50% of the respondents were concerned with the possibility of both fraud 
and network break downs thus the requirement to ensure proper access control and 
authorizations, as well as putting in place mechanisms to ensure availability of systems. 
6.4.2 Contextual issues in MDAs in the EAC 
The contextual issues discovered in the survey include the presence of manual interactions 
between MDAs. Over 60% of the respondents indicated some form of manual transactions 
amongst agencies. The other key discoveries from the responses are lack of cross government 
interoperability guidelines, as compared to the countries whose guidelines were presented in 
chapter three. Another discovery was that, although some agencies lack information security 
policies, all MDAs have some security mechanisms in place, indicating awareness of the 
need for information security.  
 
6.4.3 Information Security Framework for G2G transactions 
Respondents were unanimous in the need for standards for secure information exchange in 
G2G transactions. One Respondent put it this way: 
 “There are many IT security solutions that institutions may deploy. Some may be 
stronger than the other, and some may be incompatible with the other. Then their 
differences may not facilitate the information exchange. That’s why I think that 
any government needs to define standards for the security they want according to 
their requirements. Having the security standards will facilitate even the 
maintenance and the interoperability of the security systems that have been 
deployed in different government institutions.” 
However, it was interesting to note that even where governments have documents that state 
or prescribe specific information security standards or mechanisms for e-Government as is 
the case for Rwanda, 75% respondent agencies from Rwanda did not reflect these at all in 
their responses. Significant also was the correlation between a binding agreement being in 
place with the MDA having a common format of data exchange. That is, all MDAs that 
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indicated that a binding agreement was in place also indicated the presence of a common 
format of data exchange. 
 
These survey findings are combined with the other research done to come up with an 
information security framework for G2G transactions. 
6.5  Detailed Findings 
The detailed findings of the survey questions are as follows for each of the survey questions: 
i. Presence of information security policy: All MDAs except three have a documented 
information security policy. 
ii. Mode of transaction with other MDAs: Most agencies transact through all the three 
modes specified which are, manually, email, and access to computer systems of the other 
MDA. Eight out of the eighteen agencies surveyed indicated transactions involving 
access to computer systems of the other agencies. 
iii. Type of information involved in the transactions: Sixteen agencies indicated that payment 
information is involved in the transaction, and fifteen indicated confidential information. 
Other information indicated in the responses includes data for budget preparation and 
reports. 
iv. Concerns in electronic transactions. Eleven MDAs are concerned with fraud and fourteen 
with network breakdowns. The other concerns raised include reconciling manual and 
electronic transactions where both kinds of transactions are used. 
v. Security mechanisms: Varied mechanisms were listed including passwords, encryption, 
Secure Socket Layer (SSL) certificates and access control lists.  
vi. Binding agreements: Twelve out of the eighteen MDAs surveyed do not have binding 
agreements. Where agreements were in place, they are in the form of a memorandum of 
understanding (MoU). 
vii. Common format of exchange: Fourteen MDAs do not have a common format for 
exchange of information. The MDAs that do have a format indicated that format as being 
Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) secure 
messaging service, system interfaces, and a national payroll standard. 
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viii. Common terminology/ language: Eight MDAs do not have a common basis for language 
or terminology. The MDAs that indicated the presence of a common terminology stated 
English, laws of Uganda, payroll manual and standards. 
ix. Views of the need for standards: All responses indicated a need for information security 
standards at a government level. 
The data obtained is as summarized in Table 6-2. 
Table 6-2 Summary of Survey Responses 
Area Surveyed RW TZ UG TOTAL 
 Y N Y N Y N Y N 
Presence of information security policy 2 2 7 1 6 0 15 3 
Mode of transaction with other MDAs:         
Manual 3 1 8 0 3 3 14 4 
Email 4 0 8 0 5 1 17 1 
Access to systems 0 4 4 4 4 2 8 10 
Type of transactions:         
Payment 4 0 7 1 5 1 16 2 
Confidential 4 0 7 1 4 2 15 3 
Other 1 3 3 5 2 4 6 12 
Concerns in electronic transactions:         
Fraud 0 4 7 1 4 2 11 6 
Network Breakdowns 3 1 5 3 6 0 14 4 
Other 1 3 1 7 2 4 4 14 
Security mechanisms 1 3 7 1 6 0 14 4 
Binding agreements 1 3 3 5 2 4 6 12 
Common format of exchange 1 3 3 5 2 4 6 12 
Common terminology/ language/ laws 0 4 0 8 4 2 14 4 
Views on the need for standards  4 0 8 0 6 0 18 0 
RW=Rwanda TZ=Tanzania UG=Uganda 
 
The findings show that: 
i. Where a binding agreement is in place, there is also a common format of 
exchange. 
ii. The need for standards is unanimous for all respondents. 
The significance of these findings is that while no national information security frameworks 
have been developed in the EAC, MDAs do recognize the need for standards and have put in 
place some ways to ensure interoperability across MDAs that are participating in G2G 
transactions. 
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The secondary aim of this survey was to triangulate with the findings in chapter four. The 
areas where the survey confirms information presented in chapter five include establishment 
that electronic G2G transactions do actually take place as described in the examples of e-
government implementations in the three countries surveyed and common formats and 
binding agreements are in place. 
 
A mismatch was, however, observed in the survey response to the question on the need for 
national level standards in the case of Rwanda. The e-government strategy document 
mentions standards, but respondents from MDAs did not refer to those standards. This 
finding raises the need for a process model that will lead to MDAs continually checking what 
national level initiatives are in place, and basing their own initiatives on them. The process 
model that is presented as part of the information security framework proposed in this thesis 
addresses this need. 
6.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, the results of a survey on the individual practices related to information 
security of MDAs in the EAC have been presented. These findings indicate that some 
practices exist, but there is a need for a common framework that addresses the gaps in the 
information security frameworks in individual agencies. Although responses were obtained 
from only 18 MDAs out of the fifty to which questionnaires were sent, the responses 
obtained will add significant utility to the framework that is developed as part of the study. 
The framework, however, should be such that it considers three factors that were identified in 
the situational analysis presented in chapter five which are resource constraints; legal and 
regulatory constraints and national culture constraints. 
 
This chapter concludes the discovery phase of the study, and all the discoveries presented so 
far are synthesized in chapter seven to come up with information security requirements for 
G2G transactions in the EAC in answer to the first research question.  
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PART IV: PROPOSED INFORMATION SECURITY FRAMEWORK 
FOR G2G TRANSACTIONS IN THE EAC  
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Chapter 7 Proposed Information Security Requirements for G2G 
Transactions in EAC 
7.1 Introduction 
In parts II and III of this thesis, discoveries related to the three research questions were 
presented. These discoveries were firstly from a literature review of researches and 
implementations related to information security for e-government in general and G2G 
transactions, and secondly from a situational analysis and survey of practices in the EAC. 
 
Following the appreciative inquiry process adopted as one of the methods this study, after the 
discoveries phase, comes the dream phase. This chapter presents the dream phase of the 
Appreciative Inquiry process. The dream phase involves creating a clear results-oriented 
vision in relation to the discovered potential. The dream phase builds upon the discoveries 
and extends those to come up with an ideal. This vision is translated into an implementable 
design in the next phase, which is the design phase. Finally in the implementation phase, the 
design is adopted and implemented. 
  
In this phase, the knowledge discovered and presented in chapters 2 through 6 is analyzed to 
bring out the positive ideas that can be used to visualize information security requirements 
for G2G requirements in the EAC.  
 
The dream phase is conducted either by using matrices or brainstorming sessions. In this 
study, the dream phase is conducted by presenting the discoveries in matrices. In order to 
build a list of information security requirements for G2G in the EAC, a set of matrices is 
built based on discoveries of each chapter of parts II and III. Each matrix is refined based on 
subsequent discoveries. At the end of the chapter, these discoveries are synthesized into a set 
of information security requirements for G2G transactions in the EAC. 
7.2  Key Discoveries from Part II 
Part II of the thesis covered three chapters which are chapter two – Research related to 
information security in e-government; chapter three – Examples of policy level information 
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security frameworks; and chapter four – Standards related to information security for e-
government. 
7.2.1  Discoveries from Related Research 
The first set of matrices is built using discoveries in sections 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 of this thesis. 
These are discoveries include requirements for information security and mechanisms for 
meeting the information security requirements as shown in Table 7-1 below. 
Table 7-1 Mechanisms to implement information security requirements 
Domain Requirement Mechanism 
General Information security 
requirements 
Authentication Encryption, standards 
Access Control RBAC, ABAC, GBAC, Access 
control policies, semantic web 
Message Integrity Encryption 
Confidentiality Encryption, Standards 
Privacy Encryption, Standards, Policies 
Non Repudiation Legislation 
Trust Contractual Obligations 
G2G Specific Requirements Formal Contracts  
Legal Compliance  
Reuse   
Technical Neutrality Web Services, Service Oriented 
Architectures 
EAC Specific Requirements Need to consider context Open standards  
Need not to require full 
implementations 
Use of maturity models for tracking 
progress 
 
There is some overlap on what is presented as a requirement and what is presented as a 
mechanism in some cases. A clear separation will be achieved once all the discoveries are 
presented and synthesized in section 7.2.4. In addition, the EAC specific requirements cited 
in the research studies are not sufficient to fully address the challenges stated in chapter one 
of this thesis. These discoveries are therefore combined with more discoveries from the other 
chapters in part II and with the EAC situational analysis in Part III before attempting to 
answer this study’s research questions. 
7.2.2 Discoveries from Policy Frameworks 
The examples of policy frameworks presented in chapter three mostly add to discoveries that 
can adopted with modification in the design of an information security framework. The same 
domains used in the matrices above can be used to present the discoveries. The discoveries 
are presented in Table 7-2 below. 
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Table 7-2 Discoveries from policy frameworks 
Domain Requirement Mechanism 
General Information security 
Requirements  
Availability Business Continuity 
G2G Specific Requirements Organizational structures Clear information security roles 
Interoperability Technical, operational and semantic 
interoperability, use of standards 
EAC Specific Requirements Sustainability Governance, Risk, Compliance, 
mapping of outputs of roles; 
addressing of information security 
across government and in individual 
agencies, use of open standards, tie 
to overall government goals 
 
The sustainability requirement is part of the third research question of this study for each the 
use of standards is suggested as a way to meet that requirement. The discoveries from the 
standards discussed in chapter four are discussed in the sub section below. 
7.2.3 Discoveries from Standards 
In chapter four, non-technical and technical standards were presented. The discoveries from 
these add mainly to the proposed mechanisms for information security requirements that 
have already been discovered. These are presented in Table 7-3 below. 
Table 7-3 Discoveries from Standards 
Domain Requirement Mechanism 
General Information 
security Requirements 
Accountability Provision of assurance through, 
technical and non-technical 
measures 
Confidentiality, Integrity, 
Availability and Accountability 
Use of open standards including 
XACML, SAML and WS Security 
G2G Specific 
Requirements 
Internal Processes to address 
information security 
Promotion of effective information 
security within organizational 
boundaries. 
Privacy cross border legislation 
Authentication National level measures for 
authentication;  
EAC Specific 
Requirements 
Consider influence of national 
culture 
 
Sustainability Critical Success Factors 
 
7.2.4  Synthesized Requirements 
The first research question of this study is to identify information security requirements for 
G2G transactions in the EAC, and a G2G transaction has been defined as “The sharing of 
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information resources and services between government agencies in a restricted network 
setting with the ultimate aim of providing comprehensive, easy to access services to 
citizens.” 
 
The discoveries presented in sections 7.2.1-7.2.3 present requirements and mechanisms at 
different levels of granularity. For purposes of this study, two levels of granularity are 
considered in answering the first research questions. At the lower level, six security 
requirements are derived from discoveries as being: 
• Authentication 
• Authorization and Access Control 
• Privacy 
• Data Integrity 
• Availability 
• Trust and Non Repudiation 
 
The above requirements are grouped, at a higher level, into four security objectives, and the 
description of each objective aligned with the first research question as well as the definition 
of G2G transactions. The security objectives are: 
i. Confidentiality: This is defined as the principle of ensuring that an MDA 
participating in a G2G exchange only accesses information and systems that they 
are authorized to and any privacy requirements are preserved during the 
transaction. Confidentiality, as a security objective is motivated by the nature of 
G2G transactions identified in the survey of MDAs that was presented in chapter 
six of this thesis. 
ii. Integrity: This is defined as the principle of ensuring that the completeness, 
correctness and consistency of data are not compromised during exchange 
between MDAs that are participating in a G2G transaction. Integrity as a security 
objective is motivated by the nature of G2G transactions in which different sets of 
data may be obtained from different MDAs for the purpose of providing a 
composite service.  The integrity of all the data obtained should be maintained 
throughout the G2G transaction. 
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iii. Availability: This is defined as the principle of ensuring that the systems and the 
data that is required by MDAs in G2G transactions are available when required. 
Availability as a security objective is motivated by the recognition that G2G 
transactions ultimately aim at achieving easy access to services to citizens when 
required. 
iv. Accountability: This is defined as the principle of ensuring that MDAs involved 
take responsibility for the data, and or system access they provide to other MDAs. 
Accountability as a security objective is motivated by the recognition that there 
are already incidences reported where a G2G transaction has resulted in some 
fraud or foul play in the EAC (The Guardian Newspaper, 2009). Thus MDAs 
must have mechanisms to ensure that other MDAs trust the data or services that 
they provide. 
 
The Confidentiality objective encompasses three security requirements which are 
Authentication, Privacy and Authorization and Access Control. The integrity objective 
encompasses the Data integrity requirement, while the Availability and Accountability 
objectives cover the availability and the trust and non-repudiation requirements respectively. 
The description of the six information security requirements is shown in Table 7-4. 
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Table 7-4 Security Objectives and Requirements 
Security Objective Security Requirement Description of Requirement 
Confidentiality Authentication Verifying the identity of a user, process, or 
device, often as a prerequisite to allowing access 
to resources in an information system 
Privacy Control of access to information in accordance 
to laws, regulations or policies 
Authorization and Access 
Control 
The decision to allow a user, process, or device 
access to information or information processing 
services, and the process of granting or denying 
specific requests for obtaining and using 
information and related information processing 
services 
Integrity Data Integrity The property that data has not been altered in an 
unauthorized manner 
Availability Availability The property that a service is available whenever 
required 
Accountability Trust and Non-
Repudiation: 
The attribute of a person or organization that 
provides confidence to others of the 
qualifications, capabilities, and reliability of that 
entity to perform specific tasks and fulfill 
assigned responsibilities and not to deny any 
actions done 
 
The description of the requirements presented in Table 7-4 is a generic description that could 
apply to any kind of electronic transaction. Furthermore, the six requirements could be stated 
at a different of granularity depending on the context in which they are being applied. For 
instance, the trust and non-repudiation requirement may be broken down into two separate 
requirements or the Integrity objective could be taken to encompass more than one 
requirement, that is, include data, communications and systems integrity.  For this study, 
however, the level presented is seen to be sufficient based on the definition of G2G 
transactions which is the exchange of information and services between government agencies 
in a restricted network setting. In particular: 
• Authorization and Access Control are grouped together as one requirement. This is 
because in a G2G transaction, the user or system requesting for authorization must be 
requesting for a particular service from the responding system. Thus an authorization 
request must be responded to not only with an authorization to access a system but 
also to which resources or services the requester is allowed to use. 
• Data integrity is the only requirement addressed under the Integrity objective. Other 
possible forms of integrity such as system integrity or communications integrity are 
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not included. The justification for this is that the valuable resource being secured in a 
G2G transaction is the data. While communications between two MDAs participated 
in a G2G transaction may be compromised, this is addressed under the 
Confidentiality objective with the need to ensure that any systems or communication 
line accesses are authenticated authorized and preserve the privacy of the data that is 
being communicated in the G2G transaction. 
• Trust and Non-Repudiation are grouped together as one requirement. The justification 
for this level of granularity is that in a G2G transaction, an MDA will typically have 
to establish trust through an agreement, since the parties involved are both 
government agencies. The trust and non-repudiation requirements would form 
inseparable parts of such an agreement. 
 
The security objectives and security requirements, together address part of the first research 
question. The motivation for the identified security objectives and requirements is tied to the 
EAC contextual analysis presented in part III. The discoveries in part III are analyzed further 
in section 7.3 in order to fully answer the study’s first research question, and to build a 
foundation to answer the third research question. 
7.3  Key discoveries from Part III 
Part III which presented the EAC situational context consists of two chapters, which are 
chapters five and six. In chapter five, the EAC context was established by outlining 
legislation and policies related to information security and e-government, and by presenting 
examples of e-Government initiatives in three countries of the EAC. Chapter six presents a 
survey of information security practices that relate to G2G transactions in MDAs in the EAC. 
Since this part focused specifically on the EAC, the matrices are presented in a way that 
recognizes or appreciates the positives in the EAC situation. Unlike the discoveries pointed 
out in sections 7.1, and 7.2, this section starts to build up to the original findings of the study 
that bring out the EAC context. 
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7.3.1  Discoveries from EAC e-government Initiatives 
The situational analysis shows that there are some examples of successful e-government 
implementations and legislation that address information security. The addressing of the 
security requirements can be summarized as: 
• Mentioned (M):  The need for the security requirement is recognized and mentioned in 
documentation. 
• Described (D):  Methods of meeting the security requirement are described in 
documentation. 
• Implemented (I):  Security mechanisms to meet the security requirement have been 
practically implemented in an e-Government initiative. The use of the security 
mechanisms was established from interviewing staff of MDAs involved in e-Government 
projects and from documentation from project websites where available. 
 
The addressing of information security for each country surveyed is presented in table 7-5. 
Table 7-5 Information Security in Tanzanian, Ugandan and Rwandan e-Government Initiatives 
Requirement 
Area 
Authentica-
tion Privacy 
Authorization 
and Access 
Control 
Data Integrity 
 
Availability Trust and Non Repudiation 
 R T U R T U R T U R T U R T U R T U 
Policies, 
Strategies  
&Standards 
D - - D M M D M M D M M M M M D - - 
Legal 
Environment - - - M M M M M D - - D - - - - - D 
e-Govt 
Implementa-
tions 
I I I - - - I I I I I - I I I - - - 
Key: R=Rwanda  T = Tanzania  U= Uganda 
 
For each information security requirement identified for G2G transactions, the discoveries 
can be summarized as follows: 
Authentication: All the e-Government implementations studied in the three countries have 
implemented authentication mechanisms mainly in the form of passwords. One way to do 
this would be to use a unique identifier such as a national identification number, and include 
a section in existing laws that would recognize that national ID as the definitive authenticator 
of a citizen. There is a need as well for an authentication mechanism for an MDA in order for 
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them to be recognized when providing or using electronic services. This could be in the form 
of an electronic certificate issued by an authority recognized by law. 
 
Privacy: The findings indicate that privacy is not considered in any of the e-Government 
implementations studied although it is mentioned or described in legislation, policies and 
strategies. The reason for this may be that most of the current e-Government initiatives are 
more on presenting information to citizens rather than obtaining information from citizens, 
and using that information to provide a service. Thus as the implementations become more 
complex, there is a need for MDAs to refer to existing legislation, policies and standards. 
 
Authorization and Access Control: This requirement has been fairly well covered in the 
legal and regulatory environment as well as in the e-Government implementations. Further 
analysis is required to see whether the authorization and access control mechanisms 
addresses all kinds of e-Government transactions, that is, Government to Government, 
Government to Citizen and Government to Business as the context of a transaction affects 
access control and authorization mechanisms implemented. 
 
Availability: This requirement was addressed in e-government implementations across the 
three countries. 
 
Data Integrity: In Uganda, data integrity has been addressed in legislation. In the other two 
countries, there is a need to emulate the steps that Uganda has taken in improving on the 
legal and regulatory environment to address this requirement. 
 
Trust and Non-Repudiation: This requirement has not been met in the e-Government 
implementations studied. The explanation for this may be similar to that of privacy, and there 
is therefore a need to address it more comprehensively in the legal and regulatory 
environment and to tie those requirements to any future e-Government implementations. 
 
The discoveries in part III also resulted in answering the second research question of this 
study by identifying 3 factors that need to be taken into consideration in an information 
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security framework for G2G transactions in the EAC. These factors are resource constraints; 
legal and regulatory constraints and national culture constraints. 
7.3.2  Discoveries from Survey of MDAs 
At the individual MDA level, the relationship between the six security requirements of  
authentication, privacy, authorization and access control, integrity, availaibility and trust and 
non-repudation are as shown in Table 7-6. 
Table 7-6: Relationship Between Areas surveyed and SecurityRequirements 
Area Surveyed Security Requirement 
Presence of information security policy All 
Mode of transaction with other MDAs All 
Concerns in electronic transactions Authorisation and Access Control, Availability 
Security mechanisms* All 
Binding agreements Authorisation and Access Control 
Common format of exchange Authorisation and Access Control 
Common terminology/ language Authorisation and Access Control 
Views of the need for standards All 
 
* The security mechanisms that were listed in the survey responses were technical 
mechanisms including use of passwords, encryption, SSL and access control lists. 
7.4  Information Security requirements for the EAC 
The discoveries presented in sections 7.2 and 7.3 can now be synthesized to form an answer 
to the first research question which was “What are the information security requirements for 
G2G transactions in the EAC context?” The information security requirements and the 
mechanisms to address these requirements in the EAC context are presented in sections 7.4.1 
and 7.4.2. 
7.4.1 Information Security Requirements for G2G transactions in the EAC. 
The information security requirements for G2G in the EAC are Authentication, Authorization 
and Access Control, Privacy, Integrity, availability, trust and non-repudiation. These are 
generic requirements, but the EAC context and the G2G transactional nature then influences 
the mechanisms that meet these requirements. These mechanisms may be tried and tested 
methods such as international standards, or methods and tools that are adapted to the EAC 
context. In the framework proposed in chapter eight, some mechanisms are proposed that can 
be adopted by MDAs in the EAC. Ultimately, the mechanism chosen must address the 
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matching security requirement and meet the security objective. These mechanisms have not 
been generalized because they will depend on the implementing agency’s resources. 
7.4.2 EAC issues to be addressed in an information security framework 
The EAC factors that will influence the addressing of the information security requirements 
in a framework are resource constraints; legal and regulatory constraints and national culture 
constraints. Five perspectives are introduced in this section to address how these constraints 
can be overcome, or how information security for G2G transactions can be achieved despite 
these constraints. The five perspectives are: 
i. Technical: The technical perspective involves looking at addressing information 
security through mechanisms implementable at a system level (hardware or software) 
to meet information security requirements. Examples of these include the use of 
technical standards such as XACML and SAML. From the EAC context, technical 
mechanisms need to be “tried and tested” and based on open freely available 
standards. However, for G2G transactions, a novel mechanism is developed as part of 
this study. This is the Governance and Attribute Based Access Control (GABAC) 
mechanism that is described in detail in chapter eight and is based on open standards. 
The use of open standards, and the technical mechanisms addressed the resource 
constraint factor in the EAC. The use of open freely available standards means that 
EAC MDAs can implement robust mechanisms without having to pay much for the 
software used. At the same time, freely available documentation on those standards 
will allow the limited ICT human resources to upgrade their skills or acquire new 
skills without incurring high costs.  
ii. Operational: The operational perspective looks at addressing information security 
through mechanisms implemented within organizational units of an MDA to meet 
security requirements. Examples of these include the implementation of risk 
assessments and business continuity plans within an MDA. The operational 
perspective addressed the culture constraint factor by ensuring that initiatives are 
addressed not only at a national level but also at an organizational level. So even in 
the case where there is no central national coordination, each MDA involved in a 
G2G transaction, can follow standard operational guidelines to move towards 
addressing of information security requirements. 
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iii. Governance: The governance perspective looks at addressing information security 
through mechanisms at policy level within MDAs, and across national and regional 
government to meet security requirements. Examples of these include legislation and 
contractual agreements between MDAs. These mechanisms address the legal and 
regulatory constraints factor. 
iv. Process: The process perspective looks at addressing information security through a 
series of steps that MDAs can follow to implement a framework that will meet the 
information security requirements such that the resource constraints, legal and 
regulatory constraints and national culture constraints recognized in the EAC do not 
hinder the addressing of information security. 
v. Maturity: The maturity perspective looks at ensuring that the information security 
framework used allows for continual improvement in information security practices 
within MDAs and across national and regional governments.  
7.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter answers to the second research question, which where presented at the end of 
chapter five, have been combined with the discoveries from Parts II and III of the thesis to 
come up with a detailed answer to the first research question of this study, which is“What 
are the information security requirements for G2G transactions in the EAC context?”. This 
question has been anwered by stating security objectives, requirements and perspectives that 
need to be addressed for G2G transactions in the EAC context. Three of the perpectives that 
is the technical, operational, and governance perspectives are associated with the standards 
and both technical and non technical mechanisms for implementation. 
 
This chapter leads to the design of a  framework to meet information security requirements 
for G2G transactions in answer to the final research question. The framework design is 
presented in chapter eight and uses the foundation of the security objectives, requirements 
and perspectives that are discussed in this chapter. The framework also details the 
mechanisms that are required to address the information security requirements for G2G 
transactions in the EAC. 
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Chapter 8 TOG Framework 
8.1 Introduction 
In chapter seven, the first research question was answered with the stating of information 
security objectives and requirements as being Confidentiality with the specific requirements 
of authentication, privacy and authorization and access control; Integrity with the specific 
requirement of data integrity; Availability; and Accountability with the specific requirement 
of trust and non-repudiation. Mechanisms to meet these requirements need to be cognisant of 
the EAC context. The second research question is “What are the factors to be addressed in 
an information security framework for G2G transactions in the EAC?” This question was 
answered at the end of chapter five. The three factors identified were resource constraints; 
legal and regulatory constraints and national culture constraints. 
 
The rest of this chapter answers the third research question which is “How can a sustainable 
information security framework for G2G transactions be achieved in the EAC context?” This 
is the Design Phase of the Appreciative Inquiry process in which a framework, dubbed the 
Technical, Operational and Governance (TOG) framework to address information security 
for G2G transactions in the EAC is designed. 
8.2  Design Process 
In chapter seven, the discoveries from earlier chapters were used to come up with 
information security requirements for G2G transactions. In addition, mechanisms that may 
address some of these requirements are discovered. Furthermore, five perspectives to capture 
the EAC context are presented at the end of the chapter seven.  
 
In order to design an information security requirements framework for G2G transactions in 
the EAC, it is now necessary to come up with a design that meets the information security 
requirements. The discoveries on mechanisms and perspectives that are presented in chapter 
seven are used to develop design artifacts that will form elements of the framework. Design 
artifacts may be constructs, models, methods or instantiations (Hevner, March, Park, & Ram, 
2004). In addition to developing design artifacts, the design processes bases on a proposal by 
Carlsson (2006) to include an object design, realization design and a process design in an 
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information systems research initiative in order to come up with a successful problem 
solution. An object design is the intervention required to solve the problem (in the case of 
this study, the design of a sustainable framework for G2G transactions in the EAC). The 
realization design is guidance on how to implement the object design, and the process design 
is the methods and techniques to implement the object design. 
 
The five perspectives discovered in chapter seven form the design artifacts which are 
represented in the object design as models. These are a Technical Model, an Operational 
Model, a Governance Model, a Process Model and a Maturity Model. The first three models 
include components or mechanisms that address the meeting of information security 
requirements stated in chapter seven, in response to the first research question. The 
component or mechanisms also address the factors to be considered in the EAC stated in 
chapter five in response to the second research question. For each of the models, guidelines 
on implementation of the model are developed and useful resources to be used by the 
implementing MDAs are included. This forms the realizable design. The Process Model 
details a process cycle through which MDAs can implement the Technical, Operational and 
Governance Model while the Maturity Model outlines how the MDAs can gradually improve 
on their ability to meet the Information Security requirements over time. The Process Model 
and the Maturity Model represent the process design and are cognizant of the three factors 
that need to be considered in the EAC context which are resource constraints, legal and 
regulatory constraints and national culture constraints. 
 
The design process is shown in Figure 8-1 and the resultant framework is discussed, starting 
with an overview in section 8.3 followed by a detailed description of each of the models in 
sections 8.4 to 8.7. 
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Figure 8-1 Design Process there is some double text in the middle process  
8.3 Overview of the TOG Framework 
The TOG framework is a unified framework, which consists of five models which are based 
on the perspectives discussed in chapter seven. These are: 
i. Technical Model: The technical model presents technical mechanisms that work together 
to address the information security requirements for G2G transactions. As part of the 
technical model, a mechanism for addressing access control, the GABAC mechanism is 
presented. This mechanism was developed after the discovery that access control 
mechanisms that are discussed in literature in chapter two, can be improved upon to come 
up with a mechanism more suitable to meet the authorization and access control security 
requirement for G2G transactions. The other mechanisms presented in the technical 
model are not novel mechanisms, but are “tried and tested” as presented in the literature 
discussed in part II of this thesis. These include Service Oriented Architectures, 
Ontologies and PKI. In addition, mechanisms that were discovered as already in use in 
the survey of EAC MDAs are also included in the model. The purpose of these 
mechanisms is that they work together to produce part of the novel framework that 
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addresses the research questions in this study. For each mechanism presented, the 
purpose is given and useful resources that help MDAs to implement the technical model 
are given. 
ii. Operational Model: The operational model presents operational mechanisms that need to 
be implemented in individual MDAs to address information security requirements. The 
Operational Model makes no assumptions about the technical capabilities in the MDA, or 
even that the transactions that are taking place in the G2G transaction are entirely 
electronic transactions. 
iii. Governance Model: The governance model presents governance mechanisms that need to 
be implemented at a policy level within MDAs, amongst MDAs and across governments. 
The governance mechanisms include organizational policies, national and regional 
legislation. 
iv. Process model: The process model presents the way that the TOG framework can be 
implemented within an MDA and amongst MDAs who plan to undertake G2G 
transactions. The TOG process model captures the EAC context whereby resources to 
carry out whole security implementations at one go may not be available and where there 
may be lack of coordination across governments with regards to e-government 
implementations. 
v. Maturity model: The maturity model provides a mechanism for MDAs and governments 
to continually measure progress with regards to meeting information security 
requirements for G2G transactions. 
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Figure 8-2 TOG Framework 
 
Figure 8-2 depicts the five TOG models. Three of the models, which are the technical, 
operational and governance models, appear as pillars and the remaining two models, 
which are the process and maturity models, are mapping mechanisms across those pillars. 
This means that in each MDA, the technical, operational and governance pillars can be 
applied independently to meet information security requirements for G2G transactions, as 
and when resources are available, or when legislation is put in place. The process and 
maturity models help the MDAs to continually move towards a holistic information 
security framework, by mapping mechanisms in the technical, operational and 
governance models onto each other. The TOG framework thus addresses the information 
security requirements in a manner that recognises that the contextual issues (resources; 
lack of legislation or the culture) in the EAC may not permit a structured approach to 
implementing of an information security framework. 
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The actors in a G2G transaction are individual MDAs who have to comply with national 
and regional legislation set by the Government and with organisational policies that are 
set by the MDA’s internal governance structures (executive management). The roles of 
each of the major actors determine who implements the models of the TOG Framework 
as shown in Table 8-1. 
Table 8-1 TOG implementation by  main actors in a G2G transaction 
Actor Role TOG Model implemented 
Government Establish legislation and policies that address the 
information security objectives and requirements; 
Ratify or adopt regional legislation that addresses 
the information security requirements. 
Governance 
MDA - 
Executive 
Establish policies within the MDA to address the 
information security requirements 
Governance 
MDA - 
Operational 
Put in place operational plans and mechanisms to 
address the information security requirements 
Operational 
MDA - 
Technical 
Implement technical mechanisms to meet 
information security requirements 
Technical 
 
The process model provides steps to implement the governance, operational and technical 
models, while the maturity model allows governments and MDAs to track how their 
information security practices are growing to fully meet the information security objectives. 
 
The models of TOG are not interdependent and can be developed in parallel. This is in 
keeping with the previously stated discovery with regards to culture of lack of central co-
ordination of e-Government initiatives in the EAC, and where governance solutions and 
technical solutions are not developed and applied at the same pace. The common factor is 
that all the models are implemented with the same security objectives and requirements in 
mind. The TOG process model serves as the mapping mechanism from one model to another, 
and the maturity model provides guidance to ensure that MDAs and governments are 
continually improving towards a holistic information security framework that addresses the 
EAC context. 
 
The details of each of the models are presented in sections 8.4 to 8.8 below. 
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8.4 TOG Technical Model 
8.4.1 Description of the Technical Model 
The technical model of the TOG framework outlines technical mechanisms that can be used 
to meet the information security requirements. The technical model is motivated by the 
following factors: 
• As established in the survey conducted in the EAC as well as the description of e-
government initiatives, there are electronic G2G transactions taking place. For these 
technical mechanisms must be put in place. 
• Any MDA that hopes to start transacting electronically should be aware of technical 
mechanisms available that can be applied with minimal resources to address security 
requirements. 
• Where proven solutions exist, and where those solutions do not require major resources, 
the EAC should use these solutions and adapt them to their context. 
 
Any proven solution that can address the security requirements can be included in the 
technical model. For now, four mechanisms that can address the security objectives are 
described in more detail. These can be implemented by technical staff on their own or in 
collaboration with operational staff. The security mechanisms described are chosen on the 
basis of their suitability for G2G transactions as established in the literature review done in 
part II. Some of the mechanisms are mentioned in existing national level policies. The four 
mechanisms are Governance and Attribute Based Access Control; G2G Ontologies, SOA and 
PKI. For each mechanism the purpose of inclusion in the framework is outlined, together 
with a list of useful resources that the implementer may refer to. The mechanisms may 
overlap in addressing the information security requirements. Of the four mechanisms 
proposed, three of these are based on known mechanisms with are tried and tested in 
Government and indeed in some of the EAC governments as established in chapter five of 
this thesis. This is in keeping with the objective of the third research question, which is to 
have a sustainable framework. The fourth mechanism, which is the GABAC, is proposed 
because as discussed in chapter two, current access control models do not fit quite well with 
G2G transactions. 
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The model can be extended to include any mechanisms that the actors in a G2G transaction 
need to meet the security requirements. The TOG technical model is as illustrated in the 
Figure 8-3 below. 
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Figure 8-3 Technical Model of TOG Framework 
 
The base of figure 8-3 shows the mechanisms to be used to meet the Information Security: 
requirements. GABAC is a novel mechanism proposed in this study as being particularly 
suited to G2G transactions. The other three mechanisms are generic mechanisms. The 
security model components are described in more details in the sections below, together with 
implementation guidelines for the technical departments of MDAs. 
8.4.2 Technical Model Components: Governance & Attribute Based Access Control 
(GABAC). 
GABAC is an access control model that is based on two open standards which are XACML 
and SAML. GABAC uses an underlying legal repository and ontology mapping service as 
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shown in figure 8-4 to satisfy the information security requirements for G2G transactions. 
The objective of the GABAC model is to meet the security requirements of authentication, 
authorization and access control, privacy. 
Context Service
Legal Repository Ontology Mapping 
Service
Policy Authority Attribute Authority
Provider Web 
Service
Requester Web 
Service
 
Figure 8-4 Overview of GABAC 
 
The access control model proposed in this framework is a combination of the Attribute Based 
Access Control and the Governance Based Access Control methods described in chapter 
three of this thesis. The access control model is implemented using XACML and SAML 
which are open standards. Ontology is used for enhancing semantic interoperability and 
ensuring correct access control decisions across agencies. A legal repository (Ross, 2007) is 
used to represent legal requirements. The components of the GABAC model are as shown in 
Table 8-2. 
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Table 8-2 GABAC Components 
GABAC Component Description 
Attribute Authority The attribute authority issues SAML assertions to the MDA that is 
requesting a service in a G2G transaction. The attribute assertions 
correspond to the subject, resource and environmental attributes of the 
requester. If there is a legal requirement on the requester’s side that has to be 
complied with, this requirement is passed in a SAML condition statement. 
Policy Authority The policy authority contains the XACML Policy Decision Point (PDP) and 
Policy enforcement points that evaluate the requester’s attributes against the 
providers XACML policy. In order to evaluate the compliance with legal 
requirements XACML is extended to include a function that accepts 
environment attributes and compares against relevant laws and regulations 
within the legal repository. This operation will be stated as a XACML 
obligation in the policy of the MDA that provides the service in a G2G 
transaction. If there is no legal requirement for a particular transaction, then 
the request is granted provided the other requirements of the policy are met. 
Ontological mapping 
service 
The ontological mapping services checks that the semantics of the 
requester’s attributes match with those in the provider’s policy.  
Legal repository  The legal repository contains laws and regulations that apply to different 
transactions. The legal repository contains the conditions in which a 
transaction is considered legal or illegal. The legal repository is a database 
with several indexes to allow multiple matching by the Context Service. 
Context Service The role of the context service is to combine the results from the ontological 
mapping mechanism and the legal repository into an environmental attribute 
that is then passed to the attribute authority for authorisation and access 
control decisions to be made. 
 
The purpose of the GABAC is that it is a robust access control mechanism that addresses the 
authorisation, access control and privacy security requirements in G2G transactions. As 
discussed in section 2.2.2 existing mechanisms do not suffice. The GABAC mechanism is 
based on open standards i.e. XACML and SAML and takes into consideration prevailing 
legislation which is one of the contextual issues identified for the EAC. SAML assertions are 
used for authentication while XACML is used to formulate policies and to provide a rule 
combining algorithm and delegation in policy decisions.  
 
This is useful in G2G transactions in cases where a service may require information that 
crosses legislative domains. One agency can delegate part of the authorisation decisions 
based on the policies and laws in the participating agencies. XACML may be used together 
with SAML Authentication, Authorization Decision and Attribute assertions being issued by 
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the Certificate Authority which is part of the operational guidelines presented in section 
8.3.2. 
A high level view of how GABAC works is presented in the UML Communication diagram 
illustrated in Figure 8-5 below. 
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Figure 8-5 How GABACworks 
 
Within the Policy Authority are XACML components that play specific roles. These 
components are: 
• Policy Enforcement Point (PEP): Receives the request from the requesting MDA and 
sends the request to the context handler. 
•  Policy Decision Point (PDP): Receives the XACML request with contextual information 
from the context handler and returns the authorization decision. 
• Policy Information Point (PIP): Receives the SAML attributes and passes them onto the 
Context handler.  
• Policy Enforcement Point (PEP): Fulfills the obligation (Service Request) based on the 
authorization decision. 
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The context Service in GABAC is based on the XACML Context handler and has the role of  
• Mapping the SAML Assertions onto XACML attributes using the SAML 2.0 profile of 
XACML v2.0 (OASIS, 2005). 
• Mapping attributes from the legal repository onto XACML attributes using the XML 
Data Type Definition (DTD) for the legal repository. 
• Checking that the resultant XACML attributes are semantically consistent using the 
ontological mapping service. 
 
The legal repository represents governance level documents that affect information security, 
and are stored in XML format. The legal repository contains a complete range of laws, 
regulations, policies, standards, guidelines and directives to which the responding MDA is 
subject. There must be metadata tables that determine the matching of laws to specific 
information security requirements. 
 
If, for example, there is any G2G transaction where the location of the requesting attribute is 
from outside of the country where the responding MDA is, and the responding MDA has 
legislation that restricts the countries to which a country can provide a service, then for the 
authorization and access control requirement, the legal repository has to have a list of 
restricted countries. This information is passed on to the context service so that the 
appropriate decision is made. 
 
The ontological mapping service keeps track of those attributes that may have different 
meanings in the requesting and responding MDAs to ensure that access control decision are 
correctly made. 
8.4.3 Technical Model Components: G2G Ontologies 
 
The use of standards such as XACML and SAML as incorporated in the GABAC model 
addresses syntactic interoperability. Ontologies are a useful tool for achieving semantic 
interoperability. Ontology is a formal representation of concepts in a particular domain. The 
ontologies developed can be used to ensure correct access control decisions in G2G 
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transactions. The ontologies will be based on the common terminology in the operational 
model. 
 
The purpose of a G2G ontology in the TOG technical model is to enable the definition of 
attributes that will be used in access control and authorization decisions. In a G2G 
transaction where there may be no human intervention, a wrong authorization may be made 
because an assertion made from the requesting machine may be interpreted differently from 
the consumer’s policies. By using a common ontology, semantic interoperability is achieved. 
8.4.4 Technical Model Components: Service Oriented Architecture 
A Service Oriented Architecture is defined by World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) as a set 
of components which can be invoked, and whose interface descriptions can be published and 
discovered.W3C further define a Web Service as a software system designed to support 
interoperable machine-to-machine interaction over a network (W3C, 2004). It has an 
interface described in a format that machines can process. Other systems interact with the 
Web service in a manner prescribed by its description using SOAP messages, typically 
conveyed using HTTP with XML serialization in conjunction with other Web-related 
standards. Web Services are used to implement service-oriented architectures. 
In a G2G transaction, interactions are typically machine to machine interaction. The purpose 
of a SOA in the Technical Model is to achieve the availability security objective, when 
implemented with web services. This is because web services are technically neutral, so a 
web service produced by an MDA can be utilized by another MDA regardless of differences 
in technical platforms in the two MDAs.  
8.4.5 Technical Model Components: PKI 
PKI comprises of components that allow parties to communicate securely over public 
networks through the use of public key cryptography. A certificate authority issues and 
verifies certificates that are given to the parties in a transaction. For G2G transactions, a 
trusted third party could be agreed upon to act as a certificate authority for MDAs. 
 
The use of PKI in the TOG Technical Model would allow governments to use the internet as 
a means of communications, thus avoiding expensive point to point secure links between 
MDAs. 
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8.4.6 Implementation Guidelines for the Technical Model 
This section outlines guidelines that are applicable in the Technical Model that will lead to 
the addressing of each of the information security objectives of Confidentiality, Integrity, 
Accountability and Availability. The mapping of the mechanisms proposed in the Technical 
Model against the security requirements in shown in Table 8-3.  
 
Table 8-3 Mapping of Requirements Against Mechanisms in the Technical Model 
Security 
Objective 
Security Requirement SOA, Web 
Services 
GABAC 
mechanism 
Ontology PKI 
Confidentiality Authentication  x  x 
Authorization and Access 
Control 
 x x  
Privacy  x   
Integrity Data Integrity x   x 
Availability Availability x    
Accountability Trust & Non Repudiation x   x 
 
A government agency can choose to use other security mechanisms and map them using the 
same matrix to check that all security requirements are being addressed.  
 
Two guidelines (represented with the codes T1 and T2) for implementation of the technical 
model in MDAs are as follows: 
T1: The mechanisms used to address the information security requirements should, where 
possible, be based on free and openly available standards. 
T2: The mechanisms used to address the information security requirements should allow for 
technical and semantic interoperability across MDAs. 
 
8.4.7 Useful Resources for Implementation of the Technical Model 
In order to have a sustainable implementation, MDAs can keep up to date advances in access 
control related standards or research that would be useful for G2G transactions. The list is not 
exhaustive but gives a direction as to where a starting point or seed for those standards and 
mechanisms are referred to in this model. These are shown in the Table 8-4. 
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Table 8-4 Useful Resources for implementing the Technical Model 
Resource Source Purpose 
Organization for the 
Advancement of Structured 
Information Standards – OASIS 
www.oasis.org 
 
Source of information on 
updates to the XACML and 
SAML standards that form part 
of the GABAC.  
Centre for governance institute 
 
www.cgi.org Source on white papers on 
Governance Based Access 
Control 
Security Ontology developed by 
the United States Centre for 
High Assurance Computer 
Systems 
http://www.nrl.navy.mil/chacs/
publications.php 
Source of a security ontology 
that can be used as a base 
ontology for G2G transactions to 
enhance semantic 
interoperability outside of the 
EAC region 
Protégé Ontology development 
tool from Carnegie Mellon 
University 
www.protege.stanford.edu Free tool for development of 
ontologies 
World Wide Web Consortium www.w3c.org Source of updates on standards 
related to web services and web 
service security 
Rwanda Technical guidelines 
and standards for e-Government 
Report published by Rwanda 
Information Technology 
Authority (Now part of Rwanda 
Development Board) in 2006 
EAC perspective on PKI 
implementation 
 ISO/IEC TR14516 
 
http://webstore.iec.ch/preview/i
nfo_isoiec14516%7Bed1.0%7
Den.pdf 
Source of information on 
updates to IT security 
mechanisms and techniques 
from ISO and IEC 
 
8.5 Operational Model 
8.5.1 Description of the Operational Model 
The Operational Model of the TOG framework outlines organizational plans and practices 
that an individual MDA can use to address the information security requirements. 
The operational model is motivated by the following factors: 
• It has been established in part III those MDAs in the EAC sometimes set their own 
agendas in terms of ICT in the absence of national guidelines. The TOG framework is 
cognizant of this practice, however it is necessary for MDAs to map their initiatives onto 
legislation or policies as and when they come into effect. This is through matching 
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organizational plans to the relevant governance components that address a specific 
information security requirement. 
• Technical mechanisms for addressing information security should be backed by 
organizational plans and practices to allow for holistic addressing of information security. 
8.5.2 Components of the Operational Model 
The components of the operational model include organizational plans and programs, 
certificate authority agreements and common terminology for G2G transactions. The 
operational model is implemented by operational departments in individual MDAs and some 
components are implemented across MDAs as shown in Figure 8-6. 
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Figure 8-6 TOG Operational Model 
 
The components of the operational model are organisational structures, plans and procedures 
which address the information security requirements. The Operational Model is implemented 
by operational or business units within government or within an MDA. 
8.5.3 Implementation Guidelines for the Operational Model 
This section outlines guidelines that are applicable in the operational model that will lead to 
the addressing of each of the information security objectives of Confidentiality, Integrity, 
Accountability and Availability. The mapping of the mechanisms proposed in the operational 
model against the security requirements are shown in Table 8-5.  
 
116 
 
Table 8-5 Mapping of Requirements Against Mechanisms in the Operational Model  
Security 
Objective 
Security 
Requirement 
Risk 
Assessment 
Certificate 
Authority 
Power 
managem
ent and 
Backup 
Interoperab
ility and 
metadata 
Awareness  
Confidentiality Authentication  x    
Authorization and 
Access Control 
x x   x 
Privacy x    x 
Integrity Data Integrity x x    
Availability  x  x   
Accountability Trust & Non 
Repudiation 
x   x  
 
A government agency can choose to use other security mechanisms and map them using the 
same matrix to check that all security requirements are being addressed.  
 
a) Operational guidelines for achieving Confidentiality: 
The operational guidelines for addressing the confidentiality security objective are 
summarized in Table 8-6. 
Table 8-6 Operational Guidelines to address the Confidentiality Security Objective 
Security 
Requirement 
Guideline 
Code 
Guideline 
Authentication O1 Incorporate national identifier in systems design 
O2 Obtain certification from Certificate Authority 
O3 Conduct awareness training for potential users of services on 
required authentication mechanisms 
Authorization and 
Access Control 
O4 Implement organisational security policies. 
O5 Conduct Risk Assessment using a proven methodology 
O6 Create taxonomy of terms used in organisational processes. 
O7 Define required security attributes that take into consideration 
legal requirements and the use of standard terms. 
Privacy O8 Establish privacy mechanisms 
Establish encryption mechanisms. 
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b) Operational guidelines for achieving Integrity 
O9: Establish methods of validating data integrity. 
O10: Adopt encryption standards. 
c) Operational guidelines for achieving Availability 
O11: Establish regulations for power management. 
O12: Implement business continuity and disaster recovery plans. 
d) Operational guidelines for achieving Accountability 
O13: Establish auditable fields and transactions. 
O14: Register with Certificate Authority and Obtain Certificate. 
015: Setup incident reporting mechanism. 
016: Establish regulations for use of digital signatures. 
8.5.4 Useful Resources for implementation of the Operational Model 
MDAs can assess updates on some of the mechanisms proposed for use in implementing the 
operational model through the useful resources shown in Table 8-7. 
 
Table 8-7 Useful Resources for implementing the Operational Model 
Resource URL/Source Purpose 
Information Systems 
Audit and Control 
Association 
www.isaca.org Source of information on standards and white 
papers related to audit and risk assessment of 
information systems 
CERT Program, 
Software Engineering 
Institute – Carnegie-
Mellon University 
www.cert.org/octave Source of information on the OCTAVE Risk 
assessment methodology 
 
8.6 The Governance Model 
8.6.1 Description of the Governance Model 
The Governance model of the TOG framework outlines policy level mechanisms for 
addressing the information security requirements for G2G transactions. 
The Governance model is motivated by the following factors: 
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• A G2G transaction typically takes place across more than one organisation. This means 
that multiple organizational and security domains may be involved. Thus the handling of 
security must be at a level higher than just an individual organizational level. 
• It has been established in Part II of this thesis that there exists some legislation in the 
EAC that relates to information security for G2G transactions. This legislation must be 
complied with in any G2G transactions. The framework must therefore take into 
consideration existing legislation, and at the same be flexible enough to anticipate new 
laws or changes to existing legislation. 
• In many areas, implementation of international frameworks without adaptation has 
proved not to work, as developing countries need context-sensitive approaches both for e-
Government and information security (Dada, 2006). This is because the countries are 
resource poor i.e. weak public administrations, poor institutional capacity and low 
financial resources.  
• Governance is one of the identified pitfalls in e-Government if not properly addressed 
(OASIS, 2010a). There has to be top level awareness and ownership within government 
of any e-government related initiative. 
8.6.2 Components of the Governance model 
The components of the governance model are International standards, National and regional 
laws and regulations, and Organisational policies. Each of these components will have 
elements that apply to some or all of the information security requirements. The Governance 
model is implemented by top level management in government. Figure 8-7 shows the model. 
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Figure 8-7 TOG Governance Model 
 
8.6.3 Implementation Guidelines for the Governance Model 
This section outlines guidelines that are applicable in the governance model that will lead to 
the addressing of each of the information security objectives of Confidentiality, Integrity, 
Accountability and Availability. A mapping of the mechanisms proposed in the governance 
model against the security requirements is shown in Table 8-8. 
Table 8-8 Mapping of Requirements Against Mechanisms in the Governance Model 
Security 
Objective 
Security 
Requirement 
International 
Standards 
Legislation Organisa-
tional 
policies 
Contracts/ 
MoUs 
Confidentiality Authentication x x   
Authorization and 
Access Control 
x x   
Privacy x x   
Integrity Data Integrity x x   
Availability    x  
Accountability Trust & Non 
Repudiation 
x x  x 
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A government agency can choose to use other security mechanisms and map them using the 
same matrix to check that all security requirements are being addressed.  
 
a) Governance Guidelines for achieving confidentiality  
For confidentiality the following three security requirements should be addressed namely 
authentication, authorisation and access control and privacy. The guidelines for each security 
requirement for confidentiality are stated in Table 8-9. 
 
Table 8-9 TOG – Governance guidelines for achieving the confidentiality objective 
Security 
Requirement 
Guideline 
Code 
Guideline 
Authentication G1 Establish legislation and policies that identify the primary mechanism 
for identification of a citizen; business or government agency: 
• For citizens a unique national Identity number (ID number) may 
be used. 
• For Businesses a Tax Identification number (TIN) may be used. 
• For Government agencies an electronic identifier / certificate 
should be issued by a Certificate Authority. 
G2 A certificate authority should be established by law with the role of 
issuing identification certificates to government agencies for 
electronic transactions. 
G3 Identify related legislation that exists at international and regional 
level (EAC). 
Authorization 
and Access 
Control 
G4 Establish legislation and policies to classify information assets. 
G5 Establish policies and regulations on minimum requirements for 
access control decisions. 
G6 Identify related existing laws and regulations at international and 
regional level (EAC). 
G7 Establish legislation that enables prosecution of fraud carried out 
through electronic means and other kinds of cyber-crime. 
Privacy G8 Identify articles that address privacy in national constitutions 
G9 Establish laws and regulations on Data Privacy. 
G10 Identify related existing laws and regulations that exist at 
international and regional level (EAC). 
 
 
b) Governance guidelines for achieving Integrity 
The guidelines for achieving the integrity objective and data integrity security requirements 
at a governance level are: 
G11: Establish legislation and policies for Computer Misuse. 
G12: Establish legislation and policies to govern computer communications. 
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G13: Identify related existing laws and regulations that exist at international and regional 
level (EAC). 
G14: Establish encryption policies. 
c) Governance guidelines for achieving Availability 
The governance guidelines for achieving the availability objective and security requirements 
are: 
G15: Establish regulations for power and back up. 
G16: Establish regulations on use of standards to achieve interoperability. 
G17: Identify related existing laws and regulations that exist at international and regional 
level (EAC). 
d) Governance guidelines for achieving Accountability 
Trust and non-repudiation are the security requirements to be addressed in order to achieve 
the accountability objective. The governance guidelines for addressing accountability are: 
G18: Establish a Certificate Authority as the trusted third party to authenticate government 
agencies and departments for electronic transactions. 
G19: Establish standards for drafting contracts between government to government 
transactions.  
G20: Establish Laws and Regulations for acceptability of electronic evidence. 
G21: Establish regulations for publishing of breaches in electronic transactions (Incident 
reporting) to enable governments to identify and fix gaps in information security. 
G22: Identify related existing laws and regulations that exist at international and regional 
level (EAC). 
8.6.4 Useful Resources for Implementing the Governance Model 
In implementation of the governance model the resources shown in Table 8-10 may be found 
useful in obtaining updates on mechanisms such as national legislation and international 
standards. 
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Table 8-10 Useful resources for implementing the Governance Model 
Resource URL/Source Purpose 
ISO/ IEC 27000 series of 
security standards. 
www.iso.org Source of security standards issued by ISO 
and IEC 
Legislation of the United 
Republic of Tanzania, 
Rwanda, Uganda 
www.parliament.go.tz,  
www.amategeko.net 
www.parliament.go.ug 
Sources of national legislation in the EAC 
National Institute of 
Standards and Technology 
www.nist.org Information security standards and 
guidelines issued by the United States 
Government 
 
8.7 Process Model 
8.7.1 Description of the Process Model 
The three models proposed above represent distinct actors with distinct roles within each 
MDA. In order for the MDA to move towards holistic addressing of information security 
requirements, there has to be a mapping from one model to the other. The TOG process 
model that is proposed in this section allows an MDA to recognize what technical, 
operational or governance mechanisms are in place and use them appropriately in a G2G 
transaction. 
The process model is motivated by the need to address the three contextual factors 
discovered in the EAC which are: 
• Resource constraints: These include financial constraints due to limited national (public 
sector) budgets allocated to ICT/ e-Government initiatives and inadequate ICT skills; 
• Legal or regulatory constraints: These include lack of sufficient legislation and national 
policy frameworks related to information security in e-Government; and  
• National Culture constraints: These include uncoordinated or unstructured national 
government initiatives related to ICT or e-Government. 
The addressing of these factors is done by designing the process model such that it uses a 
‘plug and play’ approach, that each MDA applies the mechanisms that it can in a particular 
model, and maps those onto the corresponding models. Where resource or cultural 
constraints exist, the implementation still continues, and a maturity model is proposed to 
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ensure continual improvement in the MDA’s efforts to comprehensively meet information 
security requirements. 
8.7.2 Components of the Process Model 
The process model is comprised of two layers which are formally presented using the 
ebXML Business Process Specification Schema Technical Specification v2.0.4, which was 
adopted as a standard in 2006 by OASIS (OASIS, 2006). 
 
ebXML Business Process Specification Schema (BPSS) was developed specifically for e-
business, but its basic concepts lend themselves quite well to G2G transactions. The TOG 
process model is applicable at two layers. The first layer is a G2G transaction between two 
MDAs, and the second layer represents any two actors within an MDA, or country who are 
putting in place mechanisms to meet the information security requirements. The TOG 
Process is shown using ebXML notation in figures 8-8 and 8-9 below. 
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Figure 8-8 TOG Process Model - Layer 1 
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Figure 8-9 TOG Process Model - Layer 2 
 
The concepts shown in Figure 8-8 that describe the TOG process model are: 
Service Collaboration 
A Service Collaboration is a set of Service Transactions between two individual MDAs in 
one government or across governments for layer 1 of the process model, and between actors 
within an MDA for layer 2. The ebXML Business Process Specification Schema supports 
two levels collaborations which are Binary Collaborations and Multiparty Collaborations. 
Binary Collaborations are between two roles only Multiparty Collaborations are among more 
than two roles, but such Multiparty Collaborations are always synthesized from two or more 
Binary Collaborations. For instance if Roles A, B, and C collaborate and all parties interact 
with each other, there will be a separate Binary Collaboration between A and B, one between 
B and C, and one between A and C. The Multiparty Collaboration will be the synthesis of 
these three Binary Collaborations. 
Service Transactions 
A Service Transaction is the atomic unit of work in a Service Collaboration. A Service 
Transaction is conducted between two parties playing opposite roles in the transaction. The 
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roles are always a requesting role and a responding role. Like a Binary Collaboration, a 
Service Transaction is a re-useable protocol between two roles.  
 
A Service Transaction will always either succeed or fail. If it succeeds it may be designated 
as legally binding between the two partners, or otherwise govern their collaborative activity. 
If it fails it is null and void, and each partner must relinquish any mutual claim established by 
the transaction. 
Service Document flows 
A service transaction is realized as Service Document flows between the requesting and 
responding roles. In the case of the TOG process model, there is always a two way 
conversation between the MDAs therefore there is always a requesting Service Document, 
and a responding Service Document. Actual document definition is achieved using the 
ebXML core component specifications, or by some methodology agreed to by the MDAs that 
have roles in the service collaboration. 
Choreography 
The TOG Process Plug and Play approach is characterized definitively by the Service 
Transaction Choreography. The Service Transaction choreography describes the ordering and 
transitions between service transactions or sub collaborations within a binary collaboration. 
Thus the choreography in the TOG framework describes how mapping across different 
technical, operational and governance mechanisms is achieved.  
 
For Layer 1 of the TOG process model, the service transaction is the G2G transaction, in 
which one MDA requests for a service from the second MDA. To implement the TOG 
framework process model in this case, means that the responding MDA will check that the 
request complies with the security requirements from a technical, operational and governance 
perspective. The particular mechanism that needs to be check against or used to implement 
the requirement may vary, but as a starting point, some mechanisms are summarized in Table 
8-11. 
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Table 8-11 Proposed Mechanisms 
  MODEL 
Security 
Objective 
Security 
Requirement Governance Operational Technical 
Confidentiality 
Authentication 
• International 
Standards, 
• Laws and 
Regulations, 
• Organisational 
Policies 
• Risk 
Assessment 
• Certificate 
Authorities 
• Metadata 
definitions 
• Awareness 
Sessions 
• Ontologies 
• Access control 
model based on 
open standards 
(XACML, 
SAML) 
Authorization 
and Access 
Control 
Privacy 
Integrity Data Integrity 
• International 
Standards, 
Organisational 
Policies 
• Certificate 
Authorities 
• Encryption, 
SSL 
Availability Availability 
• Business 
Continuity 
Policies (BCP) 
• Power 
Management 
• Business 
Continuity 
Plans 
• Interoperability 
frameworks 
• SOA, Web 
Services, 
Uninterruptible 
Power Supply 
(UPS) 
Accountability Trust & Non Repudiation 
• Laws and 
Regulations, 
• Contractual 
Agreements and 
MoUs 
• Certificate 
Authorities 
• Digital 
Signatures, 
Certificates 
 
For Layer 2 where the interaction is between actors in an individual MDA for purposes of 
continually improving the ability to meet information security requirements, the 
choreography is that for each mechanism implemented in one model, a mapping is done 
across to the models to ensure that matching mechanisms are in place or are planned for. To 
ensure consistency in the implementation of the process model, a PDCA cycle is proposed to 
be followed as shown in Figure 8-10. 
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PLAN: Identify 
security 
requirements to be 
met
DO: Apply the TOG 
Process to apply the 
required mechanism 
to meet the 
requirement
ACT: Refine solution 
and propose 
refinement to other 
model
CHECK: Evaluate 
implementation and 
map against other 
model to identify 
gaps  
Figure 8-10 PDCA Cycle implementation of Layer 2 of the TOG Process Model 
In the planning stage, the security requirement to be met is identified based on whether the 
implementation is triggered by a service request from an MDA (Layer 1 of the process 
model) or whether an MDA is putting in place more mechanisms to address information 
security (Layer 2 of the process model). In the Do stage, the TOG process is applied, security 
mechanisms to address the requirement are implemented across all the models, where those 
mechanisms are in place. In the Check phase, the MDA evaluates the transaction to recognize 
gaps, and finally acts on them to continually improve on addressing information security 
requirements. 
8.7.3  Scenarios to Illustrate the Implementation the Process Model 
In this section, two scenarios are presented that illustrate how MDAS can implement the 
process model. The use of scenarios in process modeling has been presented in several 
studies (Gregoriades & Sutcliffe, 2008; Barnickel, Bottcher, & Paschke, 2010) and is 
intended to help implementers to quickly understand how the model can be applied in their 
particular context. The two scenarios presented below are drawn from real situations in the 
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EAC. The first scenario is drawn from the Government of Tanzania, and the second, from the 
Government of Rwanda. The scenarios are drawn from information obtained from MDAs 
that participated in the survey that is presented in chapter six of this thesis. 
 
a) Scenario 1 
The Government of a country decides to provide a pension to all citizens above the age of 65. 
The personal details of all citizens are held in a database that is managed by an MDA that is 
responsible called national identification (for purpose of this scenario, referred to as MDA 
A). A law to facilitate the payment of the pension is passed, and the MDA tasked with paying 
the pension (referred to here as MDA B) is required in this law to use only personal details 
that are in MDA A’s database. Confidentiality of the information must be maintained through 
this G2G transaction. MDA A currently has operational plans that address confidentiality of 
information but do not recognize the newly passed legislation. 
 
Using the TOG process model- Layer 2, the first action is that MDA A needs internally to 
align its operational plans with the new legislation. So the first step in the service 
choreography between MDA A executive actor and MDA A operational actor is to align the 
legislation with operational procedures. Then in implementing Layer 1, MDA B submits the 
request to MDA A, and then MDA B compares the service documents which are the various 
policies/ plans that state information security requirements. MDA A then fulfills the service 
requests in line with the requirements of the law, and applying the appropriate mechanisms in 
the TOG framework. This scenario illustrates the ‘plug and play’ nature of the TOG process 
model, in that only the specific requirement for that particular scenario is plugged into the 
TOG framework and results in a G2G transaction that meets information security 
requirements. This is illustrated in Figure 8-11. 
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Figure 8-11 Illustration of Plug and Play approach – Scenario 1 
 
b) Scenario 2 
A MDA has invested significantly in setting up a robust information security policy that sets 
out the governance requirements for information security. This MDA now wants to proceed 
with the implementation of a new application to provide services to other MDAs. The 
technical team is eager to start putting together technical mechanisms that match the 
governance requirements stated in the information security policy without necessarily 
waiting for operational departments to finish putting in place operational procedures. 
 
Implementation: The existing policy falls within the governance model, and the contents of 
the policy need to be mapped onto relevant technical mechanisms. This process falls within 
Layer 2 of the TOG process model. Once technical mechanisms are in place, the G2G 
transactions can take place, following Layer 1 of the process model. The operational model 
can be addressed when the implementers who are the MDA operational staff are ready. This 
implementation is illustrated in Figure 8-12. 
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Figure 8-12 Illustration of Plug and Play Approach - Scenario 2 
The two scenarios illustrated in figures 8-11 and 8-12 show that with the TOG framework, 
implementation can start anywhere, namely, in any model depending on the circumstances. 
The other model can be addressed as necessary when resources are available. It also shows 
that where information security initiatives are already in place, the use of TOG maps new 
implementations to existing ones, thus agencies do not have to start from scratch. 
Furthermore, not all requirements need to be addressed at once. The process can be done 
iteratively and a simple maturity model can be used to track progress by MDAs in adopting 
information security practices. The maturity model is described in section 8.8. 
8.8 Maturity Model 
The purpose of a maturity model is to propose a roadmap through which an entity can 
continually improve towards a set goal. The TOG maturity model is aimed at helping MDAs 
continually improve information security practices through the TOG framework with the 
goal of achieving a sustainable information security framework for G2G transactions that is 
applicable in the EAC context.  
 
The TOG maturity model consists of the following levels of maturity: 
131 
 
Level 0: There are no information security practices within the MDAs. Characteristics of a 
Level 0 maturity would include lack of information security policies or even documented 
information security objectives. 
Level 1: Some Governance, operational and technical mechanisms exist but do not map onto 
each other. An example of a Level 1 maturity level would be where an MDA implements 
technical security mechanisms but there is no accompanying operational or governance 
mechanisms. 
Level 2: Governance, Operational and technical mechanisms are in place, and some mapping 
has been done across the TOG models. 
Level 3: Governance, operational and technical mechanisms are in place to meet all security 
objectives and mapping across the TOG models has been achieved. 
 
The levels of maturity can be used as mechanisms in the TOG framework to address the 
Accountability objective. Thus in a G2G transaction between two MDAs, the MDA 
providing a service may inform the requesting MDA as to what level of security it is at. An 
MDA that is providing a service may also require that a requesting MDA is at a given level 
of maturity in order to access information or a service, so that information security is 
preserved even when information is passed onto another MDA. 
The TOG maturity model is illustrated in Figure 8-13. 
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Level 3: Governance, Operational or 
Technical mechanisms exist to address 
all requirements and have been mapped 
across models
 
Level 2: Some Governance, Operational or 
Technical mechanisms but some of the 
mechanisms have been mapped across models
 
Level 1: Some Governance, Operational or 
Technical mechanisms but don’t map onto 
each other
 
Level 0: No information security 
practices exist
 
Figure 8-13 Maturity model for TOG framework 
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8.9 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented an information security framework for G2G transactions in the 
EAC context. The framework comprises of five models which are technical, operational, 
governance, process and maturity models.  
 
The basic tenets or philosophy of the TOG framework is simple – each actor in a G2G 
transaction must recognize their role; and do whatever is possible to address common 
security objectives. A mapping across roles is done whenever each actor is addressing a 
security requirement. This process leads to a continual raising of information security 
awareness and a move towards holistic handling of information security even where 
resources are limited and where there is little or no co-ordination within government. For the 
technical, operational and governance models, implementation guidelines and useful 
resources are presented so as to ease implementation. The mechanisms proposed in each of 
the models, are mechanisms that have been tried and tested in existing implementations in e-
government in the EAC, with the exception of the GABAC mechanism. 
 
The TOG process model with its ‘Plug and Play’ implementation approach suits the EAC 
context where flexibility in approach is required to take into consideration the culture of un-
coordinated initiatives, and at the same time, the limited resources. The need for continual 
improvement in the addressing of information security remains relevant to the EAC, and the 
application of the TOG maturity model ensures that MDAs are continually improving on 
information security practices. 
 
The next chapter describes how the framework was applied in a real life case study for a 
G2G transaction in one of the countries of the EAC, that is, Tanzania. This is the 
Implementation stage of the Appreciative Inquiry process. 
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Chapter 9 Case Study 
9.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter the TOG information security framework was presented together with 
guidelines on how the framework can be implemented. This chapter describes how the 
framework is applied to a case study of a G2G transaction in the Implementation phase of the 
Appreciative inquiry approach, which was one of the methods used in this study. 
 
The purpose of undertaking the case study was to demonstrate that the proposed framework 
is a practical framework that can work in a real situation.  
9.2 Case Study Description 
The Tanzanian Central Government has been paying pensions to civil servants who retired 
before 1996 through a ministry responsible for finance. Due to concerns about the efficiency 
of the process, fraud and resource constraints, the ministry, in 2008, decided to outsource the 
process to a government agency. The government agency chosen is one that has experience 
in paying pensions to employees from the private sector and from other government 
agencies. The ministry required the government agency to run the payroll on secure software 
and send the payroll information electronically to banks. The banks would then debit the 
ministry account and credit the pensioners account. The ministry envisaged that this process 
would reduce human intervention which is one of the sources of fraud; ensure that pensioners 
are paid on time; and have an audit trail of transactions so as to follow up on any suspect 
cases. Furthermore, by outsourcing the arrangement to an agency that already had robust 
software, and a business continuity program in place, the risks arising from frequent power 
interruptions and lack of sufficient technical skills in the ministry would be addressed. 
Information related to the processing of the payroll is classified by the Government as 
Confidential, and the Government ministry has put in place an information security policy 
that outlines some mechanisms that need to be put in place to preserve confidentiality. 
 
The agency chosen to implement also has an information security policy in place, which 
includes a statement that states all interactions with external parties that involve system 
access must be governed by the agency’s information security policy. 
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9.3  Methodology used for Case Study 
In keeping with the interpretive methods used in this study, action research was chosen to 
apply the TOG framework to the case study. The TOG framework was applied using the 
action research methodology (de Villiers, 2005). The process undertaken can be viewed as 
illustrated in Figure 9-1. 
 
Figure 9-1Action Research: Adopted from de Villiers (2005) 
It was possible to use the action research methodology which requires the researcher to be an 
active part of the process, because the author of the thesis was an employee of the 
implementing agency, heading the information systems department.  
The actors who participated in the case study are as shown in Figure 9-2. 
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Figure 9-2 Actors in the Case Study 
 
In terms of the roles identified for actors in the TOG framework, the author of this thesis 
(researcher) had a role as MDA executive and MDA technical.  
The first step in the case study was to identify the challenges that application of the TOG 
framework was expected to address. These challenges are outlined in the next section. 
9.3.1 Challenges identified 
The process of implementing the decision began with a kickoff workshop in 2008 involving 
staff from the ministry responsible for finance and the agency chosen to pay pensions. 
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Workshop participants were drawn from all the three major actors/ roles described in the 
TOG framework, who are MDA executive, MDA operational and MDA technical. Several 
challenges were identified during the workshop and when the action plan for implementation 
was started. These challenges are categorized in three categories. For ease of reference the 
challenges are given code numbers. These are: 
a) Governance  
• C_01: Legally, the agency had no mandate to access the data held by the ministry or to 
pay pensions on behalf of the ministry. 
• C_02: Both ministry and agency had information security policies that needed to be 
aligned for purposes of the transaction. 
• C_03: The memorandum of understanding (MoU) signed between the Ministry and the 
agency did not explicitly address information security. 
 
b) Operational 
• C_04: Definitions of some terms were different. For example a survivor’s pension in the 
central government ministry is different from a survivor’s pension in the government 
agency. 
• C_05: Financial resources allocated to the outsourcing project were limited. 
• C_06:  The ministry wanted to retain some control over updates to information 
• C_07: Technical and management teams met separately during the planning process. 
• C_08: The organizational culture for the two organizations was found to be different. In 
the agency, technical staff spearheaded most initiatives and sold ideas to management, 
while in the ministry the approach was more top down, with directives given by the 
minister, which the technical and operational staff have to implement. 
 
c) Technical 
• C_09: Some of the necessary data was mostly in paper files and confidentiality and 
privacy was observed through physical access controls such as storing the data in locked 
cabinets. Access lists were on paper and files containing information were issued by a 
person responsible for storing the files. 
138 
 
• C_10: The ministry was running their payroll on a COBOL based application while the 
government agency was using an application based on Oracle Forms. The underlying 
databases and operating systems were also on different platforms. 
• C_11: The ministry offices and the agency offices had no direct data communication link. 
• C_12: Although security policies existed in both organizations, no standard requirements 
for security were set out in either policy. 
The above challenges show that the requesting MDA, at the beginning of the application of 
the case study was at Level 1 maturity on the TOG maturity model meaning that some 
governance operational and technical mechanisms were in place but did not map onto each 
other. The responding MDA was at level 2, with some mapping across operational, technical 
and governance mechanisms. 
9.3.2  Applying the TOG Framework 
The first action was to apply the TOG process model by identifying the requirements to be 
met and the mechanisms to be put place in both the requesting and responding agencies. The 
Agency and Ministry staff, following the implementation guidelines of the TOG framework, 
identified the essential mechanisms that needed to be place as shown in Table 9-1. 
 Table 9-1 Essential mechanisms to be put in place 
  MODEL 
Security 
Objective 
Security 
Requirement Governance Operational Technical 
Confidentiality 
Authentication 
 Valid user names 
Need to authenticate IP 
address, that it is from 
valid PC 
Authorization and 
Access Control 
Privacy 
Integrity Data Integrity    
Availability Availability    
Accountability Trust & Non Repudiation 
Need 
Legislation   
 
An initial application of Layer 2 of the process model identified that there were gaps in the 
Governance model. Thus the initial approach by the Ministry was to deal with the issue of 
legislation, and propose amendments to legislation to allow the agency to process payments. 
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These amendments simply allowed the agency to pay pensions on behalf of the government. 
The challenge of data access was not addressed.  
9.3.3 Reflection 
Reflection was undertaken to identify the gaps still outstanding. This was done in the form of 
a workshop, with the author still in the roles of MDA executive and MDA technical. The 
participants in the workshop were from both the Ministry and the Agency and including both 
executive and technical staff. 
The actions undertaken to meet the requirements in each of the three TOG models, 
Governance, Technical and Operational to resolve the gaps are outlined in section 9.4 
9.4 Actions undertaken 
9.4.1 Technical 
The actions described in section 9.3.2 were the first set of actions in applying the TOG 
framework. The second set of actions involved the technical staff of the agency developing a 
payroll web service that can be invoked by the ministry if they need to do updates to data. 
The code for this web service is included in this thesis as Appendix B. The same web service 
is used to run the payroll. In addressing data integrity, privacy and confidentiality, a secure 
communication link has been set up between the ministry and the agency and information 
across the link is encrypted. The relevant information security policies were translated to 
XACML. Authentication has been tied to fixed IP addresses with user names and passwords. 
Availability has been addressed through the installation of UPS for power supply 
management. The agency uses an SSL certificate issued by VeriSign for its browser 
interfaces. The challenges that still need to be addressed include automating the issue of 
security assertions, by for example, implementing SAML. 
9.4.2 Operational 
In meeting the operational information security objectives, the following activities were 
undertaken jointly by Ministry and Agency staff at an executive and technical level: 
• A risk assessment was carried out and an access control list setup 
• The parties have agreed to use the Ministry definitions where terminology differs. 
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Challenges that still need to be addressed include compiling taxonomy of terms that relate to 
the payment of pensions to ensure that terms are interpreted consistently. Some of the terms 
have been represented in OWL ontology as shown in appendix C. 
9.4.3 Governance 
Legislation was put in place to mandate the agency to pay pensions to designated recipients 
on behalf of the ministry before the implementation of the framework. The role of drafting 
and proposing amendments was undertaken by the Ministry executive staff. Based on the 
amended legislation, a contract was signed between the two parties to outline the operational 
roles and responsibilities of each party in implementing the outsourcing of payment of 
pensions. Furthermore, the parties also agreed that the information security policy of the 
ministry would prevail. Table 9-2 illustrates how the TOG framework was applied. 
 
Table 9-2 Application of the TOG framework to the case study 
  MODEL 
Security 
Objective 
Security 
Requirement Governance Operational Technical 
Confidentiality 
Authentication 
• Ministry’s 
Information 
Security Policy 
 
Authentication based 
on fixed IP addresses 
with user names and 
passwords 
Authorization 
and Access 
Control 
• Finance Act. No. 
13 of 2008 
• Contract between 
Ministry and 
Agency 
• Risk Assessment, 
Access Control 
List, 
• Standard 
Terminology for 
transactions 
• Awareness 
Sessions 
• XACML policies 
based on Ministry’s 
information 
Security Policy 
Privacy 
• Ministry’s 
Information 
Security Policy 
  
Integrity Data Integrity 
• Ministry’s 
Information 
Security Policy 
 • SSL, Encryption 
Availability Availability   
• Uninterruptible 
Power Supply 
(UPS); 
•  Pensioner Payroll 
Web Service 
Accountability Trust & Non Repudiation 
• Finance Act No. 
13 of 2008 
• MoU  between 
Ministry and 
Agency 
 
• Access Control 
List 
• SSL (from 
VeriSign) 
• Authentication by 
IP address 
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9.4.4 Improvements to Maturity 
As mentioned in section 9.3.1, maturity levels when measured using the TOG maturity 
levels, were are Levels 1 and 2 for the requesting MDA (Ministry) and the responding MDA 
(pensions agency) respectively. Layer 2 of the TOG process model was applied within the 
pensions agency, in which the author of this thesis was employed. The TOG framework was 
applied to improve the existing information security framework and to represent the 
framework using the TOG technical, operational and governance models. The resultant 
framework has been included in this thesis as Appendix D. 
9.5 Conclusion 
The case study described illustrates how the TOG framework was applied in a real life 
situation. The lessons learnt from the application were that no additional skills were required 
to implement the framework, and the technical mechanisms used were those already in use in 
the responding agency. Thus the cost of implementation of the framework was minimal. 
 
The case study acts as a proof of concept that the framework actually works and that the 
implementation is such that not all mechanisms need to be put in place at the same time in 
order to address a security requirement. Although not all aspects of the framework were 
implemented due to the nature of the case study and time constraints, the applicability of 
TOG to G2G transactions in the EAC context has been demonstrated through the described 
case study. 
 
In the next chapter, an evaluation of the TOG framework against critical success factors is 
presented. While the case study presented shows how the framework can be applied in a 
particular setting, the evaluation in chapter ten demonstrates that the TOG framework can be 
applied generally to address information security requirements for G2G transactions in the 
EAC. 
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Chapter 10 Evaluation of the TOG Framework 
10.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, a case study showing how the TOG can be implemented was 
presented. This chapter presents an evaluation of the framework to show that the framework 
is generally applicable to addressing of information security requirements for G2G 
transactions in the EAC. 
 
The TOG framework is evaluated in two ways. Firstly Critical Success Factors (CSFs) from 
both Tanzania and ISO are used and secondly by matching against G2G guidelines issued by 
the US National Research Council. The use of critical success factors as a method for 
evaluating information systems is discussed by Bergeron & Bégin (1989) who identify CSFs 
and measure performance against those factors in a case study involving an information 
system in the health domain. Caralli (2004) discusses the uses of CSFs for validation of 
security measures within an enterprise. Furthermore, one of the discoveries from the national 
information security frameworks as presented in chapter three was that as a means of 
achieving acceptability, which will contribute to sustainability, a framework may be 
evaluated against set government policy objectives. 
 
For the TOG framework evaluation, two sets of established critical success factors were 
chosen. These two sets were chosen because the TOG framework was designed to address 
information security requirements for G2G transactions in the EAC. The first set of CSFs is 
taken from the Tanzanian e-Government Strategy (United Republic of Tanzania, 2009). 
These CSFs have considered the EAC context and therefore to evaluate TOG against them 
shows how well the framework suits the EAC. The second set of CSFs is the ISO/IEC 
Information Security Management Standards (ISMS) CSFs. These are chosen because, firstly 
they relate to information security which is the focus of the TOG framework, but secondly 
because they are published by an international standards body, which is the ISO and 
therefore evaluating TOG against the ISMS standards is a measure of the robustness of the 
framework.   
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There, however, remains the issue of the G2G component of this study and of the TOG 
framework. Neither of the above two sets of CSFs addressed G2G in particular. To address 
this gap, the TOG framework is also evaluated against the guidelines for G2G transactions 
that have been issued by the US national research council (National Research Council, 2002).  
10.2 Critical Success Factors from Tanzania’s e-Government strategy 
The government of Tanzania in its e-Government strategy has identified key factors that are 
critical to successful e-Government implementation. The factors are not specifically for 
information security but can be applied as information security should form an integral part 
of the planning process of the implementation from conception to conclusion. 
 
The six CSFs identified in the Tanzanian e-Government Strategy are: 
i. Political will, support and commitment: Continuous engagement of political leaders 
in support toe-Government in order to maintain the momentum 
ii. Availability of HR capacity: Continuous capacity development, Continuous public 
involvement 
iii. Institutional and Legal framework: Clearly defined institutional framework and 
supportive legislation and enforcement mechanisms 
iv. Financial Resources: Recognition of e-Government as a priority area in the 
Government agenda 
v. Commitment by all actors: Continuous coordination and buy-in by all actors or 
stakeholders. Active coordination among all stakeholders to develop and enforce 
coherent e-Government service delivery 
vi. Sustainable Infrastructure: Network and information security; Infrastructure to sustain 
e-Government services. 
In the context of the TOG framework, the above CSFs can be related to the five models that 
make up the TOG framework which are the Technical, Operational, Governance, Process and 
Maturity Models. 
 
The Technical Model of the TOG framework identifies security mechanisms that enable 
secure G2G transactions. These mechanisms address CSF (vi); and furthermore, the TOG 
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technical model proposes web services to implement G2G transactions which are the 
backbone of e-Government Services. Sustainability is built into the TOG framework through 
the process model, that allows for implementations as and when resources are available, and 
through the maturity model that guides the implementing MDAs and governments on how to 
continually improve the way that they meet information security requirements for G2G 
transactions. The Technical Model also proposes the use of mechanisms based on open 
standards thus addressing CSF (ii) and (iv). 
 
The Operational Model of the TOG Framework proposes operational plans that will enable 
the information security requirements for G2G transactions to be addressed. This takes care 
of the institutional component of CSF (iii). 
 
The Governance Model of the TOG framework proposes the use of legislation and policies to 
meet the information security requirements for G2G transactions, and in this way addresses 
CSF (i) and (iii). 
 
The Process and Maturity models of the TOG framework contribute to CSFs (ii), (iv) and (v) 
firstly by allowing MDAs to address information security requirements through a ‘plug and 
play’ approach that does not force complete solutions to be in place at once. However, the 
process model calls for continual mapping across the technical, operational and governance 
models, thus ensuring that staff at all levels in the MDA are part of the process in addressing 
information security requirements for G2G transactions.  
 
The evaluation of the TOG framework against the CSFs in the Tanzanian e-Government 
strategy is summarized in Table 10-1. 
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Table 10-1 Evaluation of TOG against Tanzania CSFs 
CSF from Tanzania’s 
e-Government 
Strategy 
TOG Solution 
Political will, support 
and commitment 
All legislation in Tanzania is passed through the parliament. By 
identifying the governance model, political leaders understand the role 
they need to play to have successful information security in e-
Government implementation. 
Availability of HR 
capacity 
TOG addresses availability by having a flexible structure that refers to 
international open standards. Therefore there is no need for MDAs to 
reinvent the wheel where proven standards are already in place. 
Institutional and Legal 
framework 
This is addressed in the Governance and Operational Models were 
legislation and polices have to be taken into consideration. 
Financial Resources TOG is a flexible framework whose ‘plug and play’ approach to process 
implementation means that the technical, operational and governance 
components to address each security requirement can be implemented as 
and when resources are available within the acceptable risk acceptance 
level. 
Commitment by all 
actors 
Implementation of the TOG framework forces the involvement of 
technical operational and management staff. 
Sustainable 
Infrastructure 
The technical model proposes the use of open standards, and service 
oriented architectures which address the lack of interoperability that may 
exist among MDAs. 
 
10.3 ISMS Critical Success Factors (ISO/IEC, 2005b) 
ISO in the code of practice of information security management states critical success factors 
for information security management. These are applicable to the evaluation of TOG since 
TOG is designed to address management aspects of information security. The evaluation 
against the ISMS CSFs is shown in Table 10-2. 
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Table 10-2 Evaluation of TOG against ISMS CSFs 
ISMS CSFs TOG Solution 
Information security policy, 
objectives and activities aligned 
with objectives 
TOG addresses information security policies and provides 
for the mapping of those policies to operational and technical 
activities 
An approach and framework for 
designing, implementing, 
monitoring, maintaining and 
improving information security 
consistent with the organizational 
culture. 
The TOG process model allows for organizational culture 
especially in the context of Tanzania where often it is not 
possible to have a strictly hierarchical or sequential process. 
TOG allows for various start points in any of three models 
which are the technical, operational and governance models 
and then subsequent mapping to any of the other models 
using the process model, provided that the security 
objectives are set in advance. 
Visible support and commitment 
from all levels of management 
especially top management 
Implementation of the TOG framework forces the 
involvement of technical, operational and management staff. 
An understanding of information 
asset protections achieved through 
the application of information 
security risk management 
Risk Assessment is provided for as a proposed mechanism in 
the operational model. 
 
An effective information security 
awareness, training and education 
program informing all employees 
and other relevant parties of their 
information security obligations set 
forth in the information security 
policies and standards  and motivate 
them to act accordingly 
Awareness is provided for as a mechanism in the operational 
model. Furthermore, the requirement that in each model for 
each requirement, the actor has to see what has been done in 
another model ensures that technical departments, 
operational units, and executive management are aware of  
the information security initiatives across the MDA that are 
being carried out to achieve security objectives 
An effective information security 
incident management process 
An incident management process is included in the 
guidelines for the implementing the operational model. 
An effective business continuity 
management approach 
Business continuity management is provided as a mechanism 
in to address the Availability security objective. 
A measurement system used to 
evaluate performance in information 
security management and feedback 
suggestions for improvement 
The TOG maturity model allows MDAs to track their 
progress with regards to addressing information security for 
G2G transactions 
 
10.4 US National Research Council Guidelines 
The US National Research Council (National Research Council, 2002) proposes some areas 
where G2G needs have to be addressed. These include: 
• Ubiquity: Governments must provide services to all citizens. They cannot in general opt 
to serve only the easiest to reach customers.  
In the TOG framework, SOA and web services are proposed as technical mechanisms. 
These services can be accessed through mobile phones. The penetration of mobile phones 
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is quite high the EAC region and are accessible in rural areas. Thus a citizen can launch 
a request from their mobile phone which would result in a G2G transaction that would be 
securely handled by the proposed framework. 
• Trustworthiness: Citizens expect governments to provide assurances of security including 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of information. For G2G transactions there is a 
need to ensure that there is no improper disclosure of personal information while at the 
same time, certain kinds of information may be derived from personal information and 
made available to all.  
The framework presented addresses information security requirements at governance, 
operational and technical level in detail. 
• Information Heterogeneity and Semantic Interoperability: In G2G transactions, 
information is drawn from multiple sources. Integration is especially difficult in ad-hoc 
situations e.g. to respond to a crisis. But even in routine situations there is a need to 
provide a service based on aggregate information. The need for information heterogeneity 
and semantic interoperability is further underlined because government agency systems 
often employ different and incompatible conventions for data formats.  
The framework makes use of open technology neutral standards, web services and 
ontologies to achieve information heterogeneity and semantic interoperability. 
• Providing software interfaces to services: to allow other stakeholders to easily exploit 
information provided by the government. 
The framework proposes the use of Service Oriented Architectures with services 
published as web services thus enabling exploitation of the services to authorised users. 
10.5  Limitations of the Evaluation Approach 
The Critical Success Factors used to evaluate the framework allow for a weighing of each 
critical success factor against the respective component of the framework in order to 
conclude as to whether the framework addresses those critical success factors. This kind of 
evaluation, while suitable for the overall TOG framework does not critically evaluate the 
technical model of the TOG framework. In particular, the GABAC mechanism proposed as 
part of the technical model would benefit from a more suitable way of evaluation for a 
technology based mechanism. 
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10.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter which is the last in part IV, the TOG framework has been evaluated. The 
framework proposed evaluates well against critical success factors for e-Government and 
information security and matches G2G transactions guidelines.  
 
The TOG framework also addresses the constraints that are currently faced by the EAC in the 
following way: 
• Proposing a process such that the framework that can be implemented as and when 
resources are available at a regional, national and individual agency level. 
• Basing on open standards that are available freely together with examples of 
implementation and guides to useful resources. 
• Enabling implementation to be a ‘plug and play’ approach so that governments do not 
constantly have to keep up with technologies but rather keep focused on what has to 
be achieved and ensuring that technical solutions meet specific requirements and are 
backed by operational guidelines and governance policies. At the same time, MDAs 
can proceed with secure G2G transactions without waiting for legislation to be put in 
place, and can adapt their organizational practices when legislation comes into place. 
• Enabling communication between Governance level and technical level staff by using 
a format that shows what other actors have done and what has to be done to meet 
common security objectives, thus continually raising awareness across the MDA. 
In the next chapter, which is the last in this thesis, the conclusions of this study are presented, 
and the original contributions are highlighted. 
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Chapter 11 Conclusions 
11.1 Introduction 
This study set out with the general objective of adding to the body of information security 
and e-Government knowledge by proposing an Information Security framework for G2G 
transactions in the context of the EAC. The study was motivated by the observation that 
comparatively little information security research has been carried out using the EAC as a 
case study. Furthermore, given the EAC’s desire to move towards a common market which 
will entail increased G2G transaction, an information security framework will be a helpful 
aid to the EAC governments as they start to increase electronic collaborations within each 
country and across the region. 
 
The research questions that were to be answered by this study were: 
i. What are the information security requirements for G2G transactions in the EAC context?  
ii. What are the factors to be addressed in an information security framework for G2G 
transactions in the EAC? 
iii. How can a sustainable information security framework for G2G transactions be achieved 
in the EAC context? 
 
The following were the specific objectives of the study 
i. To define information security  requirements in the EAC context for G2G transactions 
ii. To propose a framework that addresses the requirements identified 
iii. To evaluate the proposed framework 
 
The framework was arrived at by: 
• Defining the key concepts of e-Government and information security in Part I of the 
thesis. 
• Studying and interpreting literature on information security related to G2G practices 
adopted by international and national bodies as standards or guidelines together with 
related academic research. The result was a literature review presented in Part II of this 
thesis. 
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• Establishing the EAC context through a synthesis of relevant documentation and the data 
obtained from a survey of information security practices related to G2G transactions in 
MDAs; and thus answering the second research question. The EAC context was 
combined with the results of Part II of the thesis to establish the information security 
requirements for G2G transactions in the EAC, and thus answering the first research 
question. 
• Combining the findings of Parts II and III to propose an information security framework 
and process that is relevant to the EAC context, and thus answering the third and final 
research question. 
The resultant framework was applied to a case study and evaluated using Critical Success 
Factors. 
11.2 Summary of findings 
11.2.1 First Research Question: Information Security Requirements for G2G 
transactions in the EAC 
Information security requirements for G2G transactions in EAC countries are not different to 
the requirements in other parts of the world and relate to the same security objectives. The 
security objectives and requirements are: Confidentiality (Authentication, Authorization and 
Access Control, Privacy); Integrity (Data integrity); Availability; and Accountability (Trust 
and non-repudiation). The information security requirements were detailed in chapter seven 
of the thesis. For the EAC, however, the mechanisms that are used to meet these 
requirements must address the three factors identified in the EAC context as detailed in the 
findings that answer the 2nd research question. Additionally, a specific novel mechanism 
suitable for meeting information security for G2G transactions, which is the GABAC 
mechanism, has been developed as part of this study. 
11.2.2 Second Research Question: Factors that need to be considered in an information 
security framework for G2G transactions in the EAC. 
Three factors were identified as being: 
i. Resource constraints: These include financial constraints due to limited national 
(public sector) budgets allocated to ICT/ e-Government initiatives and inadequate 
ICT skills; 
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ii. Legal and regulatory constraints: These include lack of sufficient legislation and 
national policy frameworks related to information security in e-Government; and  
iii. National culture constraints: These include uncoordinated or unstructured national 
government initiatives related to ICT or e-Government 
11.2.3 Third Research Question: Sustainable Information Security framework for G2G 
transactions in the EAC 
A unified framework – the TOG framework – was designed to address the information 
security requirement for G2G transactions in the EAC. The framework comprises of five 
models which are the technical, operational, governance, process and maturity models.  
 
The Technical Model proposes the use of mechanisms based on open and freely available 
standards to address the resource constraint factor in the EAC and to contribute towards the 
sustainability of the model.  
 
The Operational Model proposes mechanisms to address information security within 
individual MDA organizational units. This addresses both the resource and national culture 
constraint since each MDA, in implementing the framework can put in place non-technical 
mechanisms to address information security if there is a lack of technical skills to implement 
the technical model. At the same time, if the MDA is in a country that lacks central 
coordination of ICT or e-government initiatives, that MDA can still move towards addressing 
information security requirements through operational level mechanisms. These mechanisms 
can then be mapped onto governance level mechanisms as and when they are put in place by 
governments. 
 
The Governance Model proposes mechanisms to address information security at regional 
national or policy level within MDAs. This addresses the legal and regulatory constraint by 
providing guidance on which gaps may exist that require legislation that will address 
information security requirements. The Governance model allows policy or decision makers 
to recognize their role in ensuring information security for G2G transactions and 
implementing their role as and when resources allow. 
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The process model provides a mechanism to map or to bring together technical, operational 
and governance mechanisms towards holistic addressing of information security in G2G 
transactions. The TOG process model, particularly addresses the EAC resource, legal and 
regulatory and national culture constraints, by using a ‘plug and play’ approach that allows 
MDAs and governments to implement the appropriate mechanisms to meet the set of 
information security requirements using the available resources, and mapping those 
implementations against mechanisms that are already in place. Implementing of the process 
model also raises awareness on gaps in information security that the government or MDA 
can then plan to address when resources are available. Such a process would contribute to 
sustainability, because it allows the MDA to work within the identified constraints, but still 
achieve information security for G2G transactions.  
 
The maturity model allows the EAC governments and MDAs to monitor their progress 
towards improved information security addressing of G2G transactions. 
 
11.3 Original contributions 
The original contributions of this thesis are: 
• An identification of factors in the EAC that need to be addressed for information security 
in G2G transactions. 
• The TOG information security framework for G2G transactions which is a sustainable 
framework in the EAC context. The framework comprises of five models which are 
technical, operational, governance, process and maturity models. 
• A proposed Governance and Attribute based access mechanism model which is suited to 
G2G transactions. 
 
11.4 Limitations of the study 
The findings that have been presented as a result of this research were focused on the EAC. 
While it may be possible to apply the findings to other countries or regions with the same 
contextual factors as the EAC, this study has made no conclusions on the generalizability of 
the findings. 
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The research methodology used in the study was largely an interpretive one, with the 
researcher involved in the implementation of the framework that was developed. This 
approach may introduce an element of bias in the study. This limitation however is weighed 
against the utility of the research findings, where involvement of the researcher resulted in a 
good understanding of the research questions, and especially the contextual factors. 
 
The survey undertaken of MDAs in the EAC resulted in only 18 responses out of 50 
questionnaires sent out. This is a limitation that could be addressed in future work that bases 
on the EAC. 
 
The limitation of the evaluation method used for the framework, as discussed in section 10.5 
of this thesis, is that the CSF method used is in itself not sufficient to evaluate the novel 
technical mechanism, which is Governance and Attribute Based Access Control (GABAC) 
for G2G transactions proposed as part of the technical model of the framework. Such an 
evaluation of the GABAC mechanism could be a basis for future work in the area of securing 
G2G transactions. 
 
Finally, the TOG framework was specifically designed with the contextual factors that were 
discovered in this study in mind. These context issues including resource, legal and 
regulatory, and national culture constraints are not stagnant and may change with time. Such 
changes may result in limitations in the applicability of the framework. 
 
11.5 Conclusion and Future Work 
The general objective of this study was to add to the body of information security and e-
Government knowledge by proposing an Information Security framework for G2G 
transactions in the context of the EAC. This objective has been achieved by the development 
and application of the TOG framework to a case study from the EAC. This work has been 
published in a reputable journal. 
 
Although the TOG framework has been evaluated against both EAC and international criteria 
(ISMS), further work could include investigating how the framework can be generalized for 
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application outside of the EAC. Future work could include more detailed technical 
mechanisms with use cases to ease implementation in environments where resources are 
limited, and improvements to the GABAC mechanism. In the area of information security 
management, further work could build on and expand the maturity model that is outlined in 
this study. 
  
156 
 
References 
Alfawaz, S., May, L., & Mohanak, K. (2007). E-government security in developing 
countries: A Managerial Conceptual Framework. 40th Hawaii International 
Conference on System Sciences. 
Bakari, J. K., Tarimo, C. N., Yngstrom, L., & Magnusson, C. (2005). State of ICT Security 
Management in the Institutions of Higher Learning in Developing Countries: 
Tanzania Case Study. ICALT 2005, (pp. 1007-1011). 
Barnickel, N., Bottcher, J., & Paschke, A. (2010). Incorporating Semantic Bridges into 
Information Flow of Cross-Organizational Business Process Models. 6th 
International Conference on Semantic Systems. ACM. 
Beimel, D., & Peleg, M. (2011). Using OWL and SWRL to represent and reason with 
situation-based access control policies. Data & Knowledge Engineering, 70(6), 596-
615. 
Bergeron, F., & Bégin, C. (1989). The use of Critical Success Factors in Evaluation of 
Information Systems. Jounral of Management Information Systems, 111-124. 
Bernsten, K., & Sampson, J. O. (2005). Interpretive Research Methods in Computer Science. 
Retrieved November 30, 2011, from Norwegian University of Science and 
Technology: http://www.idi.ntnu.no/~thomasos/paper/interpretive.pdf 
Bertino, E. (2003, September). RBAC models — concepts and trends. Computers & Security, 
22(6), 511-514. 
Cabinet Office UK. (2008, December). HMG Security Policy Framework. Retrieved June 
14th, 2010, from Cabinet office UK: 
http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/111428/spf.pdf 
Caralli, R. A. (2004). The Critical Success Factor Method: Establishing a Foundation for 
Enterprise Security Management. Pittsburgh: Software Engineering Institute - 
Carnegie Mellon. 
Carlsson, S. A. (2006). Towards an Information Systems Design Research Framework: A 
Critical. First International Conference on Design Science in Information Systems 
(DESRIST 2006), (pp. 192-212). Claremont. 
157 
 
Cavoukian, A., Taylor, S., & Abrams, M. E. (2010). Privacy by Design: essential for 
organizational accountability and strong business practices. Identity in the 
Information Society, 3(2). 
CEN. (2007). Network and Information Security Standards Report. Final Version, ICT 
Standards Board. 
Centre for Governance Institute. (2005). Governance-Based Access Control 
(GBAC):Enabling Improved Information Sharing that meets Governance 
Requirments. Retrieved June 14th, 2010, from CGI: 
http://www.cgi.com/cgi/pdf/cgi_whpr_63_gbac_e.pdf 
Chango, M. (2007). Challenges to E-Government in Africa South of Sahara: A Critical View, 
and Provisional Notes for a Research Agenda. ICEGOV2007 (pp. 384-393). Macao: 
ACM. 
Chaula, J., Yngstrom, L., & Kowalski, S. (2006). Technology as a Tool for Fighting Poverty: 
How Culture in the Developing World Affect the Security of Information Systems. 
Fourth IEEE International Workshop on Technology for Education in Developing 
Countries (pp. 66-70). Iringa: IEEE. 
Chen, Y. N., Chen, H. M., Huang, W., & Ching, R. K. (2006). E-Government Strategies in 
Developed and Developing Countries: An Implementation Framework and Case 
Study. Journal of Global Information Management, 14(1), 23-46. 
Chunnian, L., Yiyun, H., & Qin, P. (2011). A Study on Technology Architecture and Serving 
Approaches of Electronic Government System. Intelligent Computing and 
Information Science, Communications in Computer and Information Science, 134(1), 
112-117. 
CIO Council. (1999, September). Retrieved September 17, 2010, from 
http://www.cio.gov/documents/fedarch1.pdf 
Coetzee, M., & Eloff, J. (2007). A Trust and Context-Aware Control Model for Web Service 
Conversations. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 4657, 115-124. 
Conklin, A. (2007). Barriers to Adoption of e-Government. 40th Hawaii International 
Conference on System Sciences. 
Cunningham, E. (2007, July 4). Rwanda Leading Africa in ICT Revolution. IPS Africa. 
158 
 
Da Veiga, A. (2008). Cultivating and assessing information security culture, PhD thesis. 
Retrieved December 1, 2011, from University of Pretoria: 
http://upetd.up.ac.za/thesis/available/etd-04242009-165716 
Dada, D. (2006). The Failure of e-Government in Developing Countries: A Literature 
Review. The Electronic Journal of E-Government in Developing Countries, 26. 
Dagada, R., Eloff, M. M., & Venter, L. M. (2009). Too Many Laws but very little progress- 
Is South African Highly Acclaimed Information Security Legislation Redundant? 
Informaton Security South Africa (ISSA09). 
Davies, J., & Jeremy, G. (2009, June). Formal Methods for Future Interoperability. inroads 
— SIGCSE Bulletin, 41(2), 60-64. 
De Capitani di Vimercati, S., & Samarati, P. (2005). New Directions in Access Control. In J. 
Kowalik, J. Gorski, & A. Sachenko (Eds.), Cyberspace Security and Defense: 
Research Issues (pp. 279-298). Gdansk: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
De Jager, A., & Van Reijswoud, V. (2007). E-governance in the developing world in action: 
the case of DistrictNet in Uganda. World Hospitals and Health Services, 43(1), 32-41. 
De Jager, A., & Van Reijswoud, V. (2007). E-governance in the developing world in action: 
the case of DistrictNet in Uganda. World Hospitals and Health Services, 43(1), 32-41. 
de Villiers, M. (2005). Three approaches as pillars for interpretive Information Systems 
research:development research, action research and grounded theory. Annual 
research conference of the South African institute of computer scientists and 
information technologists on IT research in developing countries , (pp. 142-151). 
Demchenko, Y., Gommans, L., & de Laat, C. (2007). Extending Role Based Access Control 
Model for Distributed MultiDomain Applications. In P. a. New Approaches for 
Security, H. Venter, M. L. Eloff, J. Eloff, & R. von Solms (Eds.), New Approaches 
for Security, Privacy and Trust in Complex environments (pp. 301-312). Boston: 
Springer. 
Department of Premier and Government, Tasmania. (2009). Tasmanian Government 
Information Security Framework. Hobart: e-Government Office. 
Domingue, J., Gutierrez, L., Cabral, L., Rowlatt, M., Davies, R., & Galizia, S. (2004). WP 9: 
Case Study eGovernment D9.3 e-Government Ontology. Retrieved March 30, 2011, 
from DIP: http://dip.semanticweb.org 
159 
 
Durbeck, S., Schillinger, R., & Kolter, J. (2007). Security Requirements for a Semantic 
Service-oriented Architecture. The Second International Conference on Availability, 
Reliability and Security (pp. 366-373 ). IEEE Computer Society. 
EAC. (2009). Protocol on the establishment of the East African Community Common 
Market. The East African Community. 
East African Community. (2006). EAC Development Strategy 2006 – 2010. 
East African Community Secretariat. (2005). Regional e-Government Framework. 
Ezz, I. E., & Themistocleous, M. (2005). Investigating the Barriers to G2G Adoption. e-
Government Workshop. London: Brunel University. 
Fan, J., & Zhang, P. (2007). A case study of G2G information sharing in the Chinese context. 
8th annual international conference on Digital government research: bridging 
disciplines & domains. Philadelphia: Digital Government Society of North America . 
Galpin, V. (2008). Africa, Women in Technology in Sub Saharan. In F. B. Tan, Global 
Information Technologies: Concepts, Methodologies, Tools and Applications (pp. 
1681-1688). IGI Global. 
Gerber, M., & von Solms, R. (2008). Information security requirements – Interpreting the 
legal aspects. Computers & Security, 27, 1 2 4 – 1 3 5. 
GITOC. (2009). Government-Wide Enterprise Architecture (GWEA) Framework Revision 
1.2. Government Information Technology Officer's Council of South Africa. Pretoria: 
GITOC South Africa. 
Government of Rwanda. (2010). An Integrated ICT led Socio-Economic Development Plan 
for Rwanda 2006 - 2010: The NICI 2010 Plan. 
Gregoriades, A., & Sutcliffe, A. (2008). A Socio-technical Approach to Business Process 
Simulation. Decision Support Systems, 45(4), 1017-1030. 
Guarda, P., & Zannone, N. (2009, February). Towards the development of privacy-aware 
systems. Information and Software Technology, 51(2), 337-350 . 
Gutiérrez, C., Rosado, D. G., & Fernández-Medina, E. (2009). The practical application of a 
process for eliciting and designing security in web service systems. Information and 
Software Technology , 51, 1712–1738. 
Hayat, Z., Reeve, J., & Boutle, C. (2007). Ubiquitous security for ubiquitous computing. 
Information Security Technical Report, 12(3), 172-178. 
160 
 
He, Q., & Antón, A. I. (2009). Requirements-based Access Control Analysis and Policy 
Specification (ReCAPS). Information and Software Technology, 51, 993–1009. 
Heeks, R. (2002, August). eGovernment in Africa: Promise and Practice. Information Polity, 
7(2,3), 97-114. 
Hellsten, K. S. (2010). E-Government: A Case Study of East African Community Initiative. 
In T. Dumova, & R. Fiordo (Eds.), Handbook of Research on Social Interaction 
Technologies and Collaboration Software: Concepts and Trends (pp. 80-90). IGI 
Global. 
Hellström, J. (2010). The Innovative Use of Mobile Applications in East Africa. SIDA. 
Hevner, A. R., March, S. T., Park, J., & Ram, S. (2004). Design Science in Information 
Systems Research. MIS Quarterly, 28(1), 75-105. 
Hu, V. C., Quirolgico, S., & Scarfone, K. (2008). Access Control Policy Composition for 
Resource Federation Networks Using Semantic Web and Resource Description 
Framework (RDF). International Computer Symposium (ICS 2008). Taiwan. 
Ibrahim, M., & Long, G. (2007, February 27). Service-Oriented Architecture and Enterprise 
Architecture, Part 1: A framework for understanding how SOA and Enterprise 
Architecture work together. Retrieved September 19, 2010, from IBM: 
http://www.ibm.com/developerworks/webservices/library/ws-soa-enterprise1/ 
International Telecommunications Union. (2011, December 31). The World in 2011: ICT 
Facts and Figures. Retrieved October 11, 2012, from International 
Telecommunications Union: http://www.itu.int/ITU-
D/ict/facts/2011/material/ICTFactsFigures2011.pdf 
Islam, S., Mouratidis, H., & Jurjens, J. (2011). A framework to support alignment of secure 
software engineering with legal regulations. , 10(3),. Software and Systems Modeling, 
10(3), 369-397. 
ISO. (2008). Health informatics -- Information security management in health using ISO/IEC 
27002. Geneva: International Organization for Standardization. 
ISO/IEC. (2005a). Information technology — Security techniques — Information security 
management systems — Requirements. Geneva: International Organization for 
Standardization. 
161 
 
ISO/IEC. (2005b). ISO/IEC 27002:2005 - Information technology -- Security techniques -- 
Code of practice for information security management. Geneva: International 
Organization for Standardization. 
ISO/IEC. (2009). Information Technology- Security techniques-Information security 
management systesm - Overview and vocabulary. Geneva: International Organization 
for Standardization. 
Janssen, M., & Scholl, H. J. (2007). Interoperability for Electronic Governance. 
ICEGOV2007, (pp. 45-48). Macao. 
Jeong, D., & Han, Y. (2006). Resolving the Semantic Inconsistency Problem for Ubiquitous 
RFID Applications. UIC, 4159, pp. 1134-1143. 
Kaaya, J. (2003). Implementing e-Government services in East Africa: Assessing Status 
through Content Analysis of Government Websites. Electronic Journal of e-
Government, 2(1), 39-54. 
Kaliontzoglou, A., Karantjias, T., & Polemi, D. (2008). Building Innovative, Secure and 
Interoperable E-Government Services. IGI Global. 
Kanyesigye, F. (2011, January 18). Rwanda: Third Phase ICT Action Plan Unveiled. The 
New Times. 
Karokola, G., & Yngstrom, L. (2009). Discussing e-Government Maturity Models for 
Developing World - Security View. Information Security South Africa (ISSA09). 
Kayworth, T., & Whitten, D. (2010). Effective Infomation Security requires a balance of 
social and technology factors. MIS QUARTERLY EXECUTIVE, 9(3), 163-175. 
Kokolakis, S. A., & Kiountouzis, E. A. (2000). Achieving Interoperability in a Multiple-
Security- Policies Environment. Computers & Security, 19(3). 
Lee, T. Y., Yee, P. K., & Cheung, D. W. (2009). E-government Data Interoperability 
Framework in Hong Kong. International Conference on Interoperability for 
Enterprise Software and Applications China (pp. 239-244). Beijing: IEEE. 
Loser, K., Nolte, .., Herrmann, T., & te Neues, H. (2011). Information security management 
systems and socio-technical walkthroughs. 1st Workshop on Socio-Technical Aspects 
in Security and Trust (STAST), (pp. 45 - 51 ). 
162 
 
Lowery, L. M. (2003). Developing a Successful E-Government Strategy. Retrieved October 
15, 2010, from United Nations Public Administration Network: 
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/apcity/unpan000343.pdf 
Marin-Lopez, R., Pereniguez, F., Lopez, G., & Perez-Mendez, A. (2011). Providing EAP-
based Kerberos pre-authentication and advanced authorization for network 
federations. Computer Standards & Interfaces, 33(5), 494-504. 
McKenzie, R., Crompton, M., & Wallis, C. (2008). Use Cases for Identity Management in e-
Government. Security & Privacy, 6(2), 51-57. 
MEGA-TECH, Inc. (2006). The National ICT Master Plan and e-Government Network 
Feasibility Study in Uganda. 
Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning - Rwanda. (2010). Annex II-7: State expenditure 
per Budget Agency and Programme 2010/2013. 
Ministry of Communications and Transport. (2003). National Information and 
Communications Technologies Policy. United Republic of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam. 
Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs - Tanzania. (2010a). Hali ya uchumi ya Taifa 
katika Mwaka 2009 Jedwali Na.A. 
Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs - Tanzania. (2010b). Volume IV- Public 
expenditure Estimates, Development Votes for 2010/11. 
Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs - Tanzania. (2010c, July). Taarifa Kwa Umma - 
Mfumo Mpya wa Malipo Serikalini. Retrieved September 30, 2010, from Ministry of 
Finance: http://www.mof.go.tz/mofdocs/anouncement/TANGAZO%20MAALUM-
kiswahili2.pdf 
Ministry of Information and Communication Technology - Uganda. (2008a). The Electronic 
Transactions Bill. 
Ministry of Information and Communication Technology - Uganda. (2008b). The Electronic 
Signatures Bill. 
Ministry of the Presidency, Spain. (2010). Spanish National Interoperability Framework. 
Ministry of Works, Housing and Communication - Uganda. (2004). E-Government Strategy 
and Action Plan. Draft Version 1.1, Repubilc of Uganda. 
Ministry of Works, Housing and Communications - Uganda. (2003, October). National 
Information and Communication Technology Policy. 
163 
 
Ministry of Works, Housing and Communications. (2003, October). National Information 
and Communication Technology Policy. 
Msuya, E. (2010, August). Challenges in Data Collection, consolidation and reporting for 
local government authorities in Tanzania. REPOA Brief. 
Mwangi, W. (2006). The Social Relations of e-Government Diffusion in Developing 
Countries: The Case of Rwanda. International conference on Digital government 
research (pp. 199-208). ACM. 
National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda. (2010). GDP Annual Estimates for 2009 based on 
2006 benchmark. 
National Research Council. (2002). Information Technology Research, Innovation and E-
Government. Washington DC: National Academy Press. 
Ndahiro, M. (2009). Electronic/Mobile Government in Africa:Progress Made and Challenges 
Ahead. UN Public Administration Programme. Addis Ababa: Rwanda Development 
Board. 
NIST. (2006). Minimum Security Requirements for Federal Information and Information 
Systems. National Institute of Standards and Technology, Computer Security 
Division. 
NIST. (2009). Recommended Security Controls for Federal Information Systems and 
Organizations. National Institute of Standards and Technology, Computer Security 
Division. 
OASIS. (2005). SAML V2.0 documentation. Retrieved from Organization for the 
Advancement of Secure Information Systems: http://docs.oasis-
open.org/security/saml/v2.0/ 
OASIS. (2006). ebXML Business Process Specification Schema Technical Specification 
v2.0.4. Retrieved November 11, 2011, from OASIS: http://docs.oasis-
open.org/ebxml-bp/2.0.4/OS/spec/ebxmlbp-v2.0.4-Spec-os-en-html/ebxmlbp-v2.0.4-
Spec-os-en.htm 
OASIS. (2008). Electronic Court Filing Version 4.0. Draft Committee Report. 
OASIS. (2010). OASIS Standards and Other Approved Work. Retrieved June 15, 2010, from 
OASIS: http://www.oasis-open.org/specs/ 
164 
 
OASIS. (2010a, April 12). Avoiding the Pitfalls of eGovernment. Retrieved June 30, 2010, 
from OASIS: http://oasis-egov.org/sites/oasis-
egov.org/files/eGov_Pitfalls_Guidance%20Doc_v1.pdf 
OASIS. (2010b). OASIS Standards and Other Approved Work. Retrieved June 15, 2010, 
from OASIS: http://www.oasis-open.org/specs/ 
O'Brien, L., Merson, P., & Bass, L. (2007). Quality Attributes for Service-Oriented 
Architectures. International Workshop on Systems Development in SOA 
Environments (p. 3). Washington DC: IEEE Computer Society. 
OECD. (1980, September). OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder 
Flows of Personal Data. Retrieved June 11, 2010, from OECD: 
http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,3343,en_2649_34255_1815186_1_1_1_1,00.ht
ml 
OECD. (2002). OECD Guidelines for the Security of Information Systems and Networks: 
Towards a Culture of Security. Retrieved June 13th, 2010, from Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development: 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/16/22/15582260.pdf 
OECD. (2007, June). OECD Recommendation on Electronic Authentication and Guideline 
on Electronic Authentication. Retrieved June 11th, 2010, from 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/45/38921342.pdf 
Office of the Prime Minister. (2010, April). National Development Plan 2010/2011 - 
2014/2015. Retrieved October 10, 2010, from Office of the Prime Minister, Republic 
of Uganda: http://www.opm.go.ug/manage/pdfs/ndp_april_2010_port.pdf 
Olivier, M. S. (2004). Information Technology Research: A Practical guide for Computer 
Science and Informatics (2nd ed.). Pretoria: Van Schaik. 
Parliament of Tanzania. (2007). The Written Laws (Miscellanous Amendments) Act - Part 
IX. Tanzania. 
Parliament of Uganda. (2009). National Information Technology Authority, Uganda Act. 
Parliament of Uganda. (2010). The Computer Misuse Act. 
President's Office. (2009). Tanzania e-Government Strategy. United Republic of Tanzania. 
Republic of Rwanda. (2003, May). Consitution of the Republic of Rwanda. 
Republic of Uganda. (1995). Constitution of the Republic of Uganda. 
165 
 
Republic of Uganda. (2010). Approved Estimates of Revenue and Expenditure (Recurrent 
and Development) FY 2010/11. Ministry of Finance. 
Rezaian, B. (2007). African Development: Challenges and Opportunities in Sub Saharan 
Africa. In M. Gascó-Hernández, F. Equiza-López, & M. Acevedo-Ruiz (Eds.), 
Information Communication Technologies and Human Development: Opportunities 
and Challenges. IGI Global. 
RITA. (2006). Final Report on technical standards and guidelines for e-government. 
Rwanda Information Technology Authority. 
Rose, W. R., & Grant, G. G. (2010, January). Critical issues pertaining to the planning and 
implementation of E-Government initiatives. Government Information Quarterly, 
27(1), 26-33. 
Ross, S. J. (2007). Automating Compliance. Information Systems Control Journal, 5. 
Rwangoga, N. T., & Baryayetunga, A. P. (2007). E-Government for Uganda: Challenges and 
Opportunities. International Journal for Computing and ICT Research, 1(1), 36-46. 
Saidam, S. (2007). Knowledge and E-Governance Building in Conflict Affected Societies: 
Challenges and Mechanisms. 1st international conference on Theory and practice of 
electronic governance (pp. 341-344 ). Macao: ACM. 
Scholl, H. J., & Pardo, T. A. (2010). Data-Centric Workflows in Government: A New 
Avenue of Research? 11th Annual International Digital Government Research 
Conference, (pp. 138-146). 
Schuppan, T. (2009). E-Government in developing countries: Experiences from sub-Saharan 
Africa. Government Information Quarterly, 26, 118-127. 
Segole, J., & Needham, W. (2009, June 30). Retrieved September 19, 2010, from GITOC: 
www.gitoc.gov.za/gitoc_web/index.php? 
Seidenspinner, M., & Theuner, G. (2007). Intercultural aspects of online communication a 
comparison of mandarin‐speaking, US, Egyptian and German user preferences. 
Journal of Business Economics and Management, 8(2). 
Shen, H., & Hong, F. (2006). An Attribute-based Access Control Model for Web Services. 
Seventh International Conference on Parallel and Distributed Computing 
Applications and Technologies. IEEE. 
166 
 
Simon, B., Laszlo, Z., Goldschmidt, B., Kondorosi, K., & Risztics, P. (2010). Evaluation of 
WS-* Standards Based Interoperability of SOA Products for the Hungarian e-
Government Infrastructure. 4th International Conference on Digital Society. 
Siponen, M., & Willison, R. (2009). Information security management standards: Problems 
and solutions. Information & Management, 46, 267-270. 
SITA. (2007). Minimum Interoperability Standards for Information Systems in Government. 
Retrieved June 12th, 2010, from SITA: 
http://www.sita.co.za/standard/MIOSv4.12007.pdf 
Sprott, D., & Wilkes, L. (2004, January). Understanding Service-Oriented Architecture. 
Microsoft Architect Journal. 
Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority. (2010). Report on Internet and Data 
Services in Tanzania: A Supply-Side Survey. Dar es Salaam: TCRA. 
Tarimo, C. N., Yngstrom, L., & Kowalski, S. (2005). An Approach to Enhance ICT 
Infrastrcutures Security Through Legal, Regulatory Influence. ISSA 2005, (pp. 1-12). 
The East African Community. (2009). Protocol on the establishment of the East African 
Community Common Market. 
The Guardian Newspaper. (2009, September 27). Five men who stole TRA's $77m nailed . 
Guardian on Sunday. 
Thompson, M., & Walsham, G. (2010). ICT research in Africa: need for a strategic 
developmental focus. Information Technology for Development, 16(2), 112-127. 
UN Economic Commission for Africa. (2007). National Information and Communication 
Infrastrcuture (NICI) e-Strategies : Beat Practices and Lessons Learnt. Addis Ababa: 
UN Economic Commission for Africa. 
UNCTAD. (2010, June 21). East African community adopts framework for cyberlaws to 
foster regional trade, investment. Retrieved January 15, 2011, from UNCTAD: 
http://www.unctad.org/templates/webflyer.asp?docid=13379&intItemID=1528&lang
=1 
United Nations. (2008). UN eGovernment Survey 2008: From eGovernement to Connected 
Governance. 
United Nations. (2010). 2010 Global e-Government Survey: Leveraging E-government at a 
Time of Financial and Economic Crisis. 
167 
 
United Republic of Tanzania. (2000). Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania of 
1977. 
United Republic of Tanzania. (2009). Tanzania e-Government Strategy. 
United Republic of Tanzania, President's Office. (2008). Tanzania e-Government Strategy. 
Presidents Office - Public Service Management. Dar es Salaam: -. 
United States Congress. (2002). Tit. III, E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-347 (Dec. 
17, 2002) (superseding Tit. X, Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-296 
(Nov. 25, 2002)), codified at 44 U.S.C. § 3541 et seq.[2. 
W3C. (2004, February 11). Web Services Glossary. Retrieved July 15, 2010, from W3C 
Working Group: http://www.w3.org/TR/ws-gloss/ 
W3C. (2009, October 27). OWL 2 Web Ontology Language Guide. Retrieved January 12, 
2011, from W3C: http://www.w3.org/TR/owl2-overview/ 
Wangwe, C. K., Eloff, M. M., & Venter, L. (2008a). A Proposed Implementation of SAML 
V2.0 in an e Government Setting. IST Africa. Windhoek: IIMC International 
Information Management Corporation. 
Wangwe, C. K., Eloff, M. M., & Venter, L. (2008b). Towards A Context-Aware Access 
Control Framework in Web Service Transactions. ISSA08. Johannesburg. 
Wangwe, C. K., Eloff, M. M., & Venter, L. (2009). E-Government Readiness: An 
Information Security Perspective from East Africa. In P. C. Cunningham (Ed.), IST-
Africa. Kampala: IIMC International Information Management Corporation. 
Warner, J., Atluri, V., Mukkamala, R., & Vaidya, J. (2007). Using Semantics for Automatic 
Enforcement of Access Control Policies Among Dynamic Coalitions. SACMAT, (pp. 
235-244). 
Weik, M. (2001). Computer Science and Communications Dictionary. Springer. 
Wirtenberg, J., Russell, W. G., & Lipsky, D. (2008). The Sustainable Enterprise Fieldbook: 
When It all Comes Together. Amacom. 
Zarei, B., & Ghapanchi, A. (2008). Guidelines for government-to-government initiative 
architecture in developing countries. International Journal of Information 
Management, 28, 277– 284. 
Zissis, D., & Lekkas, D. (2011). Securing e-Government and e-Voting with an open cloud 
computing architecture. Government Information Quarterly, 28(2), 239-251. 
168 
 
APPENDIX A Questionnaire used for Data Collection. 
The following questionnaire was used to collected data from MDAs in Tanzania, 
Uganda and Rwanda. 
Carina K. Wangwe 
P.O. Box 60049 
Dar es Salaam  
Tanzania   
Dear Sir/Madam, 
 
I am undertaking a PhD research project to develop an information security 
framework for electronic transactions in government and related agencies. This 
research is being conducted in the countries within the East African Community. To 
this end, I kindly request you to complete the following short questionnaire. It 
should take no longer than 15 minutes of your time. 
 
The information provided by you shall remain confidential and shall be reported in 
summary format only. 
 
Please return the completed questionnaire to me by email 
(carina.wangwe@gmail.com) or to the person who handed it to you.  
 
Should you have any queries or comments regarding this questionnaire, please 
contact by phone on +255 754 600512 or email: carina.wangwe@gmail.com. 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
Carina K. Wangwe 
PhD Student  
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University of South Africa 
 
1. What is the nature of your organisation 
 
Central Government    
    
Government Agency    
    
Parastatal Organisation    
    
Other    
 
 
2. What is your role within your organisation 
Managerial (IT)    
    
Managerial (Other)    
    
IT Support    
    
Operations    
 
 
3. Does your organisation have a documented Information (or ICT) Security Policy? 
Yes    
    
No    
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4. How does your organisation transact with other agencies/ government 
departments (You can choose more than one answer)  
 
Manually    
    
Email    
    
Access to Computer Systems of  other     
agencies (Online or remotely)    
    
Other    
 
 
5. What kind of information is involved in the transactions (You can choose more 
than one answer 
Payment/ financial    
    
Confidential information    
    
Other    
 
 
6. What are the main concerns with electronic transactions 
Fraud     
    
Network breakdowns     
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Other 
 
7. For data exchange what security e.g. encryption is in place 
 
 
 
 
8. Does your organisation have any binding agreements with regards to security of 
information with other transacting partners 
Yes    
    
No    
 
 
9. a) Is there a common format for data exchange is used e.g. SWIFT for financial 
transactions? 
Yes    
    
No    
 
b) If Yes, what common format is used?  
 
 
 
 
10. a)  Is there a common basis for terms/ language used in transactions e.g. a law or 
regulations that define terms? 
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Yes    
    
No    
 
b) If Yes, what is the common basis? 
 
 
 
11. Please enter your views about the need for standards for security of information 
exchanges within government or between government agencies and other parties. 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for your co-operation. 
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APPENDIX B Web Service Using WS-Security for Case Study 
Transaction 
The following are three files used to implement a web service for the G2G transaction 
described in the case study in chapter nine. 
i) Configuration File: 
<?xml version="1.0" ?> 
- <!--   
            Coded & Tested by G. Msangi, R.Mtendamema &C.K.Wangwe. 
  --> 
- <configuration> 
- <configSections> 
- <sectionGroup name="system.web.extensions" 
type="System.Web.Configuration.SystemWebExtensionsSectionGroup, 
System.Web.Extensions, Version=3.5.0.0, Culture=neutral, 
PublicKeyToken=31BF3856AD364E35"> 
- <sectionGroup name="scripting" 
type="System.Web.Configuration.ScriptingSectionGroup, 
System.Web.Extensions, Version=3.5.0.0, Culture=neutral, 
PublicKeyToken=31BF3856AD364E35"> 
<section name="scriptResourceHandler" 
type="System.Web.Configuration.ScriptingScriptResourceHandlerSection, 
System.Web.Extensions, Version=3.5.0.0, Culture=neutral, 
PublicKeyToken=31BF3856AD364E35" requirePermission="false" 
allowDefinition="MachineToApplication" /> 
- <sectionGroup name="webServices" 
type="System.Web.Configuration.ScriptingWebServicesSectionGroup, 
System.Web.Extensions, Version=3.5.0.0, Culture=neutral, 
PublicKeyToken=31BF3856AD364E35"> 
<section name="jsonSerialization" 
type="System.Web.Configuration.ScriptingJsonSerializationSection, 
System.Web.Extensions, Version=3.5.0.0, Culture=neutral, 
PublicKeyToken=31BF3856AD364E35" requirePermission="false" 
allowDefinition="Everywhere" /> 
<section name="profileService" 
type="System.Web.Configuration.ScriptingProfileServiceSection, 
System.Web.Extensions, Version=3.5.0.0, Culture=neutral, 
PublicKeyToken=31BF3856AD364E35" requirePermission="false" 
allowDefinition="MachineToApplication" /> 
<section name="authenticationService" 
type="System.Web.Configuration.ScriptingAuthenticationServiceSection, 
System.Web.Extensions, Version=3.5.0.0, Culture=neutral, 
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PublicKeyToken=31BF3856AD364E35" requirePermission="false" 
allowDefinition="MachineToApplication" /> 
<section name="roleService" 
type="System.Web.Configuration.ScriptingRoleServiceSection, 
System.Web.Extensions, Version=3.5.0.0, Culture=neutral, 
PublicKeyToken=31BF3856AD364E35" requirePermission="false" 
allowDefinition="MachineToApplication" /> 
</sectionGroup> 
</sectionGroup> 
</sectionGroup> 
</configSections> 
<appSettings /> 
<connectionStrings /> 
- <system.web> 
- <!--   
            Set compilation debug="true" to insert debugging  
symbols into the compiled page. Because this  
affects performance, set this value to true only  
during development. 
 
  --> 
- <compilation debug="false"> 
- <assemblies> 
<add assembly="System.Core, Version=3.5.0.0, Culture=neutral, 
PublicKeyToken=B77A5C561934E089" /> 
<add assembly="System.Data.DataSetExtensions, Version=3.5.0.0, 
Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=B77A5C561934E089" /> 
<add assembly="System.Web.Extensions, Version=3.5.0.0, Culture=neutral, 
PublicKeyToken=31BF3856AD364E35" /> 
<add assembly="System.Xml.Linq, Version=3.5.0.0, Culture=neutral, 
PublicKeyToken=B77A5C561934E089" /> 
</assemblies> 
</compilation> 
- <!--             The <authentication> section enables configuration  
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of the security authentication mode used by  
ASP.NET to identify an incoming user. 
 
  --> 
<authentication mode="Windows" /> 
- <!--             The <customErrors> section enables configuration  
of what to do if/when an unhandled error occurs  
during the execution of a request. Specifically,  
it enables developers to configure html error pages  
to be displayed in place of a error stack trace. 
 
<customErrors mode="RemoteOnly" defaultRedirect="GenericErrorPage.htm"> 
<error statusCode="403" redirect="NoAccess.htm" /> 
<error statusCode="404" redirect="FileNotFound.htm" /> 
</customErrors> 
 
  --> 
- <pages> 
- <controls> 
<add tagPrefix="asp" namespace="System.Web.UI" 
assembly="System.Web.Extensions, Version=3.5.0.0, Culture=neutral, 
PublicKeyToken=31BF3856AD364E35" /> 
<add tagPrefix="asp" namespace="System.Web.UI.WebControls" 
assembly="System.Web.Extensions, Version=3.5.0.0, Culture=neutral, 
PublicKeyToken=31BF3856AD364E35" /> 
</controls> 
</pages> 
- <httpHandlers> 
<remove verb="*" path="*.asmx" /> 
<add verb="*" path="*.asmx" validate="false" 
type="System.Web.Script.Services.ScriptHandlerFactory, 
System.Web.Extensions, Version=3.5.0.0, Culture=neutral, 
PublicKeyToken=31BF3856AD364E35" /> 
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<add verb="*" path="*_AppService.axd" validate="false" 
type="System.Web.Script.Services.ScriptHandlerFactory, 
System.Web.Extensions, Version=3.5.0.0, Culture=neutral, 
PublicKeyToken=31BF3856AD364E35" /> 
<add verb="GET,HEAD" path="ScriptResource.axd" 
type="System.Web.Handlers.ScriptResourceHandler, System.Web.Extensions, 
Version=3.5.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=31BF3856AD364E35" 
validate="false" /> 
</httpHandlers> 
- <httpModules> 
<add name="ScriptModule" type="System.Web.Handlers.ScriptModule, 
System.Web.Extensions, Version=3.5.0.0, Culture=neutral, 
PublicKeyToken=31BF3856AD364E35" /> 
</httpModules> 
- <webServices> 
<soapServerProtocolFactory 
type="Microsoft.Web.Services3.WseProtocolFactory, 
Microsoft.Web.Services3, Version=3.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, 
PublicKeyToken=31bf3856ad364e35" /> 
</webServices> 
</system.web> 
- <system.codedom> 
- <compilers> 
- <compiler language="c#;cs;csharp" extension=".cs" warningLevel="4" 
type="Microsoft.CSharp.CSharpCodeProvider, System, Version=2.0.0.0, 
Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089"> 
<providerOption name="CompilerVersion" value="v3.5" /> 
<providerOption name="WarnAsError" value="false" /> 
</compiler> 
</compilers> 
</system.codedom> 
- <!--   
        The system.webServer section is required for running ASP.NET 
AJAX under Internet 
Information Services 7.0.  It is not necessary for previous version of 
IIS. 
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  --> 
- <system.webServer> 
<validation validateIntegratedModeConfiguration="false" /> 
- <modules> 
<remove name="ScriptModule" /> 
<add name="ScriptModule" preCondition="managedHandler" 
type="System.Web.Handlers.ScriptModule, System.Web.Extensions, 
Version=3.5.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=31BF3856AD364E35" /> 
</modules> 
- <handlers> 
<remove name="WebServiceHandlerFactory-Integrated" /> 
<remove name="ScriptHandlerFactory" /> 
<remove name="ScriptHandlerFactoryAppServices" /> 
<remove name="ScriptResource" /> 
<add name="ScriptHandlerFactory" verb="*" path="*.asmx" 
preCondition="integratedMode" 
type="System.Web.Script.Services.ScriptHandlerFactory, 
System.Web.Extensions, Version=3.5.0.0, Culture=neutral, 
PublicKeyToken=31BF3856AD364E35" /> 
<add name="ScriptHandlerFactoryAppServices" verb="*" 
path="*_AppService.axd" preCondition="integratedMode" 
type="System.Web.Script.Services.ScriptHandlerFactory, 
System.Web.Extensions, Version=3.5.0.0, Culture=neutral, 
PublicKeyToken=31BF3856AD364E35" /> 
<add name="ScriptResource" preCondition="integratedMode" 
verb="GET,HEAD" path="ScriptResource.axd" 
type="System.Web.Handlers.ScriptResourceHandler, System.Web.Extensions, 
Version=3.5.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=31BF3856AD364E35" /> 
</handlers> 
</system.webServer> 
- <runtime> 
- <assemblyBinding xmlns="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:asm.v1"> 
- <dependentAssembly> 
<assemblyIdentity name="System.Web.Extensions" 
publicKeyToken="31bf3856ad364e35" /> 
<bindingRedirect oldVersion="1.0.0.0-1.1.0.0" newVersion="3.5.0.0" /> 
</dependentAssembly> 
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- <dependentAssembly> 
<assemblyIdentity name="System.Web.Extensions.Design" 
publicKeyToken="31bf3856ad364e35" /> 
<bindingRedirect oldVersion="1.0.0.0-1.1.0.0" newVersion="3.5.0.0" /> 
</dependentAssembly> 
</assemblyBinding> 
</runtime> 
- <!--  Configuring Policy: The entry must be placed here in  
    Web.config for WSE Policy statement to be used in this virtual 
directory 
 
  --> 
- <microsoft.web.services> 
- <policy> 
- <receive> 
<cache name="PensionerPayrollPolicy.xml" /> 
</receive> 
</policy> 
</microsoft.web.services> 
</configuration> 
ii) Policy File 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" ?> 
<policies 
xmlns:wsu="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2002/07/utility" 
xmlns:wsse="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2002/12/secext" 
xmlns:wsp="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2002/12/policy" 
xmlns:wse="http://schemas.microsoft.com/wse/2003/06/Policy"> 
 
<wsp:Policy wsu:Id="GovtPension.asmx"> 
<Integrity wsp:Usage="wsp:Required"  
xmlns="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2002/12/secext"> 
<TokenInfo> 
<SecurityToken> 
<TokenType>UsernameToken</TokenType> 
</SecurityToken> 
<Claims> 
<!-- Role Value Interms of value="MACHINE_NAME\Group Name" />  --
> 
<wse:Role value="GovtPenSrv\PRegistration" /> 
<wse:Role value="GovtPenSrv\PRunPayroll" /> 
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<wse:Role value="GovtPenSrv\PEditDetails" /> 
</Claims> 
</TokenInfo> 
<MessageParts 
      xmlns:rp="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/rp" 
Dialect="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/2002/12/wsse#part"> 
wsp:Body() 
</MessageParts> 
</Integrity> 
</wsp:Policy> 
 
<policyDocument 
xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/wse/2003/06/Policy"> 
<!--<mappings> element maps a resource to a policy assertion by 
policy ID />  --> 
<mappings> 
<map to="http://localhost/GovtPension.asmx"> 
<default policy="#GovtPension.asmx" /> 
</map> 
</mappings> 
</policyDocument> 
</policies> 
 
iii) Web Service 
using System; 
using System.Collections; 
using System.ComponentModel; 
using System.Data; 
using System.Linq; 
using System.Web; 
using System.Web.Services; 
using System.Web.Services.Protocols; 
using System.Xml.Linq; 
using System.Data; 
using System.Data.SqlClient; 
 
using Microsoft.Web.Services3.Security; 
using Microsoft.Web.Services3.Security.Tokens; 
 
namespace govtpensioner 
{ 
    /// <summary> 
    /// Summary description for Service1 
    /// </summary> 
    [WebService(Namespace = "http://tempuri.org/")] 
    [WebServiceBinding(ConformsTo = WsiProfiles.BasicProfile1_1)] 
    [ToolboxItem(false)] 
    // To allow this Web Service to be called from script, using 
ASP.NET AJAX, uncomment the following line.  
    // [System.Web.Script.Services.ScriptService] 
 
        //CLass to Authenticate Web Service Consumers 
public class WseSecurityHelpers 
         { 
 
public static UsernameToken GetUsernameToken(SoapContext context) 
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              { 
if (context == null) 
throw new Exception("Only SOAP requests are permitted."); 
 
                  // Make sure there's a token 
if (context.Security.Tokens.Count == 0) 
                     { 
throw new SoapException("Missing security token", 
SoapException.ClientFaultCode); 
 
 
                      } 
foreach (UsernameToken tok in context.Security.Tokens) 
return tok; 
throw new Exception("UsernameToken not supplied"); 
                } 
         } 
 
 
 
//Classs to create new Pensioner. This class is used by 
webservice Method called 
        //[Create Pensioner] to actual create a Pensioner. 
 
public class NewPensioner 
    { 
private string CHQNo; 
private string FName; 
private string MName; 
private string SName; 
private char Gender; 
private string Acno; 
private int Brno; 
private float Amount; 
public NewPensioner(string CHQNo,string FName, string MName, 
string SName, char Gender, string Acno, int Brno, float Amount) 
        { 
            this.CHQNo = CHQNo; 
            this.FName = FName; 
            this.MName = MName; 
            this.SName = SName; 
            this.Gender = Gender; 
            this.Acno = Acno; 
            this.Brno = Brno; 
            this.Amount = Amount; 
        } 
public string NP() 
        { 
            //CODE TO CONNECT AND CREATE PENSIONER HERE 
            SqlConnection con = new SqlConnection("connection 
string"); 
            SqlCommand cmd = new SqlCommand(); 
            cmd.Connection = con; 
            cmd.CommandType = CommandType.StoredProcedure; 
            cmd.CommandText = "SP_NEW_PENSIONER"; 
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            SqlParameter par1 = new SqlParameter("CHQNo", 
SqlDbType.Int, 10); 
            par1.Value = this.CHQNo; 
cmd.Parameters.Add(par1); 
//more parameters here. 
con.Open(); 
cmd.ExecuteScalar(); 
con.Close(); 
 
        } 
    } 
 
//Classs to run Payroll. This class is used by webservice Method 
called 
    //[Run Payroll] to actual create run a Payroll. 
 
public class RPayroll 
    { 
private int Month; 
private int Year; 
 
public RPayroll(int Month, int Year) 
        { 
            this.Month = Month; 
            this.Year = Year; 
        } 
 
public string RunP() 
        { 
            SqlConnection con = new SqlConnection("connection 
string"); 
            SqlCommand cmd = new SqlCommand(); 
            cmd.Connection = con; 
            cmd.CommandType = CommandType.StoredProcedure; 
            cmd.CommandText = "SP_RUN_PENSION"; 
            SqlParameter par1 = new SqlParameter("pMonth", 
SqlDbType.Int, 2); 
            par1.Value = this.Month; 
cmd.Parameters.Add(par1); 
            SqlParameter par2 = new SqlParameter("pYear", 
SqlDbType.Int, 4); 
            par1.Value = this.Year; 
cmd.Parameters.Add(par2); 
con.Open(); 
cmd.ExecuteScalar(); 
con.Close(); 
        } 
    } 
 
//Classs to Edit Pensioner. This class is used by webservice 
Method called 
//[Edit Pensioner] to actual edit a Pensioner. 
public class EPensioner 
    { 
private int PNo; 
private string Acno; 
private int Brno; 
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private float Amount; 
 
public EPensioner(int PNo,string Acno,int Brno,float Amount) 
        { 
            this.PNo = PNo; 
            this.Acno = Acno; 
            this.Brno = Brno; 
            this.Amount = Amount; 
        } 
 
public string EP() 
        { 
            //Code to edit pensioner details will be coded here 
        } 
    } 
 
//Classs to change Pensioner Status. This class is used by 
webservice Method called 
//[ChangePenStatus] to actual change Pensioner status. 
public class CPStatus 
    { 
private int PNo; 
private char status; 
private string reason; 
 
public CPStatus(int PNo,char status,string reason) 
        { 
            this.PNo = PNo; 
            this.status = status; 
            this.reason = reason; 
        } 
 
public string CS() 
        { 
            //Code to change pensioner status will be coded here 
        } 
    } 
 
public class Service1 : System.Web.Services.WebService 
    { 
        //Webservice Method to Create new Pensioner. 
        //The Particular to pass is as indicated in the Method 
Parameter. 
        [WebMethod] 
public string CreatePensioner(string CHQNo, string FName, string 
MName, string SName, char Gender, string Acno, int Brno, float 
Amount, int AuthorizationCode) 
        { 
            UsernameToken tok = 
WseSecurityHelpers.GetUsernameToken(RequestSoapContext.Current); 
 
            //Check if the Web Service Consumer is Allowed to 
create new Pensioner as defined in the web Policy 
if (!tok.Principal.IsInRole(string.Format("{0}\\CreatePensioner", 
Dns.GetHostName()))) 
 
throw new Exception("access denied"); 
183 
 
            NewPensioner Pensioner = new NewPensioner(CHQNo, 
FName, MName, SName, Gender, Acno, Brno, Amount); 
success = Pensioner.NP(); //Call Method to Create New Pensioner. 
return success; 
 
        } 
 
        //Webservice Method to Edit Pensioner Deatils 
        //Details to Edit includes:Account Number,Account 
Name,Branch Number 
        //and Amount for a given Pensioner. 
        [WebMethod] 
public string EditPensioner(int PNo, string Acno, int Brno, float 
Amount, int AuthorizationCode) 
        { 
            UsernameToken tok = 
WseSecurityHelpers.GetUsernameToken(RequestSoapContext.Current); 
 
            //Check if the Web Service Consumer is Allowed to 
change Pensioner Details as defined in the web Policy 
if (!tok.Principal.IsInRole(string.Format("{0}\\Edit Pensioner", 
Dns.GetHostName()))) 
 
throw new Exception("access denied"); 
 
            EPensioner edit = new 
EPensioner(PNo,Acno,Brno,Amount); 
success = edit.EP(); //Call Method to Edit Pensioner Details 
return success; 
        } 
 
        //Webservice Method used to change the Pensioner 
Status.Reason must also be passed 
        [WebMethod] 
public string ChangePenStatus(int PNo, char status, string 
reason, int AuthorizationCode) 
        { 
            //Authenticate Webservice Consumer 
            UsernameToken tok = 
WseSecurityHelpers.GetUsernameToken(RequestSoapContext.Current); 
 
            //Check if the Web Service Consumer is Allowed to 
change Pensioner Status as defined in the web Policy 
if (!tok.Principal.IsInRole(string.Format("{0}\\ChangePenStatus", 
Dns.GetHostName()))) 
 
throw new Exception("access denied"); 
            CPStatus   CPS = new CPStatus(PNo,status,reason);  
success = CPS.CS(); //Call Change Status for Pensioner 
return success; 
        } 
 
        //Webservice Method to run Peyroll.You must pass 
particular Month and Year 
        //for the Payroll to run. 
        [WebMethod] 
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public string RunPayroll(int Month, int Year, int 
AuthorizationCode) 
        { 
            UsernameToken tok = 
WseSecurityHelpers.GetUsernameToken(RequestSoapContext.Current); 
 
            //Check if the Web Service Consumer is Allowed to run 
Payroll as defined in the web Policy 
if (!tok.Principal.IsInRole(string.Format("{0}\\RunPayroll", 
Dns.GetHostName()))) 
 
throw new Exception("access denied"); 
 
            RPayroll Payroll = new RPayroll(Month, Year); 
success = Payroll.RunP(); 
return success; 
 
        } 
 
    } 
} 
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APPENDIX C Ontology for G2G Transactions in Case Study 
Some work was done as part of this study towards building an ontology for the case study 
described in chapter eight. The language used was OWL and the ontology was built using the 
Protégé tool. Below are screenshots showing the class hierarchy and the object and data 
properties.  
Classes in the Case Study domain ontology in the domain are bank, beneficiary, claim, 
guarantee, ministry and payroll system. 
 
The object properties are: hasA; hasAccessTo; isA; isAuthorisedTo and isPartOf. 
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The only data property in the domain is validFor 
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APPENDIX D Improving organizational maturity with TOG 
Framework. 
The TOG framework application to the case study presented in chapter nine, resulted in 
improvement in the information security policy with the implementing agency. A mapping of 
the requirements of the information security policy was done against 3 models of the TOG 
framework. This was done to guide implementation of the information security policy and to 
raise awareness for all staff of what their role at a governance, operational and technical level 
is in complying with the policy and any related governance requirements related to 
information security. The framework used is shown in the table below. 
  MODEL 
Security 
Objective as 
per policy 
Security 
Requirement 
Governance Operational Technical 
Systems 
Resources 
Classificatio
n & Control 
Authentication 
and access control  
Board Directive of nth 
Board Meeting –on 
auditor’s 
recommendations 
• HR/ Payroll as 
source of 
identification 
of staff; 
• Physical 
controls on 
access to 
offices 
 
• Domain controller 
access controls i.e. 
password management. 
• Lock account for 3 
unsuccessful log in 
attempts. 
• Encryption (email & 
access to Member self 
help) 
• Terminals should time 
out in 10 minutes if left 
inactive. 
Personnel 
Security 
Confidentiality/ 
privacy and 
accountability   
Staff & Admin 
Regulation; 
Board directive of 
nnth Board meeting 
on review of audit 
trails 
• Standard user 
name – initial 
followed by 
surname; 
• Regulation on 
review of audit 
trails 
• Password 
policy 
• Software (Microsoft 
server 2008) Use of the 
list privilege principle to 
Information systems 
Software 
Security 
Integrity and 
Availability 
Board Directive of 
nth meeting on IT 
risk register 
• Maintenance 
agreement for 
software 
 
• Documentation 
of software 
(functionalities 
and roles) 
• ICT service level 
agreement which aims 
to ensure the availability 
and integrity of systems.  
• Access controls (only 
administrator can install 
and do authorised 
modifications to 
software 
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  MODEL 
Security 
Objective as 
per policy 
Security 
Requirement 
Governance Operational Technical 
Physical and 
Environment
al Security 
Authorization  • Risk 
recommendation 
on Physical 
security of server 
room 
• Auditors 
recommendation  
• Insurance 
• Risk Register 
• Fixed Asset 
Register 
• Financial 
Regulations 
• CCTV (Closed-circuit 
television) 
• Biometric access to 
server room 
• Infrastructure 
management system  
• Installation of fire 
extinguishers, smoke 
detector and water 
detectors. 
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Abstract 
The government of Tanzania adopted an e-Government 
strategy in 2009 that is aimed at improving efficiency in 
government and providing better services to citizens. 
Information security is identified as one of the 
requirements for a successful e-Government 
implementation although the government has not adopted 
any standards or issued guidelines to government 
agencies with regards to information security.  
Comprehensive addressing of information security can be 
an expensive undertaking and without guidelines 
information security implementations may be more prone 
to failure. In a resource poor country such as Tanzania, 
there is a need for a cost effective and sustainable means 
of addressing information security in e-Government 
implementations. In this paper the authors present a case 
study of an e-Government interaction between a ministry 
and a government agency and the information security 
challenges identified in the implementation.  In order to 
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address these challenges an information security 
framework is conceptualized using action research. The 
framework is applied in the case study to address the 
identified challenges and the means to address future 
challenges in a sustainable manner is identified. Finally, 
the proposed framework is evaluated against Tanzanian 
and international metrics. 
 
Keywords 
Information Security Framework, e-Government, 
information security, e-Governance, e-Government in 
Tanzania,  
 
JEL Classification: O14, O33, O38 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Tanzania is a country in East Africa with a population of about 43 million people and per 
capita GDP in 2009 of Tanzania Shillings 693,185 or USD 522 (Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Affairs, 2010a). The government of Tanzania consists of central government 
ministries, departments and government agencies or parastatal organizations. These are 
commonly referred to by the acronym MDAs. Tanzania has recognized information and 
communication technologies as a tool for development of the country. There is a national 
ICT Policy (Ministry of Communications and Transport, 2003) that was adopted in 2003 
with the intention to guide national ICT initiatives. However each ministry within central 
government and each municipality within local government set their own agenda in relation 
to ICT. The central government budget for the financial year 2010/2011 by the Ministry of 
Communication, Science & Technology which is responsible for ICT was Tanzania Shillings 
3.1billion which is equivalent to about USD 2 Million (Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Affairs, 2010b). Despite its low GDP and low ICT spending, mobile phone penetration in 
Tanzania is fairly high, standing at 31% of the population, and the private sector has 
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introduced many services to take advantage of the high use of mobile phones. (Hellström, 
2010, p. 14). Citizens expect government to keep up with these innovations and in response 
the government of Tanzania has come up with policies and strategies to harness the use of 
ICT including an e-Government strategy. 
This Tanzanian e-Government strategy (President's Office, United Republic of Tanzania, 
2009) is aimed at improving efficiency in government and providing better services to 
citizens. The strategy outlines seven guiding principles including:  Service Innovation; Equal 
Access; Ease of Use; Benefit Realization and Involvement of All Stakeholders; Security and 
Privacy; Partnership and Outsourcing; and Interoperability. The two principles that relate 
directly to information security are Security and Privacy and Interoperability. The strategy 
lists six critical success factors, one of which is sustainable infrastructure, and goes further to 
state one of the requirements of a sustainable infrastructure as being network and information 
security. However, the strategy does not provide guidance to MDAs, who are the major 
implementers of e-Government, on how to go about addressing information security issues. 
Furthermore, there are no other government-wide policies, guidelines or standards that have 
been issued with regards to information security. In order for citizens to benefit from e-
Government, MDAs must collaborate and cooperate to come with comprehensive services 
that are efficient and secure. 
Implementation of robust information security can be an expensive undertaking. Since 
Tanzania is a country with limited resources, it is important for MDAs to have a framework 
which allows them to plan for and implement information security in e-Government 
implementations, but at the same is cognizant of the limited resources that are at the MDAs 
disposal. This paper presents such a framework and uses a case study of an e-Government 
implementation in Tanzania to illustrate how the framework can be applied. 
This paper aims at answering the research question “How can a cost effective and 
sustainable information security framework for e-Government be developed for Tanzanian 
MDAs?” Action research is used as the methodology for a case study involving an e-
Government transaction between a government ministry and a government agency. The 
observations resulting from the study are combined with secondary data from the literature 
review resulting in an information security framework that answers the research question. 
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The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: section 2 presents the case study of 
a Government to Government implementation and the approach to solve the identified 
information security challenges.  Section 3 discusses literature that is relevant to the study 
that is used to gain insights on how to solve the identified challenges.  In section 4 a 
conceptual framework is proposed and then applied to the case study.  Section 5 presents an 
evaluation of the frameworks using Critical Success Factors.  The paper ends with a 
conclusion in section 6. 
 
2. Case Study 
2.1. Background 
 
The Tanzanian Central Government has been paying pensions for civil servants who 
retired before July 2004 through a ministry responsible for finance. Due to concerns about 
the efficiency of the process, fraud and resource constraints, the ministry decided to 
outsource the process in 2008 to a government agency. The government agency chosen is 
one that has been dealing with pension payments for over 30 years for employees from the 
private sector and from other government agencies. The ministry required the government 
agency to run the payroll on secure software and send the payroll information electronically 
to banks. The banks would then debit the ministry account and credit the pensioners account.  
The ministry envisaged that this process would reduce human intervention which is one of 
the sources of fraud; ensure that pensioners are paid on time; and have an audit trail of 
transactions so as to follow up on any suspect cases. Furthermore, by outsourcing the 
arrangement to an agency that already had a robust software, and business continuity 
program in place, the risks arising from frequent power interruptions and lack of sufficient 
technical skills in the ministry would be addressed. 
 
2.2. Challenges identified in implementing the decision 
 
The process of implementing the decision began with a kickoff workshop involving staff 
from the ministry and the agency. Several challenges were identified during the workshop 
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and when the action plan for implementation was started. These challenges are categorized in 
three pillars. For ease of reference the challenges are given code numbers. These are: 
a) Governance  
• G1: Legally, the agency had no mandate to access the data held by the ministry or to 
pay pensions on behalf of the ministry. 
• G2: Both ministry and agency had information security policies that needed to be 
aligned for purposes of the transaction. 
• G3: The memorandum of understanding (MoU) signed between the Ministry and the 
agency did not explicitly address information security. 
b) Operational 
• O1: Definitions of some terms were different. For example a survivor’s pension in the 
central government ministry is different from a survivor’s pension in the government 
agency. 
• O2: Financial resources allocated to the outsourcing project were limited. 
• O3: The ministry wanted to retain some control over updates to information 
• O4: Technical and management teams met separately during the planning process. 
• O5: The organizational culture for the two organizations was found to be different. In the 
agency technical staff spearhead most initiatives and sold ideas to management, while in 
the ministry the approach was more top down, that is directives are given by the minister, 
which the technical and operational staff have to implement. 
c) Technical 
• T1: Some of the necessary data was mostly in paper files and confidentiality and privacy 
was observed through physical access controls such as storing the data in locked cabinets. 
Access lists were on paper and files containing information were issued by a person 
responsible for storing the files. 
• T2: The ministry was running their payroll on a COBOL based application while the 
government agency was using an application based on Oracle Forms. The underlying 
databases and operating systems were also on different platforms. 
• T3: The ministry offices and the agency offices had no direct data communication link. 
• T4: Although security policies existed in both organizations, no standard requirements for 
security were set out in either policy. 
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The initial approach by the Ministry was to deal with the issue of legislation, and propose 
amendments to the law which were passed by the Parliament (Parliament of Tanzania, 2008). 
These amendments simply allowed the agency to pay pensions on behalf of the government. 
The challenge of data access was not addressed. A technical team headed by one of the 
authors of this paper, was set up by the agency to coordinate the project implementation. This 
team decided to adopt a structured approach to address the challenges mentioned above. The 
process which is an ongoing iterative process uses the action research methodology (de 
Villiers, 2005) as shown in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1: Action Research process: Adopted from de Villiers (2005) 
 
Early in the process, the authors observed that some of the challenges identified have 
been addressed by studies already published in journals or conferences proceedings. The 
reuse of solutions or components of the solutions presented in such studies could be 
beneficial to the case study.  This resulted in literature surveys that identified some relevant 
studies. These studies are outlined in the next section and how they meet the challenges 
identified is discussed. 
 
3.  Literature Survey 
 
The starting point for the literature survey was existing international standards on 
information security. The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) defines 
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Reflect 
Observe & Evaluate 
Researcher 
Plan Response 
Act 
Observe & Evaluate 
Reflect 
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information security as the preservation of confidentiality, integrity and may also involve 
authenticity, accountability, non-repudiation and reliability (ISO/IEC, 2009, p. 3). 
Information security has been studied comprehensively from a technical and a management 
perspective. A few studies have also been done on information security in Tanzania. In this 
section, studies related to information security in e-Government are discussed in relation to 
the challenges observed in the case study. The studies are presented in three categories, 
which are, technical, management and studies based in Tanzania. 
 
3.1. Technical Studies on Information Security in e-Government 
 
Many e-Government implementations are achieved through Service Oriented 
Architectures (SOA) with Web Services (Chunnian et al. 2011), (Simon et al. 2010), (Scholl 
and Pardo, 2010). This is because e-Government implementations involve transactions across 
heterogeneous systems.  
The security requirements for e-Government implementations are discussed by Zissis 
and Lekkas (2011) in fiver broad categories which are Availability, Confidentiality, Integrity, 
Authenticity, and Accountability. The security requirements of a particular e-Government 
project, the Access e-Gov project (Durbeck et al. 2007) are listed as Communication security 
that can be achieved through standards-based encryption and digital signatures; Trust; 
Privacy; and access control: whereby Attribute Based Access Control is suggested to provide 
a flexible dynamic infrastructure that suits loosely coupled SOA. Beimel and Peleg (2011) 
introduce an improved method of Access Control policy composition which underpins access 
control with ontologies through the application of the Web Ontology Language (OWL) and 
the Semantic Web Rule Language (SWRL).  
The use of the Security Assertion Mark-up Language (SAML) as a mechanism for 
handling access control in an e-Government transaction was addressed in a study by Marin-
Lopez et al. (2011) and by Wangwe et.al (2009). SAML is one of several open technical 
standards adopted by the Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information 
Standards (OASIS). Other standards from OASIS include XACML which is designed for 
access control and the WS family of standards for web service security (OASIS, 2010). 
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3.2. Information Security Management 
 
ISO 27002, which is an internationally accepted standard, requires legal and regulatory 
aspects to be taken into consideration when incorporating security requirements in the design 
of systems (ISO/IEC, 2005). To this end, Guarda & Zannone (2009) state that legal 
requirements should be incorporated into software engineering for e-Government 
transactions by following existing laws and more especially those related to privacy and data 
protection. A practical implementation of how legal requirements can be incorporated in 
software system engineering is demonstrated in a study by Islam et.al (2011) in a framework 
that allows developers to elicit requirements from legislation, and track that these 
requirements are addressed through the system development. 
A study by Seidenspinner and Theuner (2007) investigates different cultural 
environments and concludes that the cultural environment of users affects their online 
behaviour. This conclusion is extended to governments in a proposition by Alfawaz et al. 
(2007) that national culture may have an impact on e-Government security effectiveness in 
developing countries. Their study looks at the effect of legislation on security and privacy 
and states that many developing countries have yet to consider adopting adequate legislation 
related to information security management which could be used to take action against the 
misuse of ICT resources.  Zarei and Ghapanchi (2008) however argue that e-Government 
development should not wait until full security levels are reached. They state that providing 
fully functional security for all the e-Government programs is impractical. Other security 
heuristic principles include the need for a security development and management plan and 
application of security standards by a team with sufficient experience.  The recommendations 
of the study by Zarei & Ghapanchi are to an extent validated by a study conducted in South 
Africa by Dagada et al. (2009) who conclude that while legislation that deals with 
information security exists, it is not used in organizational policies.  
Several governments have put in place mechanisms at a national level to govern 
information security. For instance, the government of the United Kingdom adopted Her 
Majesty’s Government (HMG) Security Policy Framework that sets out policy areas to guide 
information security management in government departments (Cabinet Office UK, 2008). 
The Government of Tasmania has adopted an Information Security Framework which 
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provides guidance to government agencies on what Information Security Policy Principles 
they need to adhere to, as well as important legislative requirements and the primary roles 
and responsibilities for information security (Department of Premier and Government, 
Tasmania, 2009). A slightly different approach has been adopted by the Spanish and South 
African Governments, who have adopted interoperability standards for government agencies 
that address security among other issues (Ministry of the Presidency, Spain, 2010; SITA, 
2007). 
 
3.3. Information Security and e-Government in Tanzania 
 
In Tanzania, a study of information security in higher institutions of learning (Bakari et 
al. 2005) led to two key conclusions, which were, the necessity of adequate planning at 
national and organizational level for a successful information strategy; and the need for 
developing countries to transform traditional information security policies into relevant 
policies to cater for digital information security. These conclusions further motivate this 
study since a framework for e-Government security would both ease planning at a national 
and organizational level, and also guide the drafting of relevant security policies.  
The need for regulations to underpin information security is discussed by Tarimo 
(Tarimo et al. 2005) who recognizes contexts in developing countries as significantly 
different from those in developed countries, and the impact on information security. Tarimo 
et.al conclude that instead of waiting for the government intervention, organisations 
deploying ICT can put forward their own initiatives to make sure that their systems follow 
standards that allow for security, interconnectivity and interoperability with other ICTs in the 
country and beyond. This conclusion is supported by the study Zarei and Ghapanchi (2008), 
which is to say that for a developing country; a top-down might not work since governments 
are slow in implementing the necessary governance structure, while a bottom- up approach 
may be constrained by lack of guidelines. 
Karokola (Karokola and Yngstrom 2009) study Tanzanian government institutions’ 
requirements with regards to information security and come up with a score of the priority 
areas. Technical security issues are ranked most important together with awareness. Non-
technical aspects including managerial, operational and economical factors are also 
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considered priority areas. This study shows that legal and regulatory requirements are not 
high on the list of priorities. This could be explained by the fact that there are currently not 
many laws in Tanzania that address information security. 
 
3.4. Reflection on the Literature Survey 
 
The literature survey provided useful insights to addressing the information security 
challenges that were identified in the case study, and in particular in highlighting areas where 
solutions to similar challenges have already been found and how other governments have 
approached information security management.  The insights to some of the challenges 
obtained from the literature survey are summarised in Table 1. For challenges, G2, O2, O4 
and T3 which are very specific to the case study, ways to address the challenges were 
obtained through brainstorming sessions, and the findings incorporated in the framework that 
is presented in section 4. 
 
Table 1: Insights from Literature Surveyed 
Identified 
Challenges 
Insights  from studies surveyed 
Governance  
G1 Where legislation exists, it should be reflected in policies. International Standards should be 
used to guide implementations. 
G3 Technical and operational solutions can and should be used in the absence of governance 
structures. 
Operational  
O1 Semantic interoperability can be achieved through common taxonomies 
O3 Robust Access control mechanisms are important for secure government to government 
transactions.  Attribute Based Access Control is a mechanism that can be used with SOA to 
ensure controlled access to information assets 
O5 Culture has an impact on web usage in general, and specifically on information security for 
online transactions. The implementation of successful information security implementations 
should thus include addressing of culture 
Technical  
T1 Access control lists can be translated into electronic polices using open standards such as 
XACML and implemented using SAML 
T2 Service Oriented Architectures and Web Services can be used for technical interoperability; 
in addition semantic interoperability can be achieved through use of ontologies. 
T4 In general, Security Objectives are Confidentiality which includes authentication, 
authorization and access control and privacy, Integrity, Availability and Accountability 
which includes Trust and Non repudiation 
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4. Proposed Framework 
 
The insights obtained from the literature survey were combined with data collected 
through observations of current information security practices in both the ministry and the 
agency, and interviews with staff involved in the implementation of the case study. From 
these, the authors conceptualized an information security framework that is referred to by the 
acronym TOG (Technical, Operational and Governance). The TOG framework recognizes 
the need for e-government transactions to be cognizant of national legislation, and policies, 
will at the same time complying with organizational policies. At the technical level, for a 
country that has limited resources such as Tanzania, the technical pillar recognizes the 
existence of tried and test mechanisms, particularly those based on open internationally 
accepted standards. 
The TOG information security framework consists of three pillars which are Technical, 
Operational and Governance pillars. The governance pillar includes legislation, 
internationally acceptable standards, national and regional standards and guidelines and 
operational policies. This pillar will be typically implemented at national level by inter-
ministerial committees together with legislative bodies such as parliament, while at MDA 
level it will be implemented by executive management and or Boards of Directors.  The 
operational pillar includes organizational plans and operational procedure and is 
implemented by organizational units within MDAs. The technical pillar includes technical 
mechanisms to address the security requirements and is implemented by Information 
Technology departments within MDAs. The components of each pillar are gleaned from the 
literature study done of researches on information security for e-government and matched to 
security objectives and requirements that are applicable to the e-government transaction. 
The detailed TOG framework is depicted in Table 2. 
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Table 2. TOG Framework 
  PILLAR 
Security 
Objective 
Security 
Requireme
nt 
Governance Operational Technical 
Confidential
ity 
Authenticati
on 
• International Standards, 
• Laws and Regulations, 
• Organisational Policies 
• Risk Assessment 
• Certificate Authorities 
• Metadata definitions 
• Awareness Sessions 
• Ontologies 
• Attribute based 
Access control 
using XACML 
& SAML 
attributes 
• Passwords 
Authorizati
on and 
Access 
Control 
Privacy 
Integrity 
Data 
Integrity 
• International Standards, 
Organisational Policies • Certificate Authorities • Encryption, SSL 
Availability Availability • Business Continuity 
Policies (BCP) 
• Power Management 
• Business Continuity 
Plans 
• Interoperability 
frameworks 
• SOA, Web 
Services, 
Uninterruptible 
Power Supply 
(UPS) 
Accountabil
ity 
Trust & 
Non 
Repudiation 
• Laws and Regulations, 
• Contractual 
Agreements and MoUs 
• Certificate Authorities 
• Digital 
Signatures, 
Certificates, 
• PKI 
 
 
4.1 Application of the Framework 
 
 The application of the framework was done by the ministry and the agency with 
activities often taking place in parallel, and with the top management being responsible for 
governance, operational staff for the operational pillar and technical staff for the technical 
pillar. Mapping across the pillars was undertaken in workshops where management and 
technical staff met to discuss their activities and map them against activities being done in 
other pillars. This approach was termed a ‘plug and play’ approach in contrast to a top-down 
or bottom up approach, although for each activity a Plan-Do-Act-Check cycle was followed 
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as shown in Figure 2.  The plug and play approach recognises that resources in the Tanzania 
government for one big initiative may not be available, but it is still possible for a department 
to start to address information security for an e-government transaction by focusing first on 
one pillar of the framework – depending on what the role of the department is, and what 
resources are available. A mapping onto the other pillars can be done from time to time, as 
resources become available. Each mapping recognises the initiative already in place and 
gradually the government moves towards a holistic addressing of information security 
requirements. 
PLAN: Identify 
security 
requirements to be 
met
DO: Apply the 
solution in the pillar 
that is applicable to 
the security 
requirement
ACT: Refine solution 
and propose refinement 
to other pillar
CHECK: Evaluate 
implementation 
and map against 
other pillars to 
identify gaps  
Figure 2: PDCA Cycle for application of the TOG framework 
 
The specific activities carried out so far in implementing the framework and addressing the 
challenges stated in section 2.2 are: 
a) Governance 
 
Legislation (Parliament of Tanzania, 2008) was put in place to mandate the agency to 
pay on behalf of the ministry before the implementation of the framework. Based on the 
amended legislation a contract signed between the two parties to outline the roles and 
responsibilities of each party in implementing the outsourcing of payment of pensions. 
Furthermore the parties agree that the information security policy of the ministry would 
prevail. 
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b) Operational 
 
In meeting the information security objectives, the following activities have been done: 
• Risk assessment has been carried out and an access control list setup 
• The parties have agreed to use the Ministry definitions where terminology differs. 
• Joint awareness sessions between technical and management teams are held every six 
months to review activities in each team and determine where solutions need to be 
mapped to each other.  
Challenges that are still to be addressed include coming up with taxonomy of terms that 
relate to the payment of pensions to ensure that interpretation of the terms is consistent. 
 
c) Technical 
 
The technical team has developed a payroll web service that can be invoked by the 
ministry if they need to do updates to data. The same web service is used to run the payroll. 
In addressing data integrity, privacy and confidentiality, a secure communication link has 
been set up between the ministry and the agency and information across the link is encrypted. 
The relevant information security policies translated to XACML. Authentication has been 
tied to fixed IP addresses. Availability has been addressed through the installation of UPS for 
power management. The agency uses an SSL certificate issued by VeriSign 
(www.verisign.com) for its browser interfaces. Thus VeriSign was used as a trusted third 
party in the absence of a certificate authority set up by government. The challenges that still 
need to be addressed include automating the issue of security assertions, by for example, 
implementing SAML. Table 3 illustrates how the TOG framework has been applied. 
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Table 3. Application of TOG framework to payroll application 
  PILLAR 
Security 
Objective 
Security 
Requirement Governance Operational Technical 
Confidentiality 
Authentication 
• Ministry’s 
Information 
Security Policy 
  
Authorization 
and Access 
Control 
• Finance Act. No. 
13 of 2008 
• Contract between 
Ministry and 
Agency 
• Risk Assessment, 
Access Control List, 
• Standard 
Terminology for 
transactions 
• Awareness Sessions 
• XACML policies 
based on 
Ministry’s 
information 
Security Policy 
Privacy 
• Ministry’s 
Information 
Security Policy 
  
Integrity Data Integrity 
• Ministry’s 
Information 
Security Policy 
 • SSL, Encryption 
Availability Availability   
• Uninterruptible 
Power Supply 
(UPS); 
•  Pensioner 
Payroll Web 
Service 
Accountability Trust & Non Repudiation 
• Finance Act No. 13 
of 2008 
• Contract between 
Ministry and 
Agency 
• Access Control List 
• SSL (from 
VeriSign) 
• Authentication by 
IP address 
 
4.2. Addressing Future Challenges 
The TOG framework allows MDAs to include any technical, operational or governance 
solutions or practices that are applicable in the context of the transactions being addressed.  
Once a solution has been adopted in one pillar, mapping will be done across the other pillars 
to ensure that comprehensive information security is achieved.  
 
5.  Evaluation 
The TOG framework is evaluated using critical success factors (CSFs). The evaluation is 
shown in Table 3. CSFs have been used as a method for helping organizations guide the 
development and management of security strategies and across their enterprises and for 
evaluation of information systems (Caralli, 2004) (Bergeron, Bégin, 1989). The TOG 
framework is evaluated in two ways. Firstly Critical Success Factors (CSFs) stated in the 
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Tanzania e-Government strategy are used. Although the CSFs are stated in relation to e-
Government they can also be applied to information security in e-Government since 
information security should form an integral part of the planning process for e-Government 
implementations conception to conclusion.  Secondly CSFs stated in the ISO 27002 
information security management standard are used. This is done in order to determine how 
the TOG framework measures up against an international standard.  ISMS Critical Success 
Factors have been adopted by ISO in the ISO/IEC Code of practice of information security 
management (ISO/IEC, 2005, p. 11). These are applicable to the evaluation of TOG since 
TOG is designed to address management aspects of information security.  
The evaluation of the TOG framework against the Tanzania e-Government Strategy and 
the ISO ISMS CSFs are presented in Table 4 and Table 5 respectively. 
Table 4: Evaluation of TOG against Tanzania e-Government Strategy CSFs 
CRITICAL 
SUCCESS 
FACTOR 
TOG solution 
Political will, 
support and 
commitment 
 
All legislation in Tanzania is passed through the parliament. The Governance pillar of TOG 
which includes legislation enables political leaders to understand the role they need to play to 
have successful information security in e-Government implementation. 
 
Availability of 
HR capacity 
 
TOG addresses HR capacity by its flexible structure that refers to international open 
standards. So there is no need for MDAs to reinvent the wheel where proven standards are 
already in place. In addition, the PDCA implementation process helps the existing HR 
resources to continually check where gaps in implementation are and focus the upgrading of 
skills or looking for new resources on the areas where skills are lacking. 
 
Institutional and 
Legal framework 
 
The TOG governance pillar includes all relevant legislation and organizational policies that 
address how a security requirement is to be met. These are then mapped onto organizational 
plans and procedures in the operational pillar.  
 
Financial 
Resources 
 
TOG is a flexible framework whose ‘plug and play’ of ‘start anywhere’ nature means that the 
technical, operational and governance components to address each security requirement can 
be implemented as and when resources are available within the identified risks acceptance 
level. 
 
Commitment by 
all actors 
 
Implementation of the TOG framework forces the involvement and collaboration of technical 
operational and management staff. Every technical implementation needs to be mapped back 
onto an operational procedure and or governance structure and vice versa. 
 
Sustainable 
Infrastructure 
 
The technical pillar emphasizes the use of open standards, and service oriented architectures 
which address the lack of interoperability that may exist among MDAs. In addition the ‘start 
anywhere’ and flexible approach to implementing TOG means that each MDA can start with 
addressing the requirements in a manner that takes the context of the implementation into 
consideration then build upon that implementation as resources improve, or review and 
change the implementation if necessary. 
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Table 5: Evaluation of TOG against ISMS CSFs 
ISMS CRITICAL SUCCESS FACTORS TOG Solution 
Information security policy, objectives and 
activities aligned with objectives 
TOG addresses information security policies and 
provides for the mapping of those policies to operational 
and technical activities 
An approach and framework for designing, 
implementing, monitoring, maintaining and 
improving information security consistent with the 
organizational culture. 
The TOG framework allows for organizational culture 
especially in the context of Tanzania where often it is not 
possible to have a strictly hierarchical or sequential 
process. TOG allow for various start points in any of the 
pillars and then subsequent mapping to any of the other 
pillars, provided that the security objectives are set in 
advance. 
 
Visible support and commitment from all levels of 
management especially top management 
Implementation of the TOG framework forces the 
involvement of technical operational and management 
staff. 
An understanding of information asset protections 
achieved through the application of information 
security risk management: 
Risk Assessment is provided for in the operational pillar 
of TOG. 
 
An effective information security awareness, 
training and education program information all 
employees and other relevant parties of their 
information security obligations set forth in the 
information security policies, standards etc. etc, 
and motivate them to act accordingly 
Awareness is provided for in the operational pillar of 
TOG. 
An effective information security incident 
management process 
TOG does not address this. Such a process however, can 
be included in the Operational Pillar. 
An effective business continuity management 
approach 
Business continuity management is provided for in the 
TOG framework in order to address the Availability 
security objective. 
A measurement systems used to evaluate 
performance in information security management 
and feedback suggestions for improvement: 
The PDCA cycle approach can be used to implement 
TOG. 
 
 
The evaluation of the TOG framework shows that it is a robust framework since it addressed 
most of the factors in an internationally accepted standard, which is ISO/IEC 27002. At the 
same, it is a sustainable framework for Tanzania as it addresses all the critical success factors 
stated in the Tanzanian e-Government strategy. 
 
6. Conclusion and Further Work 
This paper aimed at answering the research question “How can a cost effective and 
sustainable information security framework for e-Government be developed for Tanzanian 
MDAs?” To answer the question, a framework that identifies security objectives and 
requirements has been presented. The framework, dubbed the TOG framework, consists of 
three pillars, namely governance, operational and technical. Together these pillars allow an 
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MDA to addresses information security comprehensively while at the same time allowing 
flexibility in the implementation to cater for resource and other constraints. The framework is 
sustainable in that it proposes the use of open standards and service oriented architectures 
while meeting any legal or regulatory requirements. TOG also allows a ‘plug and play’ 
approach so that MDAs can start with a solution in any of the pillars for which resources are 
available and then move towards a comprehensive solution by mapping solutions from one 
pillar to another. The framework has been successfully applied to a case study. The 
evaluation of the framework shows that TOG addresses all the CSFs stated in Tanzania’s e-
Government strategy while meeting all except one of the CSFs proposed by the ISO in its 
information security management system standard. This evaluation leads to the conclusion 
that the proposed framework is a robust, sustainable and cost effective framework that is 
applicable to MDAs in Tanzania. The proposed framework adds to the body of knowledge in 
the field of information security as it shows how the Tanzania context of e-Government 
transactions can be addressed. While the mechanisms presented within the framework are 
tried and tested, the framework shows how these can be combined, as and when resources 
allow, going towards a holistic addressing of the information security This is the innovation 
of this approach rather than the government adopting without modification  either a standard 
or copying another countries’ framework. At the same time the framework enables different 
levels in government to address the same requirements through different mechanisms 
depending on their areas of expertise and then provides a means for the others to map these 
onto their initiatives. 
The authors intend to extend the study to determine whether the framework would be 
applicable in the East African Community, as the countries in the EAC have similar 
challenges in terms of information security as those in Tanzania.  
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Abstract: e-Government readiness is the measure by which a 
government is positioned to provide e-services to its citizens. In order to 
achieve e-readiness, governments must among other factors, set up 
efficient collaborations between government agencies. Such 
collaborations should take into consideration information security 
requirements. Our study looks at e-government readiness in three East 
African countries namely, Tanzania, Uganda and Rwanda from an 
Information Security perspective. Data was gathered through 
questionnaires and by reviewing country and regional e-government 
polices, as well as evaluating government agency websites.  The results 
of the study are discussed based on findings by other researches on 
Information Security and or e-government in the East African region. 
Keywords: Information Security, e-Government 
1. Introduction  
e-Government readiness is the extent to which a government has positioned itself to apply 
information and communication technologies to provide better access to and delivery of 
services to citizens, improved interaction with citizens and business, and the empowerment 
of citizens through access to information. In the East African Community (EAC), which 
consists of five countries, that is, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi, various 
initiatives towards delivery of services and citizen participation have been undertaken or are 
in progress. e-Government Policy documents have been drafted in all these countries except 
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Burundi, and various legislations are being introduced in the arena of e-Government and e-
Business[1][6][7][8]. Furthermore an East African e-Government Secretariat has been set up 
to develop regional policies.  
 However according to the UN e-Government Survey of 2008 [1], whereas earlier 
emphasis of e-government was mostly on developing e-services, the focus has shifted 
towards building and managing integrated and coordinated government services. This is 
critical since a lack of coordination in policy decisions and announcements can play a 
considerable role in undermining policy objectives and also weakening the credibility of 
institutions and policies. Furthermore the report states that ICT-based connected governance 
efforts are aimed at improved cooperation between government agencies, allowing for an 
enhanced active and effective consultation and engagement with citizens and a greater 
involvement with multi stakeholders regionally and internationally.  For the case of East 
Africa, since key infrastructure projects are underway such as the Fibre Optic Backbone 
projects in Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda, as well as national ID projects, a good foundation 
is being laid for government agencies and departments to provide integrated services to 
Citizens. This step however requires the addressing of information security, to ensure 
confidentiality and integrity of information passed from one agency to another for the 
purpose of providing a service.   
 The objective of this study was to evaluate e-Readiness in the EAC from an information 
security perspective, based on e-government policy documents, cross agency collaborations 
and government agency websites. Such an evaluation should act as a basis for 
recommendations as to how government agencies can plan for and address information 
security in future.  The remainder of the papers is structured as follows: 
Section 2 gives a brief overview of the information security requirements as indicators of e-
readiness. Section 3 explains the methodology used and presents the results obtained. This is 
followed by a critical analysis of the results with a conclusion and further research in the last 
section. 
 
2. Information Security e-readiness indicators 
The security requirements for e-Government can be considered to be: 
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• Authentication; 
• Privacy; 
• Authorization and Access Control; 
• Data integrity and 
• Trust. 
 The above requirements apply both to transactions between citizens and government 
agencies and also to inter – agency collaborations.  In order to gauge e-readiness from an 
Information Security perspective, the following factors should be evaluated. 
i) The agency should have a information security policy that outlines how and when 
its systems should be accessed, how trust is established and what standards are 
there for ensuring privacy and integrity of data. Furthermore there needs to be an 
enabling environment at country and or regional level in the form of security 
polices statements incorporated in e-government policies. 
ii) The agency should establish standard terminologies for automated transactions to 
ensure that no misunderstandings arise when dealing with another agency, that is, 
semantic interoperability is achieved. 
iii) The context of the transactions should be taken into consideration and in 
particular, risks in the inter-agency collaborations should be identified such as the 
possibility of fraud and network breakdowns. 
iv) The incorporation of security requirements in interfaces with citizens, for 
example, web pages. 
 Our study therefore investigated whether EAC government agencies or departments have 
addressed the above factors. 
3. Methodology and Results 
3.1 Structure of the Study 
The methodology used for this study was Grounded theory [2].  The study was conducted 
between December 2007 and February 2008. Data was collected from three of the five 
countries forming the EAC, namely, Uganda, Tanzania and Rwanda. Information from 
Kenya and Burundi was not obtained because of difficulties in communication at the time the 
data collection was undertaken.  Data was collected from three sources i.e. 
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Government Department websites: A review was done of web sites to investigate services 
offered and any information security related requirements e.g. authentication for e-
services. 
National e-Government policies: A review was done for of e-government and or related 
documents was done with focus on Information Security. 
Questionnaires issued to staff of Government Agencies/ Departments. The agencies included 
in the study were those which as per their operational mandate need to collaborate with 
other agencies in order to provide a service. The questions designed to address 
information security requirements identified by several studies including Bakari 
&Tarimo[3], Chaula et. al[4] both of which were carried out in Tanzania, and from 
Bakari et.al[5] which is written from a developing countries’ perspective.  Questionnaires 
were distributed to Government agencies or departments that typically undertake cross 
agency transactions. 
3.2 Results and Discussion 
3.2.1 Web Sites 
Twelve websites were examined from government departments/ agencies in the three 
countries i.e. 4 each. The Criteria for examining web sites was based on the study by Kaaya 
[6]. The results are represented in Table 1 below: 
Table 1: Websites from EA 
 Country 
Level  ( Adopted from Kaaya [5]) Tanzania Rwanda Uganda 
Initial Level: Web sites are established to provide information 
about government functions and services 
100% 100% 100% 
Intermediate Level: Downloadable forms that can be completed 
and submitted offline are made available on the web site; email 
interaction between government officials and users may also be 
supported.  
 
100% 100% 100% 
Advanced Level: Web sites begin to support some formal online 
transactions such as payments or creating and submitting 
information such as renewing driving license and filing tax 
returns. 
 
25% 25% 25% 
Comprehensive Level: Comprehensive and sophisticated 
government portals are developed to provide a wide range of 
information to users coupled with reliable security / privacy/ 
confidentiality provisions. 
 
0% 0% 0% 
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The results from the table above show that in all three countries although government agency 
web sites are available, they have not yet reached the comprehensive level. Thus government 
agencies need to address how provisions for security, privacy and confidentiality are being 
made in order to efficiently provide a wide range of e-services to citizens through inter 
agency collaborations. 
3.2.2 Review of Policies 
A review of Policy/ Strategy documents related to e-government was undertaken to 
investigate how information security requirements are addressed. The results were as 
follows: 
i) Rwanda: The Rwanda e-Government Policy Report [7] outlines minimum 
standards for security both hardware and software and includes also a 
certification server standard. Furthermore the report states that there shall be a 
root Certificate Authority (CA) to security certificates to government 
agencies. The root CA must be trusted by all other CAs. The report does not 
however state how that trust will be established. 
ii) Uganda: The Uganda e-Government Strategy [8], addresses security under the 
infrastructure component by proposing that a security infrastructure be setup 
for secure online transactions. A PKI infrastructure is mentioned including a 
Certificate Authority. Cross Agency collaboration is mentioned as the last 
phase of the e-government transformation during which agencies will take a 
whole-of-government perspective when designing and implementing services. 
Furthermore, the strategy recognises the need to incorporate, within current 
systems design, the need for among agencies to collaborate in the future. 
iii) Tanzania: The National Information and Communication Technologies Policy 
[9] recognises a need for an e-government infrastructure through which the 
public service (government departments and agencies) can communicate 
internally.  The policy includes statements that address security in terms of 
legal framework and infrastructure. 
iv) East Africa: The Regional e-Government framework [10] recognises security 
as a challenge that needs to be addressed in e-government projects. 
Furthermore, Information Security is recognised as a cross cutting issue and 
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declares that the operational efficiency of any e-government strategy will need 
strong backup support of necessary legislation on data security, network 
security, cyber crime, information systems and electronic transactions.  
It was found that, all the e-government documents mention information security requirements 
for inter agency collaborations, although the factors listed in Section 2 of this paper have not 
been addressed in detail. 
3.2.3 Results obtained from Questionnaires 
Questionnaires were distributed to government agencies with the objective of soliciting 
information about information security practices in cross agency transactions. The 
respondents were managers responsible for technology functions in agencies that engage in 
cross agency transactions by the nature of their work. Twelve questionnaires were sent out 
and eight responses were obtained with 4 responses being from Tanzania, and 2 each from 
Uganda and Rwanda. The questions asked and the responses received are summarized in 
Table 2 below. 
Table 2: Survey Results for Information security in cross-agency transactions 
  
 Country (No of Respondents) 
Question - Response Tanzania 
(4) 
Rwanda (2) Uganda (2) Overall(8) 
Presence of Information Security policy - 
Yes 
75% 100% 100% 87.5% 
Type of cross agency transactions- Manually  100% 100% 100% 87.5% 
Type of cross agency transactions -Email 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Type of cross agency transactions -Access to 
Computer Systems 
50% 0% 50% 37.5% 
Information involved in transactions -
Payment/ Financial 
75% 50% 50% 62.5% 
Information involved in transactions -
Confidential 
75% 50% 100% 87.5% 
Main concerns in cross agency transactions -
Fraud 
100% 0% 50% 87.5% 
Main concerns in cross agency transactions -
Network Breakdowns 
50% 0% 100% 50% 
Security measures such as encryption - Yes 75% 100% 100% 87.5% 
Binding agreements with regards to 
information security with partners  - Yes 
50% 0% 0 50% 
Common format for Data Exchange - Yes 50% 0% 50% 37.5% 
Common terminology for transactions - Yes 0% 0% 50% 12.5% 
Need for standards for cross agency 
transactions - Yes 
100% 100% 100% 100% 
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3.2.4 Discussion 
From the above results the following observations are made: 
• There is no significant difference in results between the three countries. 
• There appears to be a correlation between the presence of an information security 
policy and the use of security for transactions. The agency without a security policy 
has no security measures in place for transactions. 
• Fraud is a major concern in over 50% of the respondents 
• Fraud is a bigger concern than network breakdowns. 
• A need for standards is recognized by all agencies although only 37.5% and 12.5%of 
the respondents have common terminology for transactions and common data format 
exchange respectively. 
• Although in the case of Rwanda the e-government report mentions that requirements/ 
standards of security, the questionnaires returned do not refer to the document, thus 
posing the question of  whether government agency are aware of the standard. 
 
4. Conclusions and Further Work 
The results of our study show that from an Information Security perspective, some steps have 
been taken towards improving e-readiness in the East African community at an agency, 
country and regional level. However the of the factors outlined in section 2 of this paper are 
yet to be fully addressed. It can be concluded that the EAC has not fully reached e-readiness. 
The results of this study can also be related to work done by Rwangoga & Baryayetunga [11] 
who discuss e-Government in Uganda and describe successful delivery on institutional 
frameworks, legal frameworks, and ICT infrastructure.   
In order to enhance e-readiness for an Information Security perspective, the following 
recommendations are made for East African countries:  
i) The establishment of government – wide guidelines that encourage the 
establishment of Information Security policies in all government departments 
and agencies. The policies should address both inter and intra agency 
transactions as well as security requirements for interfaces with citizens. 
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ii) The establishment of Risk Management Frameworks for e-government 
transactions. The risk frameworks should identify risks and how to mitigate 
those risks. 
iii) The establishment of an e-government security ontology for East Africa to 
ensure semantic interoperability. This could be modelled on the e-government 
ontologies that have been developed in the European Union [12] and United 
States[13]. 
In future research, we  plan to look further at the development of a holistic framework 
to address Information Security in e-government. Such a framework would address 
standards, common terms, infrastructure and policies, all from the context of developing 
countries, and in particular, East Africa. 
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ABSTRACT 
Interoperability across heterogeneous domains has become a reality through technologies 
such as Service Oriented Architectures and Web Services. These technologies have been put 
to use in e-Government and e-Business, enabling services to transact without human 
intervention. Such transactions, however, raise security concerns, as a human response to an 
authorization or access request can take into consideration semantics and the context in 
which the request is being made, while a machine to machine decision to grant access  would 
rely on how well the XML based security policies have captured all semantic and contextual 
considerations.  
This paper proposes a context-aware access control framework in a web services 
environment. The framework is based on the Organization for Advancement of Structured 
Information Standards (OASIS) for web services security and access control and extends 
these to include semantic interpretation of security attributes. Furthermore, the framework 
addresses contextual information that would affect an access control decision, in a web 
service transaction, such as legal or regulatory requirements. 
KEY WORDS 
Access Control 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
With any collaboration, it is crucial to have unambiguous communications between the 
collaborators, to ensure that no information is either wrongly withheld or provided based on 
an ambiguous request.  
For Web Service transactions, one way to achieve such communication is the use of a 
semantic framework to provide a basis for interpretation of access control requests depending 
on the context of the transaction within a given domain. Furthermore, where laws and 
regulations exist that govern the transaction, these have to be taken into consideration when 
applying the access control or authorisation policy. The framework would thus include an 
access control mechanism, semantic interpretation of access requests, a context service and a 
repository of relevant laws and regulations. 
The Organisation of Advancement of Structured Information Standards (OASIS) has 
adopted standards such as the Extensible Access Control Markup Language (Oasis 2005a) 
and the Security Assertion Markup Language (Oasis 2005b) to address access control across 
heterogeneous domains. The Extensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) is a 
policy language which uses XML statements to present access control policies while the 
Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) is an XML-based security specification 
schema for exchanging authentication and authorization information. XACML and SAML 
both have extensibility mechanisms which allow them to be used for different 
implementation. Use of these standards alone does not however ensure the correct access 
control decisions in interacting web services. There is a need to ensure that those XML tags 
passed to request access are correctly interpreted in the context of the transaction.  
The use of ontologies in web services has been promoted by the World Wide Web 
Consortium (W3C) which has recommended the Web Ontology Language (OWL) as a 
general ontology for the semantic web (W3C, 2004). OWL is based on the Resource 
Description Framework (RDF) schema which was an earlier specification from W3C. The 
ontology serves the purpose of clearly defining terms that are used in a transaction, and 
enables a semantic evaluation of terms to determine similar meaning. Specific ontologies 
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based on OWL or RDF have been proposed by Ceravolo (2003), Domingue et.al. (2004), and 
Dritsas et.al.(2005) for the e-Government domain. 
For a specific ontology to be used, the context of the transaction must be taken into 
consideration. Context defines the conditions that must or must not hold in order for an 
authorisation policy to apply (McDaniel, 2003). Contextual information may include the 
location of the requester and the provider of the service or the time when the transaction is 
taking place. For transactions that are taking place in an E-Government or E-Business 
environment, the legal context may also be necessary. All contextual information needs to be 
captured and combined so as to act as input into the access control decision. 
This paper presents a framework that comprises of a context service, ontological 
mapping mechanism and a legal repository which together with extended markup languages, 
support correct access control decisions in interacting web services. The remainder of the 
paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes existing access control models for web 
services. Section 3 proposes a context –aware framework while section 4 looks at related 
work in this area and we conclude and look at further work in Section 6. 
 
2 ACCESS CONTROL IN WEB SERVICE TRANSACTIONS 
A major requirement of an access control model for web services is the handling of the 
dynamic nature of the transactions. Web services interact across disparate computing 
platforms, in different geographical locations and with different regulatory compliance 
requirements. In subsequent sub sections, we describe some access control models that have 
been proposed or implemented for web services. 
 
2.1 Role Based Access Control (RBAC) 
RBAC uses roles as a basis for access control decisions and was designed specifically with 
enterprise organisation structure in mind. RBAC allows the specification of security roles 
that map naturally to an organisation’s authorisation structures. However RBAC does not 
entirely suit web service transactions and its weakness in open environments were identified 
by De Capitani di Vimercati and Samarati (2005).  Several studies have subsequently been 
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done to extend the RBAC model in order to address some of the weaknesses (Demchenko 
et.al, 2007). 
 
2.2 Attribute Based Access Control ABAC  
In recent years, there has been a shift to looking at attributes as a basis for access control in a 
web services environment. (Coetzee and Eloff, 2007; Damaini et. al, 2005; Shen and Hong, 
2006; Yuan and Tong, 2005). Attributes describe the characteristics of the requester, and may 
be a combination of identity and role. Attributes may be subject attributes, resource attributes 
or environment attributes. The ABAC model comprises of an Attribute Authority, Policy 
Enforcement Point, Policy Decision Point and Policy Authority. 
It has been recognized that there is still a need for the usage of semantics and or 
ontologies to ensure correct access control decisions with the ABAC model, and some 
research to that end has been done. (Preibe et.al; 2006; Warner et.al, 2007). 
 
2.3 Context Aware Access Control 
Both RBAC and ABAC paradigms do provide ways to include contextual information 
(Bacon et.al, 2002; Huselboch et.al., 2005; Strembeck and Neumann, 2004). However other 
access control models that focus primarily on context  have been proposed. These include:  
2.3.1 Governance Based Access Control 
The idea as presented by the Centre for Governance Institute (2005) is that transactions in 
which information is shared must be governed by the relevant legislation to which the 
organizations sharing the information are accountable. Thus any request for information is 
checked against the existing laws or regulations before it is granted. 
2.3.2 Session Based Access Control (SBAC) 
In session based access control, the context of a transaction is limited to a session. Access to 
resources is based on the attributes of the subjects and the properties of the objects but the 
rights that can be applied at a given time are limited based on the context defined by the 
access session (Fernandez and Pernul, 2006) 
2.3.3. Location-Based Access Control (LBAC) 
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LBAC takes requester's physical location into account when determining their access 
privileges. The physical location may be combined with other attributes related to identity or 
role of the requester. Ardagna et.al (2006) propose combining location with user credentials 
to support access control decisions. 
 
3 PROPOSED FRAMEWORK 
In order to achieve correct access control decisions in the context of a web service 
transaction, we propose a framework based on the ABAC model. The proposed framework is 
illustrated in Figure 1 below: 
 
 
 
Each of the components of the framework works as follows: 
i) Policy Authority 
The policy authority contains the Policy Decision Point (PDP) and Policy enforcement points 
that evaluate the requester's attributes against the providers XACML policy. In order to 
evaluate the compliance with legal requirements XACML is extended to include a function 
that accepts environment attributes and compares against relevant laws and regulations 
within the legal repository. This operation will be stated as a XACML obligation in the 
Policy Authority Attribute 
Authority 
Ontology 
Mapping Service 
Context 
Service 
Figure 1: Conceptual Framework 
Legal repository 
Provider (Web 
Service) 
Requester (Web 
Service) 
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Provider’s policy. If there is no legal requirement for a particular transaction, then the request 
is granted provided the other requirements of the policy are met.  
ii) Attribute Authority 
The attribute authority issues SAML assertions to the requester. The attribute assertions 
correspond to the subject, resource and environmental attributes of the requester. If there is a 
legal requirement on the requester’s side that has to be complied with, this requirement is 
passed in a SAML condition statement. 
iii) Ontological mapping service 
The ontological mapping services checks the semantics of the requester’s attributes match 
with those in the provider’s policy. A mechanism to conduct such a mapping has been 
described by Patil et.al (2007).  If unknown vocabularies are used, ontology mediators may 
be used (Kolter, et.al, 2007). 
iv)  Legal repository  
The legal repository contains laws and regulations that apply to different transactions. The 
legal repository contains the conditions in which a transaction is considered legal or illegal. 
The legal repository is a database which with several indexes to allow multiple matching by 
the Context Service. 
v) Context Service 
 The context service is a key element of the framework and is adapted from Lei et.al. (2002). 
The role of the context service is to combine the results from the ontological mapping 
mechanism and the legal repository into an environmental attribute that is then passed to the 
attribute authority for authorisation and access control decisions to be made. To illustrate 
how the framework could be applied, consider the following illustrative example: 
A request for information is made in a criminal investigation where a national of 
Country A is suspected of committing a crime in Country B; and the suspected criminal is 
now in resident in Country C. In order for the service in Country C to decide whether to 
authorise access to the information the following requirements must be met:  
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• The penalty for the crime in Country C must be evaluated against the penalty 
for the crime in country A. If conviction may result in a death penalty, then 
Country C must refuse to provide information. 
• The crime committed in Country B must be interpreted in the context of the 
laws of country C. 
• Laws of country A must be examined to see if they have any relevance in the 
crime and or penalty for the crime 
Thus for this example the service provider would need access to a legal repository of 
the countries’ laws and also to the ontological mapping mechanism to make semantic 
comparisons as to whether or not all necessary conditions to grant the requested information 
hold. 
4 Related work 
There are various studies that have been done in relation to context – aware and or semantic 
– aware authorisation and access control. The studies that are pointed out below are those 
that address context in access control decisions with some reference to semantics.  
Demchenko et al. (2007) use XACML to handle policy and base on RBAC with a 
Domain Resource Management model.  The study argues that domain based access control 
provides several benefits including dynamic context management. However interpretation of 
attributes is not addressed by the study. Toninelli et.al (2006) also draw inspiration from the 
RBAC model and associate the context in which a subject transacts directly with the role that 
the subject plays in that transaction. 
Hu and Weaver (2006) look at the healthcare domain and provide a formal definition of 
context and context constraints.  The definition of context is restricted to time, location, user 
type, object type and object ID. Context is built into the policy language and WS policy is 
used for the implementation. 
Kolter et al. (2007) describe a semantic aware security architecture which includes an 
ontological mapping mechanism. The architecture is based on the ABAC model, but does not 
specifically address how contextual attributes would be handled.  
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Our work, as presented in Section 3 above, takes into consideration both semantics and 
contextual information with emphasis on legal requirements.  
 
5  Conclusion and Further Work 
We have presented a framework that comprises of a context service, ontological mapping 
mechanism and a legal repository which together with extended markup languages support 
corrects access control decisions in interacting web services. The inclusion of a legal 
repository make the framework especially useful for e-Government or e-Business 
transactions that take place across two or more legal domains where different regulations 
may apply to the transaction. Thus combine with the ontologically mapping mechanism that 
address semantic interpretation of attributes, the framework lays a basis for correct access 
control decisions based on the context of the transaction. 
Future work shall include formalising a model based on the proposed framework and 
evaluating the framework in against requirements for access control architectures (Keromytis 
and Smith, 2007) when the framework is implemented in a practical setting. 
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Abstract: Developing countries are increasingly undertaking e-
government initiatives in order to provide more efficient and cost-
effective services to citizens. Such initiatives involve collaboration 
within government agencies and with other organisations in order to 
access information and to exchange data for transactions. One of the 
issues that need to be addressed in any e-Government initiative is 
Information Security. The Organization for the Advancement of 
Structured Information Standards (OASIS), a non-profit International 
consortium, that drives the development and adoption of e-business 
standards, adopted the Security Assertion Markup Language Version 
2.0 in March 2005 (SAML V2.0). SAML is an XML-based framework 
for exchanging security assertions about authentication, authorization 
and attributes. SAML is particularly suited to e-Government 
transactions because it is platform independent and can be used with 
other security related technologies such as PKI, Smartcards and 
Biometrics in order to provide end to end security for transactions in an 
e-Government collaboration. This paper discusses a proposed SAML 
implementation in an e-government setting with specific focus on 
pensions administration. 
Keywords: e Government, Security, Web Services, Access Control    
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1. Introduction  
The concept of e-Government has been greatly enabled by advances in Internet related 
technologies and has been pushed by the need of Governments to provide efficient, effective, 
affordable and quick services to citizens.  In order to provide e-Government services 
information security is one aspect that needs to be addressed. While developing countries are 
making steady progress in terms of building infrastructure and providing access to digital 
information and services to their citizens, it is important that measures to ensure the security 
of that information are taken as part of any e-Government initiative. 
 
The security requirements for e-Government that are considered in this paper are  
• Authentication; 
• Privacy; 
• Authorization and Access Control; 
• Data integrity and 
• Trust. 
The objective of this work is to illustrate how SAML v2.0 can be used to meet the 
security requirements in an e-Government implementation using the case of pensions 
administration. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 outlines the motivation for 
this work; Section 3 contains an overview of related work on information security in e-
Government followed by a brief overview of SAML V2.0, in Section 4.  The fifth section 
describes how the Security Assertion Markup Language can be used to meet the e-
government security requirements. Section 6 illustrates the usage of SAML in the processing 
of a benefit by a pensions administrator in collaboration with other government agencies. 
Section 7 outlines the limitations of the proposed implementation in meeting all security 
requirements that are envisaged for an e-government setting. The paper concludes with a 
summary. 
 
2. Motivation 
In most developing countries, Governments are faced with resource constraints in providing 
services to citizens. While e-Government is a tool that can promote better and more efficient 
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services, it is also expensive and requires good planning. In East Africa, for example, a 
regional e-Government framework has been drafted [1] but implementation of the various 
initiatives has been slow.   The measure of how ready a country is for E-government is based 
on criteria such as connectivity, political priorities, information security, human capital and 
e-Business climate. The implementation of a platform independent standard such as SAML is 
a way to reduce the cost of addressing the information security component of an e-
Government initiative and thus contributing to the success of an e-Government 
implementation. 
3 Related Work 
Several studies have been done in relation to security requirements in an e-government 
setting. The areas of research include general approaches to security requirements 
engineering, architectures for trust models and security management. Kalloniatis [2] analyses 
frameworks for security requirement engineering in e-government applications and 
concludes that the current frameworks do not adequately cater for security requirements for 
users to keep information safe and secure. 
Specific projects in the e-government arena have been described such as the eMayor 
project where Oikonomidis et.al [3] propose a trust model for web service interaction among 
different government agencies. Within the same eMayor project, Meneklis et.al [4], describes 
the use of SAML for identity management, so as to provide standardized administration and 
transfer of authentication attributes by embedding them in SOAP messages. Arcieiri et.al [5] 
proposes an architecture for communication of digital personal data amongst government 
agencies, although the approach here uses PKI rather than SAML. 
This paper describes how the Security Assertion Markup Language, in itself, and together 
with other technologies can be used to address the security requirements for e-government. 
3 An Overview of SAML V2.0 
The Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards (OASIS), a non-
profit International consortium, that drives the development and adoption of e-business 
standards, adopted the Security Assertion Markup Language Version 2.0 in March 2005 
(SAML V2.0). SAML is an XML-based framework for exchanging security assertions about 
authentication, authorization and attributes. SAML defines the syntax and processing 
semantics of assertions made about a subject by a system entity [6]. 
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An assertion is defined as a piece of data regarding either an act of authentication 
performed on a subject, attribute information about the subject, or authorization data 
applying to the subject with respect to a specified resource [6]. Assertions are produced by a 
SAML authority, which is an abstract system entity in the SAML domain model. The user or 
web service requesting assertions from the SAML authority is called the Requester. These 
assertions are then used in communicating with an entity called a Responder, who utilises 
those SAML assertions to respond appropriately to the Requester. 
SAML assertions are of three kinds i.e. Authentications, Attribute and Authorization 
Decision. In a web services environment, SAML assertions may be carried within a SOAP 
message. Other than assertions, SAML is also composed of protocols, bindings and profiles. 
Protocols allow service providers to request for assertions, request for authentication and to 
request for name identifier registration and mapping.  Bindings are the mappings from 
SAML request-response message exchanges into standard messaging or communication 
protocols such as SOAP and HTTP. A profile of SAML defines constraints and/or extensions 
in support of the usage of SAML for a particular application [7]. SAML V2.0 comes as an 
improvement on SAML 1.1, by incorporating new attribute profiles and metadata 
specifications to improve communications among businesses in a federation. In particular, 
SAML V2.0 provides Convergence,  Federated Identifier Management, Privacy Mechanisms 
and Session Management as additional functionality [8]. 
4 Application of SAML V2.0 
SAML V2.0 addresses the security requirements for an e- government setting as outlined 
in Section 1 above, in the following manner: 
• Authentication: A SAML authentication assertion, simply asserts that authentication 
was indeed provided by the service requestor, the method of authentication used, and 
who did the authentication. An authentication services such as LDAP has to provide 
the actual authentication. For example, the following portion of an  assertion: 
<saml:AuthnStatement   AuthnInstant=2006-04-12T16:57:30.000Z”> 
indicates the time and date of an assertion; while 
<saml:AuthnContext><saml:AuthnContextClassRef> 
urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:ac:classes:Kerberos 
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indicates that the authentication was done through a local server in order to acquire a 
Kerberos ticket for subsequent use. 
• Privacy: SAML V2.0 defines how pseudonyms can be used between providers to 
represent the entity that has been authenticated. This is achieved through the NameID 
element. In addition, SAML includes mechanisms to allow providers to communicate 
privacy policy and settings 
• Authorization and Access Control: SAML authorization decision assertions indicate 
what resources the subject is allowed to access. Furthermore, SAML attribute 
assertions may be used to describe the role that the subject hold in the context of the 
particular transaction. For example: 
<saml:AuthzDecisionStatement 
Resource=”http://civilregistry.go.tz/birthdateregister.html” 
Decision=”Permit”> 
<saml:Action>GET</saml:Action></saml:AuthzDecisionStatement> 
indicates that permission has been granted to access web page birthdateregister.html. 
An example of an attribute assertion would be: 
<saml:AttributeStatement><saml:Attribute> 
NameFormat=http://pensions123.co.tz Name=”MemberType” 
<saml:AttributeValue> pensioner </saml:Attribute> 
</saml:Attribute></saml:AttributeStatement> 
• Data Integrity:  In SAML implementations, it is possible to confirm that data 
integrity has not been compromised, that is, a given message has not been altered 
during transmission. This is done through the use of XML signatures, and additional 
security related technologies such as PKI. Furthermore network protocols such as 
IPSec and RFC2246 can be used to secure SAML traffic. 
• Trust: Trust is achieved by using a separate authority (trusted third party) to issue 
security tokens which are acceptable to all parties. In the case of a SAML 
implementation, the trusted authority would issue SAML assertions to confirm the 
authenticity and access rights for the service requester.  
5 SAML Implementation 
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The case used to illustrate the use of SAML is the processing of a death/ survivors 
pension. In many developing countries, mandatory pensions are governed by law and 
administered directly by Government or through Government Agencies. Pensions 
Administrators typically handle large volumes of confidential data and fraud is a common 
problem, with a high proportion of fraud resulting from claims for benefits based on forged 
information.  
Web services are increasingly being adopted in pensions administration [9,10]. The use of 
web services enables Pensions Administrators to reduce human intervention in the processing 
of claims and to reduce the dependence on documents submitted by the intended beneficiary, 
thus reducing the possibility of fraud. These transactions require interaction between several 
external agencies and thus there arises a need to have trusted ways to provide identification, 
authentication and authorization for the users and or services that access the data.  
In the implementation of SAML, the agencies involved need a trusted third party, also 
called a SAML authority to issue SAML assertions. In order for the Pensions Administrator’s 
web service to access the web services and servers of the other agencies, the Pensions 
Administrator must have valid authentication and the appropriate authorizations. Rather than 
negotiate for access permissions with each of the agencies individually, the Pensions 
Administrator would request for assertions from the SAML authority who is trusted by all the 
other agencies. In an e-Government setting, this could be the agency that regulates the 
Financial and Pensions Industry. 
The trusted third party would produce the SAML assertions to be issued to the Pensions 
Administrator and perform the initial authentication for the Pensions Administrator. Trust 
between the third party and each of the collaborating agencies would be pre-established. The 
trust relationship could be both credential and reputation based [11]. Figure 1 below shows 
how a death (survivors) benefit would be processed. 
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The assertions issued to the Pensions Administrator would be passed from service to 
service, with the role changing if necessary, through the use of Attribute Assertions,  for each 
interaction. For example, the role of the Pension Administrator when interacting with the 
Civil Registry is different from the role with the Bank. With the Civil Registry, the Pension 
Administrator would simply be performing an enquiry on the data, while with the Bank, the 
Pension Administrator should be able to authorise a transfer of funds from one account to 
another. The assertions for the Death/ Survivors benefit scenario could be as shown in table 1 
below. 
 
 
 
 
 
SAML  
Authority 
(Trusted Third Party) 
4. Request confirmation of death 
5. Confirmation of Death 8. Pay Benefit  
9. Notify of payment 
Employer 
1. Notify of death 
 
Civil Registry Tax Agency Bank 
Beneficiary 
2.
R
eq
ue
st 
fo
r A
ss
er
tio
ns
 
7. R
em
it tax deductions  
  9. Notify of payment 
 
3. Issue A
ssertions 
 
Pensions  
Administrator 
6. Process Benefit 
Figure 1 Death Benefit Scenario 
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Table 1. Assertions issued to Pensions Administrator in Death Benefit Scenario 
 
Responder 
Assertion 
Authentication Attribute Authorization Decision 
Civil 
Registry 
Office 
Pensions Administrator 
is identified as a trusted 
client who can access 
the local server of the 
Civil Registry office 
The role of the Pensions 
Administrator is an Enquirer i.e. 
can  query the Death register in 
order to confirm details as 
submitted by the employer. 
Permit access to Death 
Register  
Tax 
Agency 
Pensions Administrator 
is identified as a trusted 
client who can access 
the local server of the 
Tax Agency 
The role of the Pensions 
Administrator is a Tax Payer i.e. 
can transfer deductions from 
benefits into the Tax Agency 
Account 
Permit execution of 
transfer to payment to 
Tax Agency account 
Bank Pensions Administrator 
is identified as a trusted 
client who can access 
the local server of the 
Bank 
The role of the Pensions 
Administrator is a bank client i.e. 
can transfer benefit payments into 
beneficiary accounts. 
Permit execution of 
transfer from Pensions 
Administrator’s 
Account into 
Beneficiary’s account. 
 
In particular, the interaction between the Pensions Administrator and the Civil Registry could 
be achieved as illustrated in the SAML code below: 
<saml:Assertion xmlns:saml="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion" Version="2.0"    
IssueInstant="2006-04-12T17:20:32"> 
<saml:Issuer>http://authority.go.tz/</saml:Issuer><ds:Signature>.</ds:Signature> 
<saml:Subject><saml:NameID format="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:nameid-
format:persistent"> pension123 </saml:NameID></saml:Subject> 
<saml:AuthnStatement AuthnInstant="2006-04-12T17:21:00" 
SessionIndex="1000001"> 
<saml:AuthnContext><saml:AuthnContextClassRef> 
urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:ac:classes:PasswordProtectedTransportKerberos 
 </saml:AuthnContextClassRef></saml:AuthnContext> 
 </saml:AuthnStatement> 
<saml:AttributeStatement><saml:Attribute> NameFormat=”http://civilregistry.go.tz”      
Name=”ClientType” <saml:AttributeValue>       Enquirer   </saml:AttributeValue> 
 </saml:Attribute></saml:AttributeStatement> 
<saml:AuthzDecisionStatement  
Resource="http://civilregistry.go.tz/deathregister.html" 
Decision="Permit"><saml:Action>  GET  </saml:Action> 
</saml:AuthzDecisionStatement> 
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</saml:Assertion> 
6 Limitations  
The SAML implementation proposed in this paper, assumes that there exists a pre-
established trust framework between the Government agencies involved in the e-Government 
transaction. Furthermore, the implementation only addresses agency to agency collaborations 
through web services, and not how the citizen shall finally receive the service. In order to 
fully address trust issues, an extension to SAML could be developed, based on a trust model 
described by Thomas A. and Venter L. [12], for the establishment of a trust relationship 
between a user and a complex web service. Other approaches to trust establishment have 
been described in various studies [13, 14]. Furthermore, SAML can be extended to cover 
various scenarios as described by Bertino and Squicciarini [15] for partial authorisations, and 
by Canovas [16] for handling non- SAML complaint credentials. Additional authentication 
mechanisms could be implemented for the human to service interfaces such as Biometrics.  
 
7 Conclusion 
A successful e-Government implementation requires the confidence of the key users of e-
government systems, that is, citizens and service providers (government agencies). Such 
confidence can be obtained through providing secure transactions in a trusted environment. 
SAML v2.0 as described in this paper, addresses the security requirements for e-government, 
in itself or together with other technologies. As a standard, SAML would provide a platform 
independent and proven way to implement information security requirements in an e-
government initiative. 
 
For developing countries, e-Government initiatives can be boosted through the use of a 
standard such as SAML to address Information Security requirements. Further work however 
needs to be done to incorporate the proposed SAML implementation into a framework based 
on existing information security policies of government agencies and placed in the context of 
existing legal and regulatory requirements with regards to information security. 
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